From Publishers Weekly
This is a book whose argument would be more effective had the author not apparently refocused his manuscript after September 11. Alexander, a journalist and writer of general audience works on military subjects, challenges the relevance and effectiveness of the "Western way of war" as articulated by, among others, Victor Davis Hanson and John Keegan. That model emphasizes intense, direct conflict focused on decisive battles whose outcomes are determined by relative loss rates. Alexander's "13 rules," in contrast, emphasize indirection: striking at weak spots, employing deception, paralyzing systems as opposed to killing men. Though the research bases of Alexander's case studies are uniformly thin, he does not seriously abuse his evidence. Most of the battles he cites in demonstration of a particular "rule" more or less support the argument. Cannae, for example, is an appropriate example of a battle of encirclement. Yet Alexander (How Hitler Could Have Won World War II) also seeks to connect his "rules of war" directly to the contemporary "war on terror." In this case, the drastic asymmetries between the adversaries make the relationships to historic battles fought by more similar forces difficult to establish. Alexander usually winds up postulating a connection rather than demonstrating it. The link, for example, between operational-level "cauldron battles" like those fought in Russia in 1941, and the tactics employed by the U.S. in Afghanistan against the Taliban, is at best tenuous, if not entirely inferential. Alexander's case should not be dismissed, but is best approached with intellectual caution. As the U.S. prepares for war, look for interest in this title to be high.
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From Library Journal
Using the works of Sun Tzu as a framework, Alexander has formulated 13 rules by which wars are won: striking at enemy weakness, feigning retreat, striking at a weak spot, etc. He devotes a chapter to each rule, describing famous battles that serve as examples of his rules in action, and then concludes each chapter with a post-9/11 implication as to the rule's application to the future of warfare. Some of Alexander's works, such as Lost Victories and How the Great Generals Win, show much original insight; others, like The Future of Warfare and How Hitler Could Have Won World War II, are not exceptional. The present work could be seen as a sequel to How the Great Generals Win, as it describes many of the same battles, and, logically, the great generals (from Napoeon and Genghis Khan to U.S. Grant and Erwin Rommel) utilized many of these principles for victory. His implications for the future are not especially thought-provoking, but this book can still serve as an excellent introduction to his work. Alexander's writing style is fluid, and his insights into many of the battles original. Recommended for military collections.
Richard Nowicki, Emerson Vocational H.S., Buffalo, NY
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Richard Nowicki, Emerson Vocational H.S., Buffalo, NY
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.
