First of all, the cover of this book as well as its title are both misleading. This book isn't just about relations between Tony Blair and George Bush per se. It is broader than that, encompassing relations amongst the big 4 allies, actually: Germany, France, Britain & the USA---pretty much ignoring Italy, Turkey, and other NATO allies. A more accurate title of this book would have been entitled something like: "The Collapse of Consensus: Euro-American Relations & the War in Iraq." There's nothing new in this book, however, but it does provide a rather concise summary of how heretofore Allied consensus ran aground over the shoals of whether to employ force against Saddam Hussein or not. Most involved were of the opinion, after all, that Saddam was a brutal dictator and that he was bucking the authority of the United Nations. Some just refused to countenance the use of force to do anything about it. A little history: UN Resolution #678 was adopted in 1990 authorizing all member states "to use all necessary means" to enforce the removal of Saddam's army from Kuwait "and to restore international peace and security in the area." Once such was accomplished, Saddam formally accepted ceasefire terms---codified under UN Resolution #687 in 1991---that he unconditionally give up all his chemical & biological weapons capability/stocks/development. Quoting Mr. Shawcross: "In March 2003, not one of the fifteen members [of the UN Security Council] doubted that Iraq was still in breach of all the relevant, binding Council resolutions since 678." (Incidentially, the word "binding" herein refers to the fact that Security Council resolutions are enforceable, unlike General Assembly resolutions---against Israel, for instance---which are purely political & NOT binding. So the double standard some see herein is but a canard.) Back to the above, it is not just the author's opinion that everyone was in agreement. You have only to consult the unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 (November 9, 2002) which threatened "serious consequences" for Iraq if it did not utilize this one last chance. France & Germany both voted for this resolution & 4 months later both continued to caution against calling "time's up" for Iraq to fully comply. French Foreign Minister Dominique De Villepin argued that "Everyone is faced with the choice of disarming Saddam Hussein peacefully or by force." To which, said Jack Straw, his British counterpart: "Dominique, that's a false choice. The choice, Dominique, is not ours as to how this disarmament takes place. The choice is Saddam Hussein's." A little more time, and a little more time, and a little more time, of course, accounted for the fact that Saddam had strung out the UN over this for over a decade up to this point. Listen to this view: "If we fail to respond today, Saddam, and all those who would follow in his footsteps, will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity, even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council, and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program." So said Bill Clinton in 1998. Unfortunately it took September 11th to bring this issue to a head---and not because Saddam hard a hand therein, but because such made it then too dangerous a gamble anymore to let Saddam's unrenounced desire to use and/or develope---or transfer---chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons. September 11, you could consequently say, allowed the neoconservative view of pre-emption to gain traction; being expressed by the likes of Tony Blair, Jack Straw, & George Bush, as well by leaders in Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Australia, Bulgaria, Portugal, Holland, et al. Others, of course, preferrred the status quo, believing that September 10th thinking was still supportable in a post 9/11 world. Thanks for reading my review. Cheers!