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In the Shadow of Violence [Format Kindle]

Douglass C. North , John Joseph Wallis , Steven B. Webb , Barry R. Weingast

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Descriptions du produit

Revue de presse

'This book is a welcomed and outstanding companion to Violence and Social Orders by North, Wallis, and Weingast. The editors apply the earlier framework to numerous countries and draw lessons from which we gain considerable insights into modern development.' Lee J. Alston, University of Colorado

'The rigorous analyses of In the Shadow of Violence empirically demonstrate the explanatory power of the theory advanced by North, Wallis, and Weingast in Violence and Social Orders, corroborating their novel understanding of economic underdevelopment as a violence-reducing equilibrium.' Benito Arruñada, University Pompeu Fabra, Spain

'In In the Shadow of Violence, eight knowledgeable specialists address the politics and economics of eight key countries in the developing world. They explore as well what North, Wallis, and Weingast call the logic of 'limited access', wherein, it is held, political order comes at the expense of sustained economic growth. Using case materials, they evaluate this claim and teach us much about the political economy of development.' Robert Bates, Harvard University

'The essays in this provocative volume, written by analytically attuned area experts, give flesh and bones to the theoretical perspective on 'limited access orders' developed in Violence and Social Orders. The studies show how the World Bank's attempts to transform countries into 'open access orders' typically yield more violence than development. The well-acclaimed editors offer an alternative approach to development policy - working within 'limited access orders' in order to improve people's livelihoods.' David D. Laitin, Stanford University

'Through the insightful, well-documented case studies in this volume, we discover that control of violence is central to the experiences of the least and most successful developing countries of the last 50 years. The lesson from their experiences is as compelling as it is unpalatable: success - peace - may depend on allowing elites to retain large rents and supporting organizations that make it easier for elites to collude. This book is necessary reading for development professionals and political economy scholars alike.' Philip Keefer, The World Bank

'North, Wallis, and Weingast come down to earth to apply their ideas to the details of poor countries' problems and institutions. Finally we are headed in the right direction. I hope Jim Kim buys everyone at the World Bank a copy; it won't leave my desk for years.' James Robinson, Harvard University

Présentation de l'éditeur

This book applies the conceptual framework of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast's Violence and Social Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2009) to nine developing countries. The cases show how political control of economic privileges is used to limit violence and coordinate coalitions of powerful organizations. Rather than castigating politicians and elites as simply corrupt, the case studies illustrate why development is so difficult to achieve in societies where the role of economic organizations is manipulated to provide political balance and stability. The volume develops the idea of limited-access social order as a dynamic social system in which violence is constantly a threat and political and economic outcomes result from the need to control violence rather than promoting economic growth or political rights.

Détails sur le produit

  • Format : Format Kindle
  • Taille du fichier : 3842 KB
  • Nombre de pages de l'édition imprimée : 376 pages
  • Utilisation simultanée de l'appareil : Jusqu'à  appareils simultanés, selon les limites de l'éditeur
  • Editeur : Cambridge University Press (31 août 2012)
  • Vendu par : Amazon Media EU S.à r.l.
  • Langue : Anglais
  • ASIN: B009XAGMYG
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Amazon.com: 4.0 étoiles sur 5  8 commentaires
7 internautes sur 7 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
5.0 étoiles sur 5 Government-sponsored monopoly corruption nations 10 février 2013
Par William Garrison Jr. - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Broché|Commentaire client Vine pour produit gratuit (De quoi s'agit-il?)
"In The Shadow of Violence", ed. by Douglass North, et. al., (Jan. 2013). This book is everything about "Limited Access Orders" (LAO). So what's an LAO? According to the authors, an LAO is a "way or organizing a society" whereby "developing societies limit violence through the manipulation of economic interests by the political system in order to create rents so that powerful groups and individuals find it in their interest to refrain from using violence" (p.3). Essentially, the authors spin the old adage "There is no honor amongst thieves" into "thieves may find it economically beneficial to engage in truces to avoid extinction." Sort of like when the La Cosa Nostra mobsters of the 1950s tried to carve up franchise territories that could be controlled by a particular crime `family member' without having to fear violent competition from other `frenimies'. These co-authors take this LAO `developing' families concept beyond the familiar Al Capone and Mexican cartel `protection racket' business models. They expand their LAO concept to include "monopolies." Unfortunately, they don't differentiate between `natural' versus `political' monopolies. Essentially, a `natural' monopoly is one whereby an inventor develops a business/product that outshines (out sells) anything similar on the market, until someone else comes along and develops a better mousetrap. Whereas a `political' monopoly is one whereby dictators or oligarchs are able to entice/bribe some government entity to give them a non-competitive monopoly control over some segment of the economy. Such as the lucrative monopolies that Filipino family members of Pres. Marcos were able to obtain from their patron. The authors should have really differentiated between these two types of monopolies. Besides studying the LAO structure of The Philippines, the authors discuss similar corrupt LAO monopolies in Bangladesh (and Pakistan), Chile, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mexico, Mozambique, Zambia, and South Korea (of Pres. Park). Would I give this book to my mother (or any one's mom) to read? No - but maybe if I wanted her to fall asleep more speedily; I mean, it's a doosy dozer; not really captivating reading. For economists and policy wonks. Similar to, but much more statistical and detailed than "Why Nations Fail" by Daron Acemoglu.
3 internautes sur 3 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
3.0 étoiles sur 5 An Intriguing Explanation of Violence for the Academic Crowd 3 avril 2013
Par Michael Griswold - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Broché|Commentaire client Vine pour produit gratuit (De quoi s'agit-il?)
In the Shadow of Violence uses a framework previously developed by Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast in previous work to nine developing countries to illustrate how political control of economic resources is used to limit violence and coordinate coalitions of powerful organizations.

The central idea of the book is that development is difficult, not because politicians are socially and morally bankrupt, but that economic institutions are manipulated in the attempt to provide stability and political order. Politicians end up spending so much money on these socially constructed low-access orders that there's little left for development.

While the ideas themselves are intriguing, this book reads as though it was intended for upper level graduate students, rather than the general readership. I often had to stop just to figure out if what I read made any sense and/or reread sections.

This book is not for the novice or someone who dabbles in political economy/development politics. What I do look is that all of the case studies seem to correspond nicely to the framework outlined in the front of the book: going from the least developed to most developed countries they include.

Though the cases themselves were interesting, this reader often found themselves lost in verbiage.
4.0 étoiles sur 5 interesting extension of economic models to violence 19 mai 2013
Par Enjolras - Publié sur Amazon.com
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I come from the political science discipline, so I'm sympathetic to the idea of using economic and political tools to study political phenomenon. In fact, I applaud the use of these analytical tools to the study of political violence. The idea of Limited Access Orders is brilliant. In short, the authors argue that some governments must expend so many resources just to manage and control society, and mitigate violence, that development is hindered. This framework is a challenge to the conventional view that development is hindered by greedy politicians or lack of resources. The authors are careful never to simply absolve local political elites, but do point out rational motive for some seemingly irrational policies.

I'm generally not one to say that scholars need to take into account every development from every field on a subject. However, in this case it might have helped to take into account some of the more traditional accounts of kleptocracy in the case studies. For example, we saw the Marcoses not just reward and punish supporters, but also stole huge sums of money for personal use, including Imelda's notorious shoe collection. I'm presuming the authors don't think the shoe collection helped political stability.

This book is an academic work by top political economists. However, as with many Cambridge academic tomes, it's also fairly readable. That said, it's not for the general audience. I'd recommend it only for students with at least a college level course in comparative politics.
3 internautes sur 5 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
3.0 étoiles sur 5 if you only have a hammer, everything is a nail 2 mars 2013
Par tom abeles - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Broché|Commentaire client Vine pour produit gratuit (De quoi s'agit-il?)
The most valuable part of this book is the case studies presented. The worst feature of the book is the attempt by the various authors to shoehorn their research into the Limited Access Order (LAO) and its variances created by the editors of the volume in a previous volume, Violence and Social Order. The first problem as this reviews title suggests, is that the editors are all economists, mostly affiliated with the conservative think-tank, the Hoover Institution. This means that the authors want to create a frame or model of development cast primarily in economic terms when the reality, as we are seeing today with the middle east, is that the world is really more complex; and, as the rise of heterodox economics points out, not all stability and evolution within a country can be analyzed within such a limited frame. To do so is like cutting off the toes of the ugly sisters to try to fit their feet into Cinderella's slipper.

Then we have the question of why one would go through the effort to create the model at all. Science creates models and adheres to protocols so that research can be duplicated for validation and have predictive power. Today, some in the sciences are even questioning this approach with the rise of "Big Data" and fast computers like IBM's Watson. Others point out the uncertainty with models when looked at through the lens of complexity theory. Unfortunately, as the case studies show, one can learn a lot from the history of developing countries, but the case studies presented here are qualitative research, not even consistant between the work of the various authors. So we find these interesting and informative but the volume fails to convince one that to appreciate the analysis that LAO is necessary to extract "lessons learned". Each of these countries has been studied by other disciplines, thus it might be worthwhile to do comparisons by looking through different academic lenses.
4.0 étoiles sur 5 More research needed 16 juillet 2013
Par Junglies - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Broché|Commentaire client Vine pour produit gratuit (De quoi s'agit-il?)
I selected this book while still part of the way through the recent work by Pippa Norris Making Democratic Governance Work: How Regimes Shape Prosperity, Welfare, and Peacealthough I was not very familiar with the contributions by North at that time. The contrast between the approach of the political scientist (Norris) and the economist (North) is acute. Whilst reading for my first BA in Economics I had selected Development Economics as one of my specialist areas and later became familiar with the work of, and the author, Lord (Peter) Bauer.

In the Shadow of Violence utilizes a Case Study approach which does not sit easily with me, having been trained in the rigorous discipline of economics as is traditionally taught.

I found that the quality of the case studies varied considerably with authors and I was irritated with much repetition and verbosity with some more that others.

That aside, I found the hypothesis of the authors interesting and relevant but at the same time I felt that the subjects under the microscope lacked real operational applicability.

If one looks at Norris' work, she backs up her claims with research studies from other fields as well as her own while the contributors to the North volume repeatedly talk about rents, but their papers are too general and ill-defined to be considered proof. Indeed, one is oft reminded of Popper's dictum, that a theory that explains everything, explains nothing.

I was also struck by the fact that the papers consider states which are said to be at various points on a closed-open access spectrum but do not include problematic states like Zimbabwe which would be a challenge to the mode of analysis.

Overall I do consider this book to provide some valuable insights but it needs to refine and clarify and make operational some of the central concepts such that a more rigorous set of research studies can be carried out.
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