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Between 1995 and 1998, Robert S. McNamara led a series of blunt conversations between American and Vietnamese scholars and officials. "The discussions were frank and tough throughout, as befits the first-ever discussion by former enemies of this tragic war," writes McNamara, author of the controversial bestseller
In Retrospect and the U.S. secretary of defense from 1961 to 1968. "Had this dialogue occurred in real time, rather than in retrospect, I believe the tragedy could have been prevented." That's probably an overstatement, but it's a useful starting point for this inquiry, in which many contributors probe the causes of the war and try to draw lessons from them.
The structure of Argument Without End is unconventional, with McNamara writing introductions and conclusions to most of the chapters, which sometimes read like excerpts of transcripts and often like pieces of analytical history. Readers will get the sense of observing a graduate-level seminar on the war, with some of its most knowledgeable participants and critics making presentations. The result is a provocative text eager to challenge assumptions. McNamara's presence hangs over everything--this really is his book, despite the numerous coauthors sharing credit--and his sense of optimism is eerie. "Both Hanoi and Washington could have accomplished their purposes without the appalling loss of life," he writes. A statement like that shows 20/20 hindsight, yet it's an awfully candid remark from a man who had much to do with America's humiliation in Southeast Asia. This is an important contribution to our understanding of that terrible conflict. --John J. Miller
From Publishers Weekly
Erroneous mindsets, mutual ignorance and misunderstandings between Washington and Hanoi drove the escalation of of the Vietnam War, concludes former Secretary of Defense McNamara in a challenging report full of revelations both fascinating and appalling. Based on six sets of talks held in Hanoi between 1995 and 1998 that brought together U.S. and Vietnamese scholars, policy makers and former military officers, this major reappraisal of the war is presented as a critical oral history. Among the meetings participants were McNamara, Nicholas Katzenbach (former deputy secretary of state), General Vo Nguyen Giap (ex-North Vietnamese defense minister) and Vietnams retired foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach. During the talks, McNamara writes, he was amazed to learn that Hanoi saw U.S. peace initiatives as part of a sinister plot to establish a permanent colonial regime in Saigon. Washington, misperceiving North Vietnam as a communist puppet bent on conquering all of Southeast Asia, let a mind-boggling number of opportunities slip by that might have averted war or brought a negotiated settlement. We learn that elements within Hanois top leadership wanted to accept a neutral Saigon coalition government; we are told that key escalation points (e.g., the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin attack) were not ordered by Hanoi to target Americans, as Washington assumed, but were decentralized decisions made for essentially local reasons. While it would be easy to dismiss this book as a self-flagellating exercise in hindsight, its unprecedented testimony by key players on both sides makes it an invaluable sequel to McNamaras 1995 bestseller, In Retrospect. Photos not seen by PW.
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.
