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A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East (Anglais) Broché – 26 avril 2012

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A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East + Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain's Secret War in Arabia, 1916-18
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Descriptions du produit

Revue de presse

'With superb research and telling quotations, Barr has skewered the whole shabby story...The convulsion of that fateful line in the sand are still being felt today - not only in the Middle East, but throughout the world' --Michael Binyon, The Times
'Racy... [Barr] is right to assert that few British readers grasp the ferocity of Anglo-French antagonism in the Levant' --Max Hastings, Sunday Times

Quatrième de couverture

'One of the unexpected responses to reading this masterful study is amazement at the efforts the British and French each put into undermining the other' The Spectator
In 1916 two men secretly agreed to divide the Middle East between them.
Sir Mark Sykes was a visionary politician; François Georges-Picot a diplomat with a grudge. They drew a line
in the sand from the Mediterranean to the Persian frontier, and together remade the map of the Middle
East, with Britain's 'mandates' of Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, and France's in Lebanon and Syria. Over the next
thirty years a sordid tale of violence and clandestine political manoeuvring unfolded,
told here through a stellar cast of politicians, diplomats, spies and soldiers, including T. E. Lawrence, Winston
Churchill and Charles de Gaulle.
Using newly declassified papers from the British and French archives, James Barr vividly depicts the covert,
deadly war of intrigue and espionage between Britain and France to rule the Middle East, and reveals for the
first time the shocking way in which the French finally got their revenge.

'The very grubby coalface of foreign policy ... I found the entire book most horribly addictive' Independent
'He has scoured the diplomatic archives and has come up with a rich haul that brings his narrative to life' Financial Times

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Détails sur le produit

  • Broché: 464 pages
  • Editeur : Simon & Schuster (26 avril 2012)
  • Langue : Anglais
  • ISBN-10: 1847394574
  • ISBN-13: 978-1847394576
  • Dimensions du produit: 13 x 3 x 19,8 cm
  • Moyenne des commentaires client : 5.0 étoiles sur 5  Voir tous les commentaires (1 commentaire client)
  • Classement des meilleures ventes d'Amazon: 152 en Livres anglais et étrangers (Voir les 100 premiers en Livres anglais et étrangers)
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3 internautes sur 3 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile  Par Pr Agr JC DEPRESSEUX, Manosque le 26 octobre 2012
Format: Broché Achat vérifié
Ouvrage bien structuré et documenté, permettant au lecteur averti mais non spécialiste une meilleure compréhension de la genèse des conflits qui agitent le Proche Orient. Qui a prétendu que l'histoire ne repassait pas les plats ?
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Désolé, nous n'avons pas réussi à enregistrer votre vote. Veuillez réessayer

Commentaires client les plus utiles sur Amazon.com (beta)

Amazon.com: 10 commentaires
3 internautes sur 3 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
thoroughly entertaining review of one of the most tempestuous periods in modern history 27 avril 2014
Par Adam Royale - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Format Kindle Achat vérifié
James Barr's enthralling tale is well told and even better researched as it takes us through the tortuous roads of colonial intrigue that finally releases the forces and tensions of the modern Middle East. The book depicts both Britain and France as the midwives of the state of Israel whose rivalries also gives birth to the grotesque and grissly monsters that has become today's Syria, Iraq and of course Palestine. Highly recommended to anyone who would like to understand the political and social dilemmas facing middle eastern politicians and populace would try to work for a lasting peace in the Region. If ever there is an expose of the thoroughly discredited policies of colonial conquest and rule, this book demonstrates it in an understated and thoroughly human way. Highly recommended
3 internautes sur 4 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
Colonial Rivalry 22 septembre 2012
Par kadiya - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Format Kindle Achat vérifié
Barr reveals just how caustic the jealousies of the colonial rivals, France and Britain, were in the first part of the 20th century. It is fascinating to observe how the petty conceits of a national leader can affect the history of nations. I was surprised at how far the British went to appease de Gaulle, while they were actually supposed to be allies. The book was entertaining in the way it recorded surreptious methods in which the actual characters on the ground in Syria and Palestine circumvented the constraints of Whitehall to do what was best in Britain's interest. Intriguing!
This well-written and researched book has been spoiled by a ... 20 février 2015
Par Richard Lightbown - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Broché
This well-written and researched book has been spoiled by a plethora of petty errors and omissions. This limits its use as an academic source. I did not record all the inaccuracies that I noticed, but the following come to mind:
1) Britain did no ‘seize’ Cyprus in 1878 (p9): it was leased to the British Empire following the Congress of Berlin.
2) Neither did Britain ‘seize’ the Suez Canal (p9): it took out a loan from Rothschild to buy the Egyptian Government’s stock.
3) In his account of the Fashoda Incident of 1898 Barr omits any reference to the Anglo-Egyptian victory under Kitchener at Omdurman earlier in that year when nearly 10,000 Sudanese were killed for the loss of 28 British and 20 Egyptians. It was hardly surprising therefore that the French force of 12 French officers and 150 Senegalese soldiers was ordered to withdraw after Kitchener arrived at Fashoda with 2,500 Sudanese soldiers and five gunboats with Maxim guns and field-guns.
4) The suggestion that Ronald Storrs was responsible for instigating the Hussein-McMahon correspondence (p23) is implausible, although the egotistical Storrs may have claimed this to have been so. Hussein’s son Abdullah had contacted Kitchener in February 1914 when the latter was British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt. Although Kitchener was non-committal, contacts had been maintained. Storrs, who was not fully fluent in Arabic, was more likely to have been responsible for the gaffs in the correspondence, such as the suggestion that Lebanese Christians were not Arabs.
5) Herbert Samuel is similarly credited for the work of others on p32. Samuel was certainly an ardent Zionist, but the real hard graft and intrigue to secure the Balfour Declaration was led by Chaim Weizmann, backed by Walter Rothschild.
6) Barr mentions on p51 that Allenby’s predecessor had twice failed to capture Gaza. In fact the town had been captured during the first Battle of Gaza but Dobell had feared a counter attack and had ordered a withdrawal. The exhausted troops were unable to recapture the town the following day. Barr does not mention that gas and tanks were used during the Second Battle although both were rendered ineffective by the heat and, in the case of the tanks, the sandy conditions. The town was razed by shelling from Australian artillery and the French Navy during the third battle.
7) The account of the riot at Haifa oil refinery is misleading. The Irgun had thrown grenades into a crowd of Arab workers killing six and wounding forty-two. This provoked the attack on Jewish workers in the refinery, for which Ilan Pappé gives different casualty figures (39 killed and 49 wounded). The Jewish Agency publically condemned the Irgun atrocity but secretly authorised the Hagannah to carry out retaliation. This took the form of raids on the villages of Balad al-Shaykh and Hawsha where houses were blown and set on fire and according to Zachary Lockman some 60 were killed, included women and children.
8) The death toll at Deir Yassin (p365) is generally reckoned to be much less than 250, even by scholars critical of the Zionist actions. Barr ought to have mentioned that the village had an agreement with the Hagannah that it would not allow Arab fighters to stay there and in return the Zionists had promised not to attack it. In consequence Haganah forces had not intended to take part in the attack. However Stern Gang and Irgun members had been unable to overcome resistance in the headman’s house (they were more familiar with caching bombs and ambushing soldiers and unarmed civilians) so a nearby Palmach unit was briefly called in to suppress the resistance.
9) The victims of the reprisal massacre on Mt Scopus in Jerusalem (p366) were not all non-combatants (Barr describes them as ‘doctors, nurses and students’). The dead included two members of the Irgun injured at Deir Yassin, and members of the armed escort from the Hagannah.
10) The Altalena which Barr describes on p364 as a 'landing craft' was actually a landing ship, tank (LST) of 4,800 tons.

The problem of this sloppy writing is that when Barr gets into original material from his own researches one is unable to to accept it at face value but is also unable to verify it from other sources. This considerably detracts from the value of the work as a source of reference.
The Bad and the Ugly without much Good. 29 janvier 2015
Par ahertzba - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Format Kindle Achat vérifié
A look at the an unfortunate period in the history of the Middle East with all the warts of self-interest and short sightedness -- the destructiveness of looking in the mirror and not out the window. There are few heroes, though I'm sure that each of the adversaries have a different and self-justifying story to tell. Alas, the spinning does nothing to alleviate the results attained. Despite the "where you sit determines where you stand" truism, bad policies come home to roost, as in "what comes around goes around." This book is an excellent integration of complex, multi-faceted events and a sad read.
2 internautes sur 3 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
Disapointed 9 mai 2014
Par BILL RIORDAN - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Format Kindle Achat vérifié
This is more of a history text-book or a student's reference book than a "good read". It falls into the trap which many such publications fall into, namely crediting the reader with a much greater knowledge and understanding of the underlying facts, issues, personalities and organisations than most non-academic readers, however interested in the subject, possess. This makes for very heavy going. No doubt a fine production but a little to esoteric for the majority of readers.
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