Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev [Anglais] [Broché]

Yegor Ligachev was a member of the Politburo during the Priemership of Mikhail Gorbachev. While in the early days of Perestroika Ligachev supported it because he saw it as a way to renew Socialism, he opposed efforts by anti-communists who seized control of the Perestroika process and sought to restore capitalism and dismantle the Soviet Union. Whether you agree with Ligachev and his support for continuing Socialism or not this is a fascinating account of the political dealings in the Kremlin during the Gorbachev period. Kremlinologist Stephen Cohen wrote the introduction to the book and Cohen has several disagreements with the author such as whether people like Ligachev who opposed the more radical free market reforms in the Soviet Union should be considered Conservatives. That appelation doesn't fit since Yigachev and others like him were at teh left end of the political spectrum in the Soviet Union while Yakovlev and his allies were at the right end. The radical Perestroika forces should therefore be considered the conservatives.

I wish the author had given a better explanation as to why Gorbachev allowed the anti-communists to gather power in the Soviet government and didn't do more to oppose themand how people like Yakovlev reached the top of the Soviet government in the first place. The author mentions his intention to write a second volume which I hope would answer these questions.

Those who label Ligachev a "bitter old Communist reactionary" obviously are grinding an ideological axe, and didn't bother with Stephen Cohen's indispensible introduction. Only those committed a priori to the downfall of the USSR demonized Ligachev in such terms - confirming the very points raised in his memoir.

As Cohen discusses in the introduction, this book is self-serving like all political memoirs - it's far from the "true story." But it's a necessary prism in decoding the full history of the perestroika era. Ligachev's main thesis - that Gorby unleashed forces he couldn't control, like a sorcerer's apprentice - has a credible basis. In separating the party from the state, it wasn't long before the state itself came apart. Which raises the question Ligachev addresses: was the USSR reformable?

Yes - but on its own terms, Ligachev argues. Gorbachev strayed from Andropov's original vision, importing Western forms not compatible with "Soviet reality." Such Soviet-realistic reforms would have focused on pluralism within the CPSU, not outside it; on building upon other social structures than nationalism to revitalize Soviet society. Gorby was caught between appeasing Western leaders and banks, and leading his own empire, and fell into the breach.

Is the world better off for Ligachev being the loser? Gorby himself joined his former aide in the ash heap of history, but there's no evidence that what followed in Moscow or the rest of the world has been any improvement. Corruption is worse than under Brezhnev; similarly, "New Russia's" wars have been just as brutal. There is no "empire," but then there is no counterweight to NATO. The thought of placing missiles in the heart of Europe, or unceasing "wars on terror" in the Middle East, or unilateral "global force projection" were unreal in Ligachev's time - and should have stayed so.

Former Politburo member Yegor Ligachev's account on the merits and shortcomings of perestroika demonstrates precisely how the CPSU (especially its conservative elements) were separated from the reality of tremendous social changes that had taken place in Soviet society. For Ligachev, perestroika is encapsulated in the contradictory slogan "More democracy! More socialism!" and an unequivocal claim that "we are trying to eliminate the alienation of the producer from the means of production". It is highly doubful that the average Soviet citizen thought about Marxist dogmas when their country was being torn apart by economic shortages and ethnic conflict.