A Colossal Failure of Common Sense et plus d'un million d'autres livres sont disponibles pour le Kindle d'Amazon. En savoir plus
  • Tous les prix incluent la TVA.
Il ne reste plus que 3 exemplaire(s) en stock.
Expédié et vendu par Amazon.
Emballage cadeau disponible.
Quantité :1
A Colossal Failure of Com... a été ajouté à votre Panier
État: D'occasion: Bon
Commentaire: Amazon - Offres Reconditionnées vous assure la même qualité de service qu'Amazon.fr ainsi que 30 jours de retour.
Vous l'avez déjà ?
Repliez vers l'arrière Repliez vers l'avant
Ecoutez Lecture en cours... Interrompu   Vous écoutez un extrait de l'édition audio Audible
En savoir plus
Voir les 2 images

A Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The Incredible Inside Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers (Anglais) Broché – 6 août 2009


Voir les 5 formats et éditions Masquer les autres formats et éditions
Prix Amazon Neuf à partir de Occasion à partir de
Format Kindle
"Veuillez réessayer"
Relié
"Veuillez réessayer"
EUR 25,23 EUR 2,50
Broché, 6 août 2009
EUR 15,01
EUR 6,21 EUR 0,01

A court d'idées pour Noël ?

Offres spéciales et liens associés


Produits fréquemment achetés ensemble

A Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The Incredible Inside Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers + The Greatest Trade Ever: How One Man Bet Against the Markets and Made $20 Billion
Prix pour les deux : EUR 22,74

Acheter les articles sélectionnés ensemble


Descriptions du produit

Extrait

Prologue
 
I still live just a few city blocks away from the old Lehman Brothers
headquarters at 745 Seventh Avenue—six blocks, and about ten
thousand years. I still walk past it two or three times a week, and each
time I try to look forward, south toward Wall Street. And I always resolve
to keep walking, glancing neither left nor right, locking out the
memories. But I always stop.
 
And I see again the light blue livery of Barclays Capital, which
represents—for me, at least—the flag of an impostor, a pale substitute
for the swashbuckling banner that for 158 years was slashed above the
entrance to the greatest merchant bank Wall Street ever knew:
Lehman Brothers.
 
It was only the fourth largest. But its traditions were those of a
banking warrior—the brilliant finance house that had backed, encouraged,
and made possible the retail giants Gimbel Brothers, F. W.
Woolworth, and Macy’s, and the airlines American, National, TWA,
and Pan American. They raised the capital for Campbell Soup Company,
the Jewel Tea Company, B. F. Goodrich. And they backed the
birth of television at RCA, plus the Hollywood studios RKO, Paramount,
and 20th Century Fox. They found the money for the Trans-
Canada oil pipeline.
 
I suppose, in a sense, I had seen only its demise, the four-year
death rattle of twenty-first-century finance, which ended on September
15, 2008. Yet in my mind, I remember the great days. And as I
come to a halt outside the building, I know too that in the next few
moments I will be engulfed by sadness. But I always stop.
 
And I always stare up at the third floor, where once I worked as a
trader on one of the toughest trading floors on earth. And then I find
myself counting all the way up to thirty-one, the floor where it all went so catastrophically wrong, the floor that housed the royal court of King
Richard. That’s Richard S. Fuld, chairman and CEO.
 
Swamped by nostalgia, edged as we all are by a lingering anger,
and still plagued by unanswerable questions, I stand and stare upward,
sorrowful beyond reason, and trapped by the twin words of those possessed
of flawless hindsight: if only.
 
Sometimes I lie awake at night trying to place all the if-onlys in
some kind of order. Sometimes the order changes, and sometimes
there is a new leader, one single aspect of the Lehman collapse that
stands out above all others. But it’s never clear. Except when I stand
right here and look up at the great glass fortress which once housed
Lehman, and focus on that thirty-first floor. Then it’s clear. Boy, is it
ever clear. And the phrase if only slams into my brain.
 
If only they had listened—Dick Fuld and his president, Joe Gregory.
Three times they were hit with the irredeemable logic of three of
the cleverest financial brains on Wall Street—those of Mike Gelband,
our global head of fixed income, Alex Kirk, global head of distressed
trading research and sales, and Larry McCarthy, head of distressed-
bond trading.
 
Each and every one of them laid it out, from way back in 2005,
that the real estate market was living on borrowed time and that
Lehman Brothers was headed directly for the biggest subprime iceberg
ever seen, and with the wrong men on the bridge. Dick and Joe
turned their backs all three times. It was probably the worst triple
since St. Peter denied Christ.
 
Beyond that, there were six more if-onlys, each one as cringemakingly
awful as the last.
 
If only Chairman Fuld had kept his ear close to the ground on
the inner workings of his firm—both its triumphs and its mistakes. If
he had listened to his generals, met people who formed the heart and
soul of Lehman Brothers, the catastrophe might have been avoided.
But instead of this, he secluded himself in his palatial offices up there
on the thirty-first floor, remote from the action, dreaming only of accelerating
growth, nursing ambitions far removed from reality.
 
If only the secret coup against Fuld and Gregory had taken place
months before that clandestine meeting in June 2008. If the eleven
managing directors who sat in ostensibly treasonous but ultimately
loyal comradeship that night had acted sooner and removed the Lehman leaders, they might have steadied the ship, changing its course.
 
If only the reign of terror that drove out the most brilliant of
Lehman’s traders and risk takers had been halted earlier, perhaps in
the name of common sense. The top managers might have marshaled
their forces immediately when they saw giants such as Mike Gelband
being ignored.
 
If only Dick Fuld had kept his anger, resentment, and rudeness
under control. Especially at that private dinner in the spring of 2008
with Hank Paulson, secretary of the United States Treasury. That was
when Fuld’s years of smoldering envy of Goldman Sachs came cascading
to the surface and caused Paulson to leave furious that the
Lehman boss had disrespected the office he held. Perhaps that was
the moment Hank decided he could not bring himself to bail out the
bank controlled by Richard S. Fuld.
 
If only President George W. Bush had taken the final, desperate
call from Fuld’s office, a call made by his own cousin, George Walker
IV, in the night hours before the bank filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
It might have made a difference.
 
If only . . . if only. Those two words haunt my dreams. I go back
to the fall of Lehman, and what might have made things different. For
most people, victims or not of this worldwide collapse of the financial
markets, it will be, in time, just water over the dam. But it will never
be that for me, and my long background as a trader and researcher has
prompted me many times to burrow down further to the bedrock, the
cause of the crash of 2008. I refer to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act in 1999.
 
If only President Clinton had never signed the bill repealing
Glass-Steagall. Personally, I never thought he much wanted to sign it,
but to understand the ramifications it is necessary to delve deeper, and
before I begin my story, I will present you with some critical background
information, without which your grasp might be incomplete.
It’s a ten-minute meadow of wisdom and hindsight, the sort of thing I
tend to specialize in.
 
The story begins in the heady, formative years of the Clinton presidency on a rose-colored quest to change the world, to help the poor, and ended in the poisonous heartland of world financial disaster.
 
 
Roberta Achtenberg, the daughter of a Russian-born owner of a
Los Angeles neighborhood grocery store, was plucked by President
Clinton from relative obscurity in 1993 and elevated to the position of
assistant secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Roberta and Bill were united in their desire to increase home
ownership in poor and minority communities.
 
And despite a barrage of objections led by Senator Jesse Helms,
who referred to Achtenberg as that “damn lesbian,” the lady took up
her appointment in the new administration, citing innate racism as
one of the main reasons why banks were reluctant to lend to those
without funds.
 
In the ensuing couple of years, Roberta Achtenberg harnessed all
of the formidable energy on the massed ranks of United States
bankers, sometimes threatening, sometimes berating, sometimes
bullying—anything to persuade the banks to provide mortgages to people
who might not have been up to the challenge of coping with up-
front down payments and regular monthly payments.
 
Between 1993 and 1999, more than two million such clients became
new homeowners. In her two-year tenure as assistant secretary,
she set up a national grid of offices staffed by attorneys and investigators.
Their principal aim was to enforce the laws against the banks, the
laws that dealt with discrimination. Some of the fines leveled at banks
ran into the millions, to drive home Achtenberg’s avowed intent to utilize
the law to change the ethos of providing mortgage money in the
United States of America.
 
Banks were compelled to jump into line, and soon they were
making thousands of loans without any cash-down deposits whatsoever,
an unprecedented situation. Mortgage officers inside the banks
were forced to bend or break their own rules in order to achieve a good
Community Reinvestment Act rating, which would please the administration
by demonstrating generosity to underprivileged borrowers
even if they might default. Easy mortgages were the invention of Bill
Clinton’s Democrats.
 
However, there was, in the mid- to late 1990s, one enormous advantage:
amid general prosperity, the housing market was strong and
prices were rising steadily. At that point in time, mortgage defaults
were relatively few in number and the securitization of mortgages, which had such disastrous consequences during the financial crisis that began in 2007, barely existed.
 
Nonetheless, there were many beady-eyed financiers who looked
askance at this new morality and privately yearned for the days when
bank policies were strictly conservative, when credit was flatly denied
to anyone without the proven ability to repay.
 
And at the center of this seething disquiet, somewhere between
the persuasive silken-tongued members of the banking lobby and the
missionary zeal of Roberta Achtenberg, stood William J. Clinton,
whose heart, not for the first time, may have been ruling his head.
 
He understood full well the goodwill he had engendered in the
new home-owning black and Hispanic communities. But he could not
fail to heed the very senior voices of warning that whispered, There
may be trouble ahead.
 
President Clinton wanted to stay focused with the concerns of
the bankers, many of whom were seriously upset by Achtenberg’s pressure
to provide shaky mortgages. And right before the president’s eyes
there was a related situation, one that had the deepest possible roots
in the American financial community.
 
This was the fabled Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the post–Wall
Street crash legislation that prevented commercial banks from merging
with investment banks, thus eliminating the opportunity for the
high-rolling investment guys to get their hands on limitless supplies of
depositors’ money. Glass-Steagall was nothing short of a barrier, and it
stayed in place for more than sixty years, but the major U.S. banks
wanted it abolished. They’d tried but failed in 1988. It would take another
four years for this Depression-era legislation to come once more
under attack.
 
President Clinton understood the ramifications, and he was wary
of the reform, wary of seeming to be allied with the power brokers of
the biggest banks in the country. He understood the complexities of
the Glass-Steagall Act, its origins, and its purposes—principally to
prevent some diabolical investment house from plunging in big on a
corporation like Enron and going down with a zillion dollars of small
depositors’ cash. No part of that did President Bill need.
 
On one hand was the belief of the main U.S. clearing banks that
such mergers would strengthen the whole financial industry by increasing
opportunities for hefty profits. But there were many people
running small banks who were fearful that a repeal of Glass-Steagall
would ultimately lead to large conglomerates crushing the life out of
the minnows.
 
President Clinton always kept a weather eye on history, and he
was aware the commercial banks, with their overenthusiastic investments
in the stock market, had essentially taken the rap for the crash
of 1929. They were accused of crossing a forbidden line, of buying
stock in corporations for resale to the public. It had been too risky, and
the pursuit of huge profits had clouded their judgment.
 
The man who had stood firmly in the path of the gathering storm
of the 1930s was Virginia senator Carter Glass, a former treasury secretary
and the founder of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. The somewhat
stern Democratic newspaper proprietor was determined that the commercial
banks and the investment banks should be kept forever apart.
 
He was supported by the chairman of the House Banking and
Currency Committee, Alabama congressman Henry Bascom Steagall,
and it was their rigid legal barricade that did much to solve Wall
Street’s greatest-ever crisis. The biggest banks were thenceforth prevented
from speculating heavily in the stock markets. But even then, a
lot of people thought it was a harsh and restrictive law.
 
With President Clinton in office for only three years, the major
banks once more marshaled their forces to try for a third time to repeal
Glass-Steagall, and once more it all came to nothing, with the nation’s
small banks fighting tooth and nail to hold back a system they thought
might engulf them. But in 1996 they failed once more.
 
In the early spring of 1998, however, a Wall Street detonator exploded,
sending a sharp signal that the market was willing to go it
alone despite the politicians. On April 6 Citicorp announced a merger
with Travelers Insurance, a large corporation that owned and controlled
the investment bank Smith Barney. The merger would create a
vast conglomerate involved with banking, insurance, and securities,
plainly in defiance of Glass-Steagall.
 
The House scrambled to put a reform bill together, but the issue
died in the Senate after it became clear that President Clinton had
many concerns and was almost certain to veto it. The $70 billion
merger between Citicorp and Travelers went right ahead regardless.
The result was a banking giant, the largest financial conglomerate in
the world, and it was empowered to sell securities, take deposits, make
loans, underwrite stocks, sell insurance, and operate an enormous variety
of financial activities, all under one name: Citigroup.
 
The deal was obviously illegal, but Citigroup had five years to get
the law changed, and they had very deep pockets. Senators harrumphed,
and the president, concerned for the nation’s smaller banks, worried.
 
However, the most powerful banking lobbies in the country
wanted Glass-Steagall repealed, and they bombarded politicians with
millions of dollars’ worth of contributions. They cajoled and pressured
Congress to end this old-fashioned Depression-era law. Inevitably they
won. In November 1999, the necessary bills were passed 54–44 in the
Senate and 343–86 in the House of Representatives. In the ensuing
days the final bipartisan bill sailed through the Senate, 90–8 with one
abstention, and the House, 362–57 with fifteen abstentions. Those
margins made it vetoproof. I remember the day well. All my life my
dad had been telling me that history inevitably repeats itself. And here
I was listening to a group of guys telling me it was all different now,
that everything was so much more sophisticated, “doorstep of the
twenty-first century” and all that, so much more advanced than 1933.
 
Oh, yeah? Well, I never bought it. It’s never different. I knew that
Glass-Steagall had been put in place very deliberately to protect customer
bank deposits and prevent any crises from becoming interconnected
and forming a house of cards or a row of dominoes. Carter
Glass’s bill had successfully kept the dominoes apart for more than
half a century after his death.
 
And now that was all about to end. They were moving the pieces,
pressing one against the other. I remember my concern as I watched
the television news on November 12, 1999. The action on the screen
was flying in the face of everything my dad had told me. I was watching
President Clinton step up, possibly against his better judgment,
and sign into law the brand-new Financial Services Modernization Act
(also known as Gramm-Leach-Bliley), repealing Glass-Steagall. In less
than a decade, this act would be directly responsible for bringing the
entire world to the brink of financial ruin. Especially mine.  --Ce texte fait référence à l'édition Broché .

Revue de presse

“...gives the readers a visceral sense of what it was like to work at Lehman Brothers and the fateful decisions and events that led to the company’s death spiral...”
—Michiko Kakutani, The New York Times

“Highly readable…A Colossal Failure of Common Sense largely rings true. It expresses the anger that many former Lehman employees still feel toward Mr. Fuld. And it convincingly characterizes the investment bank as a house divided against itself, between the bears who had foreseen bubbles and the bulls who wrongly believed that this time was different.”
—The Economist

“... describes a CEO ­acting as if his firm was too big to fail.”
—Wall Street Journal

“...poignantly told...from an insider [who] witnessed, often in amazement and disgust, the corporate dysfunction and hubristic leadership that led to [Lehman’s] demise.”
—BusinessWeek

“...engaging and even funny.”
—Fortune
--Ce texte fait référence à une édition épuisée ou non disponible de ce titre.


Détails sur le produit

  • Broché: 368 pages
  • Editeur : Ebury Press (6 août 2009)
  • Langue : Anglais
  • ISBN-10: 0091936152
  • ISBN-13: 978-0091936150
  • Dimensions du produit: 12,6 x 2,3 x 19,8 cm
  • Moyenne des commentaires client : 5.0 étoiles sur 5  Voir tous les commentaires (1 commentaire client)
  • Classement des meilleures ventes d'Amazon: 97.488 en Livres anglais et étrangers (Voir les 100 premiers en Livres anglais et étrangers)
  •  Souhaitez-vous compléter ou améliorer les informations sur ce produit ? Ou faire modifier les images?


En savoir plus sur les auteurs

Découvrez des livres, informez-vous sur les écrivains, lisez des blogs d'auteurs et bien plus encore.

Dans ce livre (En savoir plus)
Parcourir les pages échantillon
Couverture | Copyright | Table des matières | Extrait | Index | Quatrième de couverture
Rechercher dans ce livre:

Commentaires en ligne

5.0 étoiles sur 5
5 étoiles
1
4 étoiles
0
3 étoiles
0
2 étoiles
0
1 étoiles
0
Voir le commentaire client
Partagez votre opinion avec les autres clients

Commentaires client les plus utiles

Par Becuwe sur 14 septembre 2011
Format: Relié
Très satisfait par cet ouvrage qui éclaircit des problématiques complexes. Il sera très utile à tous ceux qui veulent comprendre les mécanismes de la crise financière.
Remarque sur ce commentaire Avez-vous trouvé ce commentaire utile ? Oui Non Commentaire en cours d'envoi...
Merci pour votre commentaire. Si ce commentaire est inapproprié, dites-le nous.
Désolé, nous n'avons pas réussi à enregistrer votre vote. Veuillez réessayer

Commentaires client les plus utiles sur Amazon.com (beta)

Amazon.com: 296 commentaires
366 internautes sur 440 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
The quintessential barbell trade 15 août 2009
Par cynic - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Relié
Two kinds of people are likely to be attracted to this book: the common man in the street who wants to know how a company like Lehman blew up so spectacularly and the financial markets insider who wants to know the inside scoop.

If you are the former, this book is likely to please. It has all the elements of a pot boiler - the breathless accounts of secret meetings, mutiny in the boardroom and the heroic efforts of a few key guys trying valiantly to save the sinking ship. It has the relentless enemy and the arch villain. The only thing missing is the scantily clad woman draped over the hero's arm.

The other side of the barbell is the financial services insider who knows all the acronyms inside and out - CDO, CLO, RMBS, CMBS, SIV who is nevertheless looking for a straight account of what went wrong - like the classic 'smartest guys in the room' on the Enron disaster.

If you are on that side of the barbell, steer clear of this book. It offers no insight into anything, except perhaps the massive ego of a low level trader. By all accounts, Larry McDonald should never have been allowed to place the kind of bets he claims to have made. He was obviously a junior trader on a bond desk that used shareholder money to short everything in sight taking massive short CDS positions on all sorts of names, good and bad. The irony seems entirely lost to him, but his desk was part of the CDS problem - buying protection with no underlying holdings.

Like any gambler, he worships the analyst (Jane Castle) who gave him the hot tip - (Buy Delta, young man!) but is too dumb to acknowledge that Delta could easily have woundup another Eastern, or more to the point, another TWA. The 'hostile' bid from US Airways that made his profit, nearly killed US Airways... but I digress.

Larry does let his political persuasions come through. Clinton is an arch villain for letting Roberta Achtenberg loose on banks 'forcing' them to lend to the huddled masses. 'Easy mortgages were the invention of Bill Clinton's Democrats' he proclaims. Never mind that the CRA ran for over 12 years with nary a problem until the boneheads on Wall Street decided to get in on the action by securitizing it.

Perhaps the most telling passage comes in the tail end of the book and summarizes it quite well:

"All my life, I've been a laissez-faire Ronald Reagan / Margaret Thatcher capitalist, swearing by the market, taking the risks and the devil take the hindmost. But this one time, I was looking for a Givernment rescue and I wasn't going to get it"

This one time. When my stock value is at stake, the principles I held all my life just vaporized. Hank Paulson should have cared more about my stock options in Lehman. That son-of-a-bitch was making an example out of Lehman with *MY* money.

This book is a lousy excuse for a tell-all or even a straight accounting of the events leading up to Lehman;s demise. 'When Genius Failed' this ain't.
40 internautes sur 47 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
A limited-view insider's tale 6 octobre 2009
Par Carson Cole - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Relié Achat vérifié
This book is not a detailed look at why Lehman fell. It is one persons view--a lopsided view from the trading desk. The author spent way too much time talking about his career and brilliant calls, and way too little time on what was happening in the executive suite.
114 internautes sur 147 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
How corporate ethics can fail and a cautionary tale! 21 juillet 2009
Par Todd Bartholomew - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Relié
The collapse of Lehman Brothers is seen as the pivotal event that led to the economic collapse of 2008 and much press has been devoted to the exact chronology of how Lehman came to fail. But it takes inside knowledge to really get into the corporate psychology, culture and the psyche of the employees and Larry McDonald is that person. A farmer Vice President at Lehman, McDonald has the knowledge and insight to know what led Lehman to take the actions that ultimately led to its demise and McDonald repeats quite convincingly here his central premise as to what led to the collapse; that it wasn't a large number employees, but only eight, including CEO Richard Fuld. It was the investment strategy of this small coterie of employees that overextended Lehman's holdings of credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and derivatives that ultimately led to Lehman's desperate need to de-leverage and quickly seek an infusion of capital. McDonald paints a portrait of detached and distant senior executives who created an almost separate lair at Lehman's headquarters that only served to increase their detachment. In turn these leaders inculcated a culture of relentless demand for results led employees to take greater risks and in turn fostered a culture of greed.

McDonald's tale of `mission creep' when it comes to declining ethics is a familiar tale whether it is WorldCom, Enron or Lehman. But at times his premise seems a bit conflicted: if the truly destructive forces at Lehman were limited to these eight employees alone then why focus on the broader culture of declining ethics? Weren't those declining ethics equally responsible for Lehman's collapse? Can someone so close to the situation really be objective in analysis and conclusions? McDonald certainly does seem to have done his homework on the research and there are some genuine bombshells in here, especially the meeting between then CEO Richard Fuld and then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson regarding Lehman's de-leveraging. The upshot of the meeting was Fuld sharply criticized Paulson both personally and professionally, and McDonald posits that it was this interchange that likely led to Paulson's decision not to intervene to save Lehman Brothers. Given recent developments with Paulson regarding Merrill Lynch's shotgun marriage with Bank of America the veracity of McDonald's story seems to be increasingly true.

While there is a flood of books on the economic collapse, the best ones more narrowly focus on specific players as it's easier to follow microeconomic stories than macroeconomic ones. "A Colossal Failure..." follows in the tradition of great books such as "Barbarians at the Gate" about the takeover of RJR Nabisco or "The Smartest Guys in the Room" about the Enron fiasco. "A Colossal Failure..." is very well written and well researched, but it is also a chilling look into not only McDonalds psyche, but those of his compatriots on Wall Street. No one wakes up in the morning plotting how to destroy their company that day, but the erosion of ethics is so gradual that many wind up doing things they ultimately come to regret dearly. The damage to their resumes, to their credibility, and their ability to find a new job is often irreversible. To varying degrees McDonald partially succeeds in his argument that it was the gang of eight, who he names in the book, which ultimately brought Lehman Brothers down. But to a larger degree it was many of the employees, himself included, who were the willing participants that changed to corporate culture to one of unbridled greed that ultimately led to the fall. "A Colossal Failure..." is at once a roman a clef and a cautionary tale to all of corporate America; this too could be you if you're not careful!
45 internautes sur 57 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
Suffered through the book from start to finish 12 août 2009
Par Don Draper - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Relié
The fall of Lehman, including the hubris and mismanagement of Dick Fuld and Joe Gregory, is an important story to be told. However, this book is a colossally painful read. I would wait until future books by journalists come out.

This book is simply a vehicle for McDonald's own ego and hubris, which is ironic given the subject matter. He claims that he is an insider, but he was one of thousands of vice presidents. And yet he deceptively tries to paint the picture that he, Michael Gelband, Alex Kirk, and Larry McCarthy were all at the same table. This, along with lines like "I was the only one who realized..." go to his overall credibility and makes me just roll my eyes.

Everything is black and white to McDonald, but there is much more nuance to this story and that's what I want to read. And the melodrama throughout the book is beyond annoying -- starting with the line "It was probably the worst triple since St. Peter denied Christ." Seriously? And it's like that all the way through the book.

Long story short, the only reason why this book will make any money is because it's the first book out. But it's worth the wait to get the story from an author whose goal is not simply self-promotion and my take-away from this book is that McDonald wrote it more to stroke his ego than anything else.

There will be plenty of books that take the necessary and critical look at Fuld and Gregory's actions, so save your time and money and skip this one.
103 internautes sur 136 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
Self serving badly written rubbish 11 août 2009
Par Trikon - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Relié
As a former Lehman Managing Director who worked with many of the key characters in this book, Lawrence McDonald excepted, I would strongly recommend potential readers to avoid this poorly written, turgid, self-serving drivel. The author, a relatively junior employee, clearly had no access to most of the protagonists in Lehman's demise, other than a small coterie of New York Fixed Income colleagues. This is an ill-informed rant, which simultaneously attempts to whitewash a select group of individuals. There is a great book out there waiting to be written about the fall of the House of Lehman, but this is not it. If I could rate this no stars, or preferably negative stars, that's what it would get.
Ces commentaires ont-ils été utiles ? Dites-le-nous


Commentaires

Souhaitez-vous compléter ou améliorer les informations sur ce produit ? Ou faire modifier les images?