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Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing (Anglais) Broché – 7 juin 2007


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Descriptions du produit

Revue de presse

This refreshingly iconoclastic book awakens us all to how little we know about financial markets, and how much we have to discover. I particularly enjoyed the reference to the emperor's clothes worn by the mutual fund industry. Shefrin's clear reaffirmation of the fallibility of professional investors will lead even the most impressionable of investors to consider, yet again, the advantages of market indexing strategies.--John Bogle, Founder and Senior Chairman, The Vanguard Group, and author, Common Sense on Mutual Funds

This book helps readers recognize, and avoid, bias and errors in their financial decisions, and modify and, it is hoped, improve their overall investment strategies. (JP Morgan Private Bank Annual Summer Reading List.)

Behavioral finance is about normal people and the markets that drive them crazy. Shefrin's insights into these people and markets will provide you with solutions to many financial puzzles--as you read the book and long after you close it.--Meir Statman, Glenn Klimek Professor of Finance, Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University

Beyond Greed and Fear challenges your most fundamental assumptions about investing and uncovers psychological traps that may prevent you from achieving higher returns on your portfolio.--Martin S. Fridson, Managing Director, Merrill Lynch & Co., and author, How to Be a Billionaire

Shefrin synthesizes a wealth of research and observations about human behavior and financial anomalies into a broad and deep perspective on financial markets. No other book so splendidly lays out the fundamentals of behavioral finance.--Robert Shiller, Stanley B. Resor Professor of Economics, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Beyond Greed and Fear is the first truly comprehensive behavioral finance book written for practitioners. It should be required reading for portfolio managers and traders.--W. Van Harlow III, President and CIO, Strategic Advisors, Fidelity Investments

Most books about financial markets overlook the human element--a serious omission since people matter on Wall Street as well as on Main Street. Beyond Greed and Fear is a fine examination of the budding field of behavioral finance. I recommend it to anyone who intends to trade with other human beings, or who is a human being.--Richard H. Thaler, Robert P. Gwinn Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago

Financial practitioners, argues the author, must acknowledege and understand behavioral finance in order to avoid many of the investment pitfalls caused by human error.--Business Horizons

One edition of this work should be in every investment collection--CHOICE, H. Mayo

Présentation de l'éditeur

This book provides a comprehensive treatment of behavioural finance. With the use of the latest psychological research, Shefrin helps us to understand the human behaviour that guides stock selection, financial services, and corporate financial strategy. He argues that financial practitioners must acknowledge and understand behavioural finance - the application of psychology to financial behaviour - in order to avoid many of the investment pitfalls caused by human error. Shefrin points out the common but costly mistakes that money managers, security analysts, financial planners, investment bankers, and corporate leaders make, so that readers gain valuable insights into their own financial decisions and those of their employees, asset managers, and advisors.


Détails sur le produit

  • Broché: 368 pages
  • Editeur : OUP USA; Édition : 1 (7 juin 2007)
  • Collection : Financial Management Association Survey and Synthesis Series
  • Langue : Anglais
  • ISBN-10: 0195304217
  • ISBN-13: 978-0195304213
  • Dimensions du produit: 23,4 x 3,3 x 15,5 cm
  • Moyenne des commentaires client : 3.5 étoiles sur 5  Voir tous les commentaires (2 commentaires client)
  • Classement des meilleures ventes d'Amazon: 93.997 en Livres anglais et étrangers (Voir les 100 premiers en Livres anglais et étrangers)
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3 internautes sur 3 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile  Par Nom le 18 mai 2002
Format: Relié Achat vérifié
Une théorie entre trois actes sur la perception de l'évolution des marchés, l'influence de celle-ci sur les marchés et la subjectivité du risque tel que perçu. Enfin tout cela est psychologique n'est-ce pas? On pense aussi à la reflexivité, autre théorie récente. Pas trop facile à lire cependant. mais de nombreux exemples en rendent la lecture agréable et instructive.
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1 internautes sur 1 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile  Par Christophe FAURIE VOIX VINE le 29 juin 2010
Format: Relié
La théorie économique classique veut que les marchés soient rationnels. L'auteur s'évertue à démontrer le contraire. Notamment en observant des marchés qui dépendent de très peu de paramètres, or, quand ces paramètres sont figés, les prix peuvent néanmoins être victimes de réelles danses de Saint-Gui, c'est la "non rationalité" humaine qui entre en jeu.
Pas besoin d'être un expert pour lire ce livre, mais il est quand même quelque peu indigeste.
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Amazon.com: 23 commentaires
63 internautes sur 66 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
Pushing Too Far? 30 mars 2001
Par J. Michael Gallipo - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Relié
In Beyond Fear and Greed, Mr. Shefrin has written a fairly interesting account of the advances in behavioral finance. He draws heavily on previously published research (although often published in fairly esoteric sources), so people searching for lots of new insights will probably be disappointed. That said, Mr. Shefrin covers most of the common biases that we are prone to including mental accounting, loss aversion, trend following and the like. If a reader doesn't see him or herself in at least some of his illustrations, I suspect he is not being honest with himself.
My major problem is that in some instances I think Mr. Shefrin engages in his own form of hindsight bias. For example, in his account of wall street strategists' market predictions I think he finds his bias after he knows the results. If the market had a strong year previously and the strategist predicted another strong year and was proved wrong, then he was guilty of trend following. If however, the same strategist predicted a weak market and proved to be wrong, then he was guilty of gambler's fallacy (mean reversion). So basically either choice represents bias IF YOU ARE WRONG. And yet, just because you are right does not change the mental processes that went into your decision.
However, despite the weaknesses of this book, overall it provides much food for thought for any serious investor and is probably worth at least a quick read.
87 internautes sur 95 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
A slow waltz through the psychology of investing 18 avril 2000
Par Bruce_in_LA - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Relié Achat vérifié
This book has a good heart, but I can't recommend it so highly. The author takes several classical cognitive mistakes that humans make (some will recognize the classic names of Kahnemann and Tversky; they are one of the substrates of this book). The author applies such mistakes to a wide range of investment problems - holding on to losing stocks too long, anthropomorphizing stock decisions, and so on. The sort of psychology that makes you think that a coin that has flipped tails three times now has a 95% chance of flipping heads on the next toss. Most intelligent readers (the sort that buy Harvard Press books) could get the same points in a much briefer format, like a book chapter or a 10-page article. For example, people tend not to save enough for retirement because the future seems a long time away and they think they'll catch up and it will work out. Well, yes. Next?
18 internautes sur 18 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
A good Overview of the Subject 21 mai 2001
Par NYC - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Relié
Mr. Sherfin has written an entertaining, yet scholarly overview of the subject. It is pitched at the practitioner rather than the layman, so anyone wanting detailed financial planning advice or quick fire trading ideas is going to be disappointed. What you do get however is a fascinating insight into the reasons that long-term stock market anomalies continue to exist, and the forms that they take. This should finally bury the idea that markets are efficient.
A couple of beefs though; firstly, as Sherfin points out several times "investors learn slowly" in yet most of the time series he quotes seem to be 3 to 10 years - statistically pretty insignificant in making generalizations about market behavior. Secondly, while he is rightly cynical about he money management industry (and does a good job at exposing some of its less creditable tricks), he at once dismisses active money management - "a combination of private interests and behavioral phenomena provide the basis for the existence of this active segment" - and then goes on to document the success of Fuller & Thaler Asset Management in producing considerable excess return. So which is it Mr.Sherfin?
33 internautes sur 38 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
Selective Presentation of the Evidence 25 juin 2005
Par Herbert Gintis - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Relié Achat vérifié
I am a behavioral economist with a deep belief in the notion that human decision-makers deviate in important ways from the scientific principles laid down in modern rational choice theory. There is no doubt but that very many investors hold erroneous notions of the dynamics of price movements, and having a correct understanding will, on average lead to better returns on one's portfolio. Sheffrin presents the evidence for this position in an interesting and accessible manner.

Shefrin's main advice for investors is absolutely correct, and would improve the asset positions of many poor souls with idiotic notions of stock dynamics. His advice is that if you are not a gifted and dedicated stock expert, you should invest in a low-maintenance cost array of mutual funds, and above all, do not churn your stocks. It doesn't help to be smart, lucky, a stud with the girls, or blessed by God. Moreover, if you think you have one of the "gifted analysts" for a broker, you are to be counted as among the suckers who are never given an even break.

Shefrin has another thesis which he presents with great verve, but which is on very shakey grounds. This is that "gifted stock analysts" can on average, significantly out-perform the market. He believes this MUST be the case if a significant fraction of investors are behaving irrationality. However, there is another possibility, which is that stock brokers as a group gain from the excessive churning that irrational investors permit or ask them to do, but that it is impossible to "beat the market" except by pure luck or by personally studying firm fundamentals and future prospects.

Shefrin's data in favor of the "gifted analyst" is episodic and anecdotal, and there is plenty of data on the other side. For instance, in Malkiel's classic "Random Walk Down Wall Street", he relates the evidence that chimps throwing darts do as well as major brokerage houses. Sheffrin presents contrary evidence for a more recent period in which "gifted experts" outperform the random darts. New evidence, collected by Money magazine, shows that a group of experts did far worse than the darts in 2003. All of this evidence is spotty and anecdotal. The plural of anecdote is not data.

I am not convinced by this book that the efficient markets hypothesis, applied to final returns to investors (after payments to stock brokers and other transactions costs), is not correct. I think the author makes a mistake taking so strong a position when the evidence is so weak on this account. I am certainly not convinced that Malkiel's analysis is in any way overturned by new evidence.

However, if Shefrin convinces a few investors to act more sanely, he will have fulfilled an important social function.
44 internautes sur 54 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
A random walk through behavioral finance. 25 mai 2000
Par Patient Researcher - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Relié Achat vérifié
This book contains some interesting tidbits. Unfortunately, it is rife with serious errors and unwarranted assertions.
For example, in chapter 6 Prof. Shefrin attempts to discredit contrarian sentiment indicators. For all I know they may be worthy of discredit. Unfortunately for his argument, the data he chooses to display, Figures 6-1 and 6-3, appear to support the value of these indicators.
He declares the practice of investing in companies one knows to be "familiarity bias". While this is apt for employees with all funds in the company stock, he also applies it to Peter Lynch. According to Shefrin, Lynch beat the market 11 out of 13 years, and beat his nearest competitor by 6%(!) per year. Shefrin grudgingly admits there may have been some skill involved, but goes on to inform us that _investors_ "attribute too much of that success to skill rather than luck". Uh-huh.
In his chapter on public offerings, Prof. Shefrin declares that existing shareholders are being ripped off, because dramatic gains at the start of trading demonstrate the IPO could have sold at a higher price. Apparently Prof. Shefrin is unaware that underwriters enter into an obligation to support the aftermarket, and would be unlikely proceed without a good chance of an aftermarket pop, nor would subscribers purchase.
The chapter on closed end fund discounts is interesting. Unfortunately Prof. Shefrin fails to include the net present value of future management fees in his discussion.
Perhaps there will be a much revised and improved second edition.
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