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Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa
 
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Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa [Format Kindle]

Dambisa Moyo , Niall Ferguson
4.0 étoiles sur 5  Voir tous les commentaires (3 commentaires client)

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Descriptions du produit

Revue de presse

A damning assessment of the failures of sixty years of western development (Financial Times)

Kicks over the traditional piety that Western aid benefits the third world (Books of the Year Sunday Herald)

Dambisa Moyo makes a compelling case for a new approach (Kofi Annan)

Provocative ... incendiary ... a double-barrelled shotgun of a book (Daily Mail)

This reader was left wanting a lot more Moyo, a lot less Bono (Niall Ferguson)

Présentation de l'éditeur

In the past fifty years, more than $1 trillion in development-related aid has been transferred from rich countries to Africa. Has this assistance improved the lives of Africans? No. In fact, across the continent, the recipients of this aid are not better off as a result of it, but worse—much worse.

In Dead Aid, Dambisa Moyo describes the state of postwar development policy in Africa today and unflinchingly confronts one of the greatest myths of our time: that billions of dollars in aid sent from wealthy countries to developing African nations has helped to reduce poverty and increase growth. In fact, poverty levels continue to escalate and growth rates have steadily declined—and millions continue to suffer. Provocatively drawing a sharp contrast between African countries that have rejected the aid route and prospered and others that have become aid-dependent and seen poverty increase, Moyo illuminates the way in which overreliance on aid has trapped developing nations in a vicious circle of aid dependency, corruption, market distortion, and further poverty, leaving them with nothing but the “need” for more aid. Debunking the current model of international aid promoted by both Hollywood celebrities and policy makers, Moyo offers a bold new road map for financing development of the world’s poorest countries that guarantees economic growth and a significant decline in poverty—without reliance on foreign aid or aid-related assistance.

Dead Aid is an unsettling yet optimistic work, a powerful challenge to the assumptions and arguments that support a profoundly misguided development policy in Africa. And it is a clarion call to a new, more hopeful vision of how to address the desperate poverty that plagues millions.



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2 internautes sur 2 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
2.0 étoiles sur 5 Au secour 26 novembre 2012
Par Forge
Format:Broché|Achat vérifié
Ce livre est creux du début à la fin malgré les quelques cautions journalistiques (et non pas académiques) qui lui sont données en début de livre. Il ne suffit pas de venir d'Afrique pour prétendre savoir ce qui est bon pour le continent. D'autant que c'est l'influence de son passé à Goldman Sachs bien plus que son enfance en Zambie qui transparaît tout au long du livre. N'espérez pas y trouver de solutions innovantes puisqu'elle ne croit qu'en une libéralisation massive et aux investissements chinois. Il n'y a donc plus qu'à attendre ! On privilégiera dans la même veine un auteur comme Easterly qui s'appuie sur des éléments autrement plus intéressants que sa propre opinion, ou sur Duflo et Banerjee pour une approche véritablement rigoureuse et équilibrée.
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5.0 étoiles sur 5 super 28 juin 2013
Format:Broché|Achat vérifié
le livre a arrivé dans 4 jours, dans une condition superbe (neuf). aucun plaine. un bon livre qui donne des alternatives parfois utopique de l'aide mais à prendre sérieusement, et bon à comparer avec The Bottoom Billion par Collier.
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0 internautes sur 1 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
5.0 étoiles sur 5 Geniiiiaaaaaaaaaaaaal 4 mars 2014
Par Joël Mah
Format:Broché|Achat vérifié
L'envoie etait parfait le paquet pareil. Tou etait bieeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeen fait
Pas a redire. Je reste fan number uno.

Vous restez dans mon top 5.
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Amazon.com: 3.9 étoiles sur 5  125 commentaires
90 internautes sur 99 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
5.0 étoiles sur 5 Credible and Insightful! 21 mars 2009
Par Loyd E. Eskildson - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Relié
Over the past 60 years at least $1 trillion in aid was sent to Africa - yet, calls for even more grow steadily louder. Moyo - a native of Zambia, contends that evidence demonstrates that this aid has made the poor poorer. Real per-capita income today is lower than it was in the 1970s. In other words, aid is not part of the solution, it is part of the problem.

Even after aggressive debt-relief campaigns in the 1990s, African countries still pay close to $20 billion in debt repayments per year - at the expense of education and health care. Moyo also asserts that the roughly 500,000 individuals in the "aid business" have no motivation for that aid to succeed; meanwhile, well-meaning individuals such as Bono have choked off debate of its efficacy.

The author claims that the most obvious criticism of aid is that it enables rampant corruption and bloated bureaucracies. In 2002, the African Union, an organization of African nations, estimated that corruption was costing $150 billion/year. Transparency International, a corruption watchdog, states that Zaire's former president is reputed to have stolen at least $5 billion from the country. Across Africa, over 70% of government funding comes from foreign aid - enabling those governments to avoid accountability to local citizens since they pay so little.

In Cameroon, it takes a potential investor about 426 days to gain a business license, vs. 17 in South Korea. Under the auspices of the U.S. Food for Peace program, each year millions are used to buy American-grown food that is then shipped to Africa where it puts local farmers out of business.

Moyo's bottom-line is that other regions should stop the largess towards Africa, and Africa should focus on becoming more attractive to private investment. This includes ceasing to be the source of the world's greatest number of armed conflicts.
224 internautes sur 277 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
3.0 étoiles sur 5 Dead Aid Not Quite Dead On 2 avril 2009
Par David Donelson - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Relié
Dead Aid is an interesting, provocative look at the foreign aid industry and its effects on Africa. Dambisa Moyo, who formerly worked for Goldman Sachs and the World Bank, draws a conclusion not unknown to others in the field: development aid (as differentiated from humanitarian aid) has not only done little good for the nations of Africa but has indeed caused great harm. While I don't necessarily disagree with her conclusion, I didn't find her arguments particularly convincing.

There is no question that much of the aid intended to build economies in Africa has been grossly wasted, stolen, and misused. There is little to show for the trillions of dollars that have been poured into the continent--a failure with numerous causes. But Moyo's main premise is that aid itself is the cause, that it creates a culture dependent on foreign handouts and rife with corruption that, according to the author, apparently wouldn't exist if aid weren't available. I find both arguments hard to swallow, especially since they are based mostly on the logical premise of cum hoc ergo propter hoc (with this, therefore because of this). In this thinking, when aid is given, the recipients don't develop other resources, therefore aid causes them to not try. It's the same argument that's been used for years to oppose welfare programs applied in this instance not to individuals, but to entire nations. I find that a little facile. I suspect aid fails more often because it is poorly structured and managed, an argument that Moyo essentially dismisses out of hand.

Whether you agree with Moyo's reasoning or not, you have to seriously question the solutions she proposes. While outlining a litany of worthwhile approaches to economic development including micro-lending, opening markets in the developed world to African products, and more foreign direct investment (FDI), her silver bullet is a solution only an investment banker could love: the bond market. Somehow, Moyo expects the magic of the free market financial system to end corruption in Africa, stop wasteful spending, and power the continent out of poverty. I react to that proposal the same way Jaime Talon, one of the lead characters in my novel, Heart of Diamonds: A Novel of Scandal, Love and Death in the Congo, did when confronted by a similar argument about a panhandler in New York: "What matters is that right now--today--that man over there is hungry. Somebody needs to do something about that, not just ignore it and hope the holy and all-powerful market economy will provide a solution."

I have to ask, given the brilliant performance of Wall Street and Fleet Street in providing structured finance for America and Europe, how can we expect them to solve the problems of Africa? These are the people who brought us sub-sub-prime mortgages wrapped in gilt-edged bond ratings and called gold. Their ability to assess risk and police wasteful government spending in Kinshasa is rather suspect, at least to me. I also fail to see how corrupt leaders and their minions will be any less likely to steal funds from private lenders than they are from the World Bank. Perhaps my most significant objection, though is when Moyo says the developing nations will be better served paying ten percent interest (the rate she quotes for emerging market debt in 2007) than the 0.75% they are charged by the World Bank. How does that work to anyone's advantage other than the investment bankers?

Don't misunderstand my review. I agree with many of Moyos' conclusions and her objections to the current approach to foreign aid. Mandating the purchase of American products with American aid dollars, for example, is enormously wasteful, self-serving, and undoubtedly harms the African farmers and manufacturers such aid could help. She's also dead on when she calls for an improved business climate in Africa so that direct investment, both foreign and local, stands a better chance to succeed.

Pulling Africa out of the swamp of poverty is a complex operation. I applaud Dambisa Moyo for presenting a provocative set of arguments in clear, understandable layman's prose. Dead Aid brings an important subject into the public eye.
20 internautes sur 23 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
4.0 étoiles sur 5 Rigor and conviction 20 février 2009
Par H. Laurent - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Broché
As I was not aware of the Aid programs bias and problems. I always complied with the current and unique trend: "Send more Monies to Africa. It will solve all of their problems". This book brought me a brand new look at the Aid system and to discover why it does not always work.

With Passion and Rigor Ms Moyo brings a lot of numbers and facts to the table. She also brings solutions and tools that may work in the future.

Sometimes, I was lost in numbers and redundant affirmations as some points are obvious from the beginning. I have to admit, I skipped some pages.

I learned a lot and this book allowed me to better understand the situation. Glad I read it
9 internautes sur 9 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
5.0 étoiles sur 5 DEAD AID IS AFRICA'S ALBATROSS 24 novembre 2010
Par Vakunta - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Broché|Achat vérifié
Dambisa Moyo's masterpiece is an economic blueprint intended to serve as a paradigm for weaning Africa off the debilitating aid-dependency syndrome that has kept the continent in perpetual economic stagnancy for decades. Using dependable statistics, Moyo argues that government-to-government or bilateral aid (which should be distinguished from charity-based aid) to Africa undermines the ability of Africans to conceptualize their own best economic and political policies. As she puts it: "The net result of aid-dependency is that instead of having a functioning Africa, managed by Africans, for Africans, what is left is one where outsiders attempt to map its destiny and call the shots."(66) Foreign aid does not only undermine economic growth, it keeps recipient countries in a state of endemic poverty. It is itself an underlying cause of social unrest and possibly even civil war.

Moyo notes that the "prospect of seizing power and gaining access to unlimited aid wealth is irresistible."(59) To buttress her argument, she refers to Grossman (1992) who contends that the underlying purpose of rebellion is the capture of the state for financial advantage, and that aid makes such conflict more likely. In the past fifty years, Moyo observes, over US$1trillion in development-related aid has been transferred from the rich countries of the West to Africa. Yet, aid has helped make the poor poorer; economic growth slower.

According to Moyo, the notion that foreign aid can alleviate systemic poverty, and has done so in Africa is tantamount to a myth. Millions in Africa, she notes, are poorer today on account of aid dependency. Indeed, aid has been and continues to be, an unmitigated political and economic and humanitarian disaster for Africa. Aid is not benign--it is malignant. In short, aid is not part of the solution; it is the problem. And here is how.

Aid breeds corruption in Africa. If the world has one picture of the African continent, it is one of corrupt statesmen. With very few exceptions, African leaders have crowned themselves in gold, seized land, handed over state businesses to relatives and friends, diverted billions of aid-money to foreign bank accounts, and generally treated their countries like giant personalized cash dispensers. According to Transparency International, Mobutu Sese Seko of erstwhile Zaire is estimated to have looted the State to the tune of US$5billion.

Roughly the same amount was stolen from Nigeria by President Sani Abacha and placed in Swiss private banks. The list of corrupt practices in Africa is endless. However, the point about corruption in Africa is not that it exists; the point is that foreign aid is one of its greatest aides. Aid creates a vicious cycle of dependency in Africa; a cycle that chokes off desperately needed investment, instills a culture of kleptomania, and facilitates rampant and systematic corruption, all with deleterious consequences for economic growth. It is this cycle, Moyo posits, that "perpetuates underdevelopment, and guarantees economic failure in the poorest aid-dependent countries" (49).

Aid creates a fertile ground for rent-seeking, that is, the use of governmental authority to take and make money without trade or production of wealth. Because foreign aid is fungible--easily stolen, redirected and extracted-- it facilitates corruption. At a very basic level, an example of this is where a government official with access to aid money set aside for public welfare takes the money for his own personal use. Examples are legion in Africa. Foreign aid programs, which tend to lack accountability, and check and balances, act as substitutes for tax revenues.

The tax receipts that aid releases are then diverted to unproductive and often wasteful purposes rather than the productive public expenditure (education, health infrastructure, etc) for which they were ostensibly intended. Moyo points out that in "Uganda, for example, aid-fueled corruption in the 1990s was thought to be so rampant that only 20 cents of every US$1 of government spending on education reached the targeted local primary school."(53)

Strangely enough, Larry Diamond (2004) observes, Western aid agencies, notably the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, continue to give aid to African states, with notorious authoritarian and corrupt governments. His list includes Cameroon, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Angola, Eritrea, Guinea and Mauritania. Africa is the region that receives the largest amount of foreign aid, receiving more per capita in official development assistance than any other region of the world.

Yet her social infrastructure is in a state of utter decrepitude! Moyo notes that any large influx of money into an economy, however robust, has the potential to create serious problems. With the relentless flow of unmitigated, substantial aid money to Africa, these problems are magnified, especially in economies that are, by their very nature, poorly managed, weak and susceptible to outside influence, over which domestic policymakers have little or no control.

Moyo contends that increases in foreign aid are correlated with declining domestic savings rates. As she puts it, "As foreign aid comes in, domestic savings decline; that is, investment falls."(61) She further observes that with all the tempting aid monies on offer, which are notoriously fungible, the relatively few people who have access to it, spend it on consumer goods instead of saving the cash. As savings decline, local banks have less money to lend for domestic investment.

Worse still, foreign aid has an equally damaging crowding-out effect: although aid is meant to encourage private investment by providing loan guarantees, subsidizing investment risks and supporting co-financing arrangements with private investors, in practice it discourages the inflow of such high-quality foreign monies. Moyo points out that empirical research has shown that higher aid-induced consumption leads to an environment where much more money is chasing fewer goods."(61) This almost invariably leads to price rises--inflation.

Over and above, aid chokes off the export sector. This phenomenon is known as the Dutch disease, as its effects were first observed when natural gas revenues flooded the Netherlands in the 1960s, devastating the Dutch export sector and increasing unemployment. Moyo argues that aid inflows have adverse effects on overall competitiveness, export sector (usually in the form of decline in the share of those in the manufacturing sector and ultimately growth).

In the oddest turn of events, the fact that aid reduces competitiveness, and thus the trading sector's ability to generate foreign-exchange earnings, makes countries even more dependent on aid, leaving them exposed to all the negative consequences of aid-dependency. In countries with weak financial systems, additional foreign resources do not translate into growth of stronger financially dependent industries.

So if foreign aid harbors such adverse effects for African economies why are donors bent on doling it out? And why aren't recipients sagacious enough to put an end to the lethal cycle of aid? Moyo's Dead Aid model provides solid answers to these intriguing questions. She notes that "Africa is addicted to aid. For the past sixty years, she says, Africa has been fed aid. Like any addict, Africa needs and depends on its regular fix, finding it hard, if not impossible to contemplate existence in an aid-less world."(75) Her book provides an antidote, a road map for riding Africa of aid dependency.

Arguing that the aid program in Africa has not worked precisely because it was never conceived with the intention of promoting the economic development of Africa, she proposes alternatives to foreign aid. She notes that like the challenges faced by someone addicted to drugs, the withdrawal is bound to be painful. Nonetheless, if implemented in the most efficient way, the solutions offered in Dead Aid will help to dramatically reduce Africa's reliance on aid money.

Moyo cites Botswana as an example of an economic success story in Africa. Botswana began with a high ratio of aid to GDP but used the aid wisely to provide important public goods that helped support good policies and sound governance and laid the foundation for robust economic growth for the country.

She says this stratagem can be replicated all over Africa. Her alternatives to aid, predicated on transparency and accountability, would provide the life-blood through which Africa's social capital and economies will grow. Her Dead Aid strategy leaves room for modest amounts of aid to be part of Africa's development financing strategy. Systematic aid will be a component of her Dead Aid Model, but only insofar as its presence decreases as other financing alternatives take hold. The ultimate goal, as far as Moyo is concerned, is an aid-free Africa.

In a nutshell, Dead Aid proposes radical solutions to the pressing economic problems of our time. It offers a new model for financing development in Africa's poorest countries, one that offers economic growth, promises to significantly reduce endemic poverty, and most importantly, does not rely on aid. Though Moyo is not the first economic pundit to take Western aid donors to task, never has the case against aid been made with such rigor and conviction. She does not pull her punches.

"In a perfect world," she writes, "what poor countries at the lowest rungs of economic development need is not a multi-party democracy, but in fact a decisive benevolent dictator to push through the reforms required to get the economy moving."(xi) Her most radical proposal comes in the form of a rhetorical question: "What if," she asks, "one by one, African countries each received a phone call...telling them that in exactly five years the aid taps would be shut off permanently?"(xi)
20 internautes sur 25 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
5.0 étoiles sur 5 global citizenship primer 20 mars 2009
Par Byron Reimus - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Relié
While this book is about Africa, many of the overall insights, lessons, etc. Dambisa Moyo puts on paper here apply as much to the all but frozen state of postwar development and aid policies in many other parts of the world today. This is easily one of the most important, well-written and documented books on the chronic band-aid solutions to the Third World challenges promulgated not just by celebrities and philanthrocapitalists but First World governments, foundations and other institutions still stuck in the early part of the 20th century. Moyo's remarkable treatise should be required reading for public as well as private sector leaders.
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&quote;
Post-war aid can be broken down into seven broad categories: its birth at Bretton Woods in the 1940s; the era of the Marshall Plan in the 1950s; the decade of industrialization of the 1960s; the shift towards aid as an answer to poverty in the 1970s; aid as the tool for stabilization and structural adjustment in the 1980s; aid as a buttress of democracy and governance in the 1990s; culminating in the present-day obsession with aid as the only solution to Africas myriad of problems. &quote;
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&quote;
In most functioning and healthy economies, the middle class pays taxes in return for government accountability. Foreign aid short-circuits this link. Because the governments financial dependence on its citizens has been reduced, it owes its people nothing. &quote;
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&quote;
This is the micromacro paradox. A short-term efficacious intervention may have few discernible, sustainable long-term benefits. Worse still, it can unintentionally undermine whatever fragile chance for sustainable development may already be in play. &quote;
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