Desert Generals [Anglais] [Relié]

This work is a study of military leadership under stress, not a detailed blow-by-blow campaign history. The setting is the Libyan and Egyptian deserts, between June 1940 and January 1943. The perspective is thoroughly British and the fluctuating tide of British military fortunes is depicted by a detailed examination of the five key commanders in this period. Originally written in 1960, this work was revised in 1981 to incorporate the later information on the role of Enigma. Although Barnett's main contention - that General Montgomery's accomplishments were more mythical than factual - is not addressed until the last chapters, it is the primary intent of the author to debunk this myth.

The first chapters deal with the opening of the desert war and the initial victories of Field Marshal Wavell and General O'Connor over the Italians. Beda Fomm was O'Connor's brilliant victory, but today it is overshadowed by Rommel's battles. Despite the extent of these victories, the victors were soon forgotten: O'Connor was captured in the initial attack of the German Afrika Korps and Wavell was relieved by Churchill. Although this was an interesting phase of the war for the British, these chapters lack the dynamic quality that the rest of the book has.

General Sir Alan Cunningham, a hero of the campaign in Ethiopia, was sent to replace O'Connor. He was the first British general to face Rommel on even terms, but he lasted in command for only three months. When Cunningham took command, the British were still reeling from Rommel's first offensive and desperately attempting to raise the siege of Tobruk. Cunningham presided over the premature Operation "Crusader" to relieve Tobruk, constantly goaded by Churchill to strike at once. Barnett's portrait of Cunningham is interesting in two respects. First, as a successful colonial soldier suddenly thrust into command of a large mechanized army, Cunningham fumbled Operation Crusader (although more for non-technical reasons, like failure to achieve mass at the decisive point or maintain unity of effort). Cunningham was able to recover and muddle through to a victory of sorts, but suffered a loss of confidence that was fatal to his continued command. This is Barnett's second interesting point, on the strain of battle command upon the commander. Ostensibly, Cunningham was relieved due to "battle fatigue" but the erosion of his command authority and confidence was closer to the truth.

General Auchinleck, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mideast, then made a disastrous choice in selecting General Ritchie to temporarily command the 8th Army. Although Operation Crusader had forced Rommel to abandon the siege of Tobruk and pull back, Ritchie took over command as the Germans swept back up to the Gazala line outside Tobruk. Ritchie was well-connected politically and he possessed a soldierly image but unfortunately, his professional abilities were modest. Ritchie was unimaginative and indecisive - fatal attributes when faced by an adversary like Rommel - and his static defense and piece-meal use of armor resulted in the 8th Army's greatest defeat. After Tobruk was lost and Rommel pushed into Egypt, Auchinleck decided to relieve Ritchie and take over command of the 8th Army himself.

Barnett's portrait of Auchinleck and his chief-of-staff Dorman-Smith is intended to vindicate these men as the true saviors of Egypt and British military fortunes in Africa. The case is persuasive. Although only in command for a few months, Auchinleck stopped Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein and began the process of re-organizing the 8th Army into a more effective force. Dorman-Smith was a military intellectual, and he accurately predicted Rommel's likely course of action and advised Auchinleck on British dispositions. Unfortunately, Churchill visited Egypt right after 1st Alamein and Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith were relieved. The reasons are ambiguous, but the purge was due to political and personal reasons much more than military factors. The benefactor was General Montgomery, who became the new commander of 8th Army.

Barnett's portrait of Montgomery is even more unflattering than most American portrayals of this controversial general. I was unaware, for example, that while at Sandhurst Montgomery has set another cadet on fire as part of a hazing incident (and even recounted it in his memoirs). Montgomery took command when the British were finally receiving massive reinforcements in Egypt and Rommel's forces were at their weakest. Engima decryption also gave Montgomery valuable insight into the enemy's strength and weaknesses. Nevertheless, Montgomery's set-piece Second Battle of El Alamein was nearly a failure. The breakthrough battle was a muddle that nearly foundered on Rommel's minefields and anti-tank barriers. When German supply difficulties finally helped to turn the battle his way, Montgomery clearly fumbled the pursuit and allowed the Afrika Korps to escape. However, Barnett cites the creation of the Montgomery Myth - that his battles all went according to plan and that he was invincible - as necessary to restoring bruised British military prestige. In these pages, Montgomery is clearly labeled as a vainglorious liar of limited military capabilities, but with a keen eye for public relations.

This book is an excellent study of command. For these readers who believe that Hitler interfered with the German war effort, this book is valuable for showing how Churchill also interfered. Churchill's Greek adventure in 1941 weakened the British in North Africa at a critical moment, as well as his diversion of forces to the Far East in December 1941. Likewise, Churchill's insistence on holding indefensible Tobruk in 1942 led to a great British disaster. Furthermore, Churchill was constantly badgering his commanders to attack which reduced the amount of time they had to learn their commands and build up their forces.

There are only two areas I can fault in this book. First, the sketch maps are absolutely awful. The reader will need to find other campaign maps to support the text because these are crude in the extreme. The second area is on the strategic impact of the war in the desert. Several times, Barnett makes the assertion that the war could have been lost if the Germans had broken through at El Alamein. Of course, Barnett is British and the British would like to have everyone believe that the British Army won the Second World War (or at least prevented it from being lost). Barnett also parades "what if" fantasies about German troops reaching the Persian Gulf in a month or even going on to India. This is nonsense, even without hindsight. Rommel's logistics were stretched to the breaking point getting to El Alamein but Barnett makes it sound like going an extra 1,500 miles would be easy. The book lacks balance in placing the Desert War in its proper historical perspective: it was a sideshow for the Germans and a valuable training ground for the British, but the war was decided elsewhere. Loss of Cairo did not equate to loss of the war. Barnett might have done well to remember that Napoleon's conquest of Egypt under similar circumstances (British naval superiority) did not produce any great strategic result for him. It is hard to see how Rommel's handful of troops and tanks could have done much beyond taking Cairo and even harder to see how holding Cairo would have saved Hitler's empire.

I don't think I may have read a better account of Desert War than Barnett's Desert Generals.By all means a revisionist history ,the book traces the careers of five British Generals in North Africa: O'Connor,Cunnigham,Ritchie,Auchinleck,Montgomery.Their operations represent collective British effort in preventing Rommel's Deutsche Afrika Korps from seizing Egypt, Middle East.

The book opens with brilliant campaign of Maj Gen O'Connor which began as a raid but climaxed in the Battle of Bedda Fomm resulting in the destruction Rudolpho Graziani's Italian Tenth army.Unfortunately British political establishment in London failed to exploit this victory.O'Connor's Western Desert force could have easily taken Tripolitania thus completing the conquest of Italian North African empire.Instead forces were diverted to Greece .This was a blunder of monumental proportions for which Churchill must be held accountable.

The diversion prolonged North African campaign,for it helped Germans land troops in Tripolitania.Besides forces assigned to the Far East were sucked into the defence of egypt ;consequently British were unable to resist Japanese onslaught.Author also is highly critical of Churchill's direction of war in North African theatre.PMs continous prodding led to Battle Axe-premature offensive to defeat Rommel-which ended in a fiasco.Ultimately Gen Wavell was made the scapegoatand had to resign.

Poor British performance continued under generals who succeded O'Connor.How can we explain heavy British defeats in Desert War?
Author says this was due to poor,faulty armoured tactics.During Crusader offensive General Cunnigham split the armour across length and breadth of the battle field.Instead armour should have been massed enabling it to strike like a clenched fist.Cardinal failure of British was unlike Germans they failed to organise Combined Arms Teams with tank as the pivot.Mad onrush of tanks against fixed German defences without artillery support led to heavy losses.Barnett attributes this to comparmentalised,orthodox ,regimental tradition of British army.

British tactical conduct of battle improved considerably under Gen Auchinleck's dynamic leadership.Author calls Auk as the man who saved Egypt.Against this it must be said when Rommel started probing Egypt's defences Afrika korps had shot its bolt.Ammunition and fuel shortages -due to failure of Axis High Command to neutralise Malta-crippled the movement of German armour.Besides Rommel had lost the services of his efficent Radio Intelligence Service commanded by Alfred Seebohm.With the result he had no idea of British plans ,intentions ,capabilities and was now boxing in the dark.

On the other hand his opponent had a clear picture of Rommel's intentions thanks to Enigma decrypts.Auchinleck's calculated aggression helped British defend Egypt.Swift punches here, there unhinged Rommel throwing his battle plans into disarray.

The book contains virulent criticism of Montgomery's generalship.Firstly ,author condemns Montgomery for claiming credit for repelling Rommel at Alam Halfa.Facts show the plan for repelling German assault had been devised by Auchinleck with the help of his brilliant chief of staff Eric Dorman Smith.Montgomery while becoming Commander of desert army inherited those plans and put them into effect.With the battle progressing favorably ,Montgomery ,according to the author,botched the opportunity of annhilating Rommel's Panzer Armee.He could have done so by unleashing his armour from Alam Halfa ridge which would have descended into the Africa Korps rear- at a time when it had bitten deep into British defences-severing it from its base.There would have been no El-Alamein then.

Further author impugns the wisdom of fighting this set- piece battle.Auchinleck's successful defence of Egypt prompted the Allies to sent a expeditionary force to North Africa.Landings which were to be effected on Rommel's rear would have compelled him to abandon fixed defences and withdraw.British then could have launched their superior mechanised forces to cut off retreating Germans.Instead yearning for national prestige made them fight a battle which came close to disaster.

Author faults Montgomery's breakthrough plan .Armour was used a battering ram.Sheer weight of metal helped Eighth Army hack,crunch their way through German defences.Despite suffering tremendous losses Montgomery knew that victory would be his.Thanks to Ultra, he knew German strength was ebbing away.If he could sustain this attrition for few more days enemy would break.This happened precisely.Despite possessing superior mobility British failed to cut off retreating Germans owing to the chaotic nature of their advance.

All the above are intresting observations which have combined to demolish Montgomery myth.No doubt book raised a storm when it was first published in 1960.I feel author has displayed remarkable courage,intellectual honesty in challenging the established views which made this book military classic.

What follows is from the preface of Desert Generals, and it is THE reason to read this book:

"The theme of this book is the struggle of individual will against circumstance. The subject matter is human characer. In these five uncommon men during the Desert Campaigns (of World War II), as in the condensed action of a tragedy, were displayed nobility, frailty, resolution, loyalty, indecison, vanity, fear, simplicity, selfishness, greatness and littleness..."

"Desert Generals" delivers all of that and more..much more.

And make it six generals, not five. The Desert Fox, Erwin Rommel, must be included as well. Six generals, five British, one German, a study in character, leadership, the lack of it, and meddling politicians in a time of war.

Good read. Very good. It's about men, not war.