Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse (Anglais) CD – Livre audio, CD, Version intégrale
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Thomas Woods est toujours aussi dydactique, concis, et facile a comprendre. Il parvient a rendre presque amusant un sujet qui pourrait facilement devenir fastidieux, et dans la tradition de Hayek et Mises s'appuie sur une logique imparable, et non pas une ideologie quelconque.
En tous cas, c'est le meilleur ouvrage qui permette de comprendre facilement les origines reelles de la crise, qui sont diametralement opposees aux legendes repetees inlassablement par politiciens, medias, et "experts".
Les reels responsables de la crise actuelle sont avant tout les politiciens qui sont intervenus pour manipuler les marches immobiliers et financiers aux USA, et non pas "les marches", le "capitalisme", "les banques", les "paradis fiscaux" et autres boucs emissaires mis en avant par ces memes politiciens.
Cet ouvrage (comme les autres du meme auteur, en particulier The Church And The Market, ou les publications du Mises Institute - [...]) permet de comprendre le contre-sens absolu effectue par les gouvernements un peu partout, et donc d'anticiper le desastre qui s'annonce.
Comment les gouvernements et les banques centrales, en particulier le gouvernement U.S. et la Fed, provoquent des bulles par l'intermédiaire de la création inconsidérée de monnaie et de crédit, source d'endettement et de spéculation? En voilà l'explication.
Deux mythes sont détruits au passage: la mentalité "too big to fail" et la peur de la déflation. Les gouvernements et les autorités monétaires sont donc responsables en dernière analyse des cycles "boom-bust" dans un régime de monnaies fractionnaires. Les plans de sauvetage et de facilité monétaire ne font qu'aggraver les situations à long terme (leçon de Hazlitt), au lieu de s'attaquer à la mauvaise dérégulation et aux interventions déstabilisantes.
Il faut donc revenir à ce que dit la théorie autrichienne à propos du marché libre, de la monnaie saine et de l'étalon-or; et mettre fin à la manipulation monétaire.
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It is curious that Congress is on the verge of passing an economic stimulus bill that is opposed by nearly two thirds of Americans. Mr. Woods provides the logic behind the intuition of this increasingly disenfranchised majority. Americans opposed to further government meddling should read this book to fully arm themselves with the knowledge necessary to win the debate. Well-intentioned Americans who support government intervention in the economy should read this book to understand the unintended consequences of their support.
Partisan readers beware: regardless of your political affiliation, you will discover that your party shares in the blame for the mess we're in. It is best to check your party affiliation at the door before you read this book. But read it!
The first chapter quickly identifies fractional reserve central banking as the main driver of the current and previous economic downturns. It's a long-overdue call to debate the necessity of our Federal Reserve system.
The second chapter addresses the housing bubble, and how the loudest voices on all sides of the debate are proposing solutions to the symptoms instead of recognizing the real problem.
The third chapter addresses the government's futile reactions to the financial and economic crisis in the last months of 2008. It's amazing to see such recent history covered so well in a book.
The fourth chapter alone is well worth the price of the book. Mr. Woods explains in plain language that economic cycles are not natural phenomenon, but are caused by artificial manipulation of the money supply. The business cycle theory of Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek is explained in a manner easily understood by the layman reader.
Chapter five covers myths of the Great Depression. Understanding this time in our history has never been so important as it appears we are on the verge of repeating the same mistakes. Mr. Woods gleans lessons by comparing previous market busts and subsequent government reactions to them.
Again, the sixth chapter alone is worth the price of the book. Mr. Woods explains the nature of money. It's hard to believe how something we use every day can be such a mystery to us. It's impossible to effectively engage in the debate about fractional reserve central banking without understanding the nature of money. We learn in this chapter how money is a creation of the free market and not a government invention.
The book ends with a chapter that instructs us on what courses of action (or inaction) that we should take in order to restore a lasting prosperity. It is vastly different than the choices being proposed by our government and the media.
Whether you are a liberal, conservative, or something else, I implore you to read this concise, well-reasoned book. In the most important debate in our lifetimes, this book represents a side that is ignored by the media. Ignore it at your peril.
Which is, of course, a Problem, since as historian Thomas Woods notes in this important book, the Federal Reserve bears a large part of the blame for the mess we're in. In the first part of "Meltdown," Woods shows how both in theory (the Austrian School, to be precise) and in practice, Fed policy fueled an artificial boom and instead of allowing the necessary, if unpleasant, short-term bust that will lead to recovery, is pursuing policies guaranteed to drive us deeper into the abyss. Little of this finds its way into the popular or business press, suggesting that the people who know the truth aren't talking, and the people who are talking either don't know or are deliberately trying to keep the helicopter hidden. As Woods writes, "critics of the market who ignore the arguments raised in this chapter are, to say the least, not being honest" (p. 86).
But to paraphrase Will Rogers (no relation), it's not so much the things we don't know that are a problem, it's the things we DO know that aren't really true. That's why every bit as important as Woods' explanation of the role of the Federal Reserve in the unnecessary cycle of boom and bust is his taking down of decades' worth of myths about the government's role in the economy. As the author points out, historians have more or less abandoned the idea that New Deal intervention "got us out of the Depression," but the myth remains stronger than ever among journalists and the public. The result of this is not only a profound misunderstanding of American history, but more to the point, a widespread delusion that "history proves" massive government spending promoting consumer demand is the way out of a recession. Here again we see the apocalyptic power of bad ideas.
All this suggests the economic crisis, and particularly the stimulus-driven response to it on the part of the Bush and Obama administrations, are a domestic equivalent of the Iraq War (I want to note that this is my metaphor, not Woods'): an over-reaction to a situation by and large of our own creation, and sold to the American people through a series of lies, the plan largely benefits those who argue for it most strongly while the rest of us end up poorer. The "opposition" is arguing over details while conceding the fundamental principle -- an intervention that gives the government a foothold of occupation it will probably never relinquish.
That's why "Meltdown" is so important -- and why the Austrian School, which alone not only foresaw the coming crash but understood why it was going to happen, deserves so much wider attention. If I could improve anything about "Meltdown," I would have made even more prominent the citations of thinkers and books interested readers should pursue. Woods does do this in an appendix, and I strongly recommend you read the footnotes closely. But something like the "additional reading" or "books they don't want you to read" call-outs of the author's The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History would, I think, have been even more useful.
If "respectable opinion" does pay attention to this book and the ideas it promotes, it will do so with the same combination of pity and contempt that earlier book received. As Woods writes, "You do not win friends in the political and media establishments by proposing a monetary system that cannot be exploited by governments to enrich their friends, enable their addiction to spending and looting, and fund their bailouts" (p. 134). But out here among the non-establishment, you DO make friends by telling the truth. And Tom Woods has a lot of friends.
In brief, Wood's argument is that "conservatives" do in fact share a significant portion of the blame for the present crisis. This is not because, as the cannard goes, they "deregulated" the economy. Indeed, regulatory spending during the Bush presidency went up 65% in real terms, a fact that I am amazed escaped any notice in this book. (See Jan Reason Magazine, "Is Deregulation to Blame?") Nor is it because the Democrats somehow prevented them from providing enough oversight into Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac, two supposedly private companies which would never have existed were it not for their creation by government fiat. The real reason is because they allowed, and even collaborated in, a massive increase in currency inflation under Chairmans Greenspan and Bernacke and refused to heed warning signs about the consequent housing market bubble. Despite Republicans' recent discovery that the Community Reinvestment Act has been used of late to offer loans to people who obviously were not qualified for them, the fact is that "conservatives" have been just as guilty about manipulating markets as liberals have for the last two decades and neither will own up to real problem: our Federal Reserve System does not limit crises like these. It creates them.
In fingering the Fed as the cause of the current crisis, Woods is siding with a long line of dissenting economists popularly known as the Austrian School. These economists argue, in brief, that the boom and bust cycles of free economies (command economies avoid the cycle by remaining in virtually permanent depressions) are due to artificial increases in and contractions of the credit market, usually caused by government manipulation of the money supply. In Austrian theory interest rates are important because they reflect what consumption a person is willing to give up in the present for some future gain. One would not "borrow" to create a new product unless one had a reasonable expectation that the return would be greater than the interest rate. Of course, an entreprenuer could be wrong in her analysis, but the prevailing intrest rate still guides investment in the economy as a whole. Bad investments are quickly liquidated, and capital flows to new opportunities. But if markets are manipulated, say by inflationary policies, it is difficult to know if new investments are really that valuable, or just appear to be. Once money circulates through the economy and prices rise, it becomes obvious which investments were legitimate which were not, but in the meantime, there is a massive misalignment of resources, a problem the market "solves" with a recession.
Austrian theory does a very good job, as it happens, of explaining both the "dot com" bust of 2000 and the housing crisis of 2007-08. But the solutions Austrian theory proposes are politically unpopular, or perhaps more honestly, they are unpopular among the political class. The ideal solution is for government to stay out of the way and let the economy heal itself. Alas, that solution has not been tried since the 1920-21 depression, where it worked wonders in turning around a moribound economy. Instead, government officials like to take action and "do something" (ie. reward their political cronies under the guise of promoting the public good) and so they soak up useful capital for wasteful spending projects (more windmills anyone?) at precisely the time that capital is at a premium even for profitable pursuits. Governments also encourage more consumer spending (saving would do more good) and generally tax healthy businesses to subsidize those that should have been allowed to go bankrupt. Naturally, such policies accerbate the depression, but at least a few individuals benefit from them and government officials can proclaim their "successes" with these public examples. The private suffering their policies provoke are largely unnoticed and rarely connected to these policies.
To make sure that these consequences are brought home to people, Woods examines the two instances in history when Keynesian policies were most thoroughly employed: the Great Depression, and Japan from 1989 to the present. In both cases, Keynesian policies were practiced to the hilt and yet in both instances, the depression lingered on with no "real" success changing the economic crisis. This is because the problem was not with the crisis per se, but rather with the misallocation of resources from the preceding artificial "boom." A steadfast refusal to permit the reallocation of resources will simply prolong the situation, but that is exactly what governments do. There is, of course, a modern myth that the failure of the New Deal to solve the problems of the depression is just a modern right wing fantasy. The reality of course is that the New Dealer's themselves recognized their policies were a failure, and I was pleased to see Woods quote Secretary Henry Morganthau to this effect, "We have tried spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work..." (p. 149) But just to make sure the point is not missed by naive revisionists like Paul Krugman, who is if anything even more of an embarassment to the Nobel committee than Al Gore, Woods goes on to recount the experience of Japan with their 10 bailouts, decades of 0 interest rates, and a depression that is now worse than our own of the 30s. None of which will make any difference to the true believers. Indeed, Krugman insists Japan should have spent even more, though how much more he cannot specify.
And that leads to the ultimate problem with this otherwise nice little book. It is a rush job hoping to influence a debate that is already pretty much over. People overwhelmingly opposed the first 700 billion dollar bailout and it was voted through with strong bipartisan support. Many opposed the second as well, but it is even larger and already signed into law. Yes, House Republicans suddenly rediscovered their small government principles now that they are such a tiny minority their vote no longer matters. This hardly inspires much confidence in their future probity. But in the meantime, we have years of mismanagement (at best) before us and the likelyhood is decent for a prolonged recession, at the very least. Woods of course provides a few modest suggestions for real change: allow businesses to fail, cut government spending, deregulate, but "change" was never an actual goal of the electorate this last election. Had it been, we would have Ron Paul as President. But in trying to influence a debate that is for the most part over, Woods did not do his thesis the justice it deserves. As I noted at the start of my review, he does not touch upon the massive regulation of the economy under the Bush administration which contributed to this crisis. And he barely mentions the wild misappropriations of the first 700 billion package. How could he? Despite the fact we all knew they were coming (and this latest "stimulus" is probably worse) we are only now finding out the details behind this scandal. Part of the problem with writing history as it happens is that many of the most important details will be left out, either due to haste or necessity.
Thomas Woods is a top notch historian. He is certainly a better writer than the majority of American historians today. But valuable as this book is, it is incomplete. We know the effects of Bush Obama policies will be detrimental to the economy--indeed, they already are. But we do not know how this detriment will play out. Indeed, Americans are probably the preeminent entreprenuers in the world. A new industry in an as yet unrecognized, and hence unregulated, field may develop that will save this economy, much as the internet came in on the heels of federal mismanagement following the Savings and Loan debacle. The resulting wealth creation overwhelmed the government mismanagement that could have lead to a deeper recession or depression. And something similar may yet happen. It is more likely here than in Japan, I would suspect. Careful historians do not have to debase themselves into public pundits like Krugman does. I suspect that in two years time, this good book could have been a great book, explaining (not predicting) either a great depression, or a miracle of American individualism that somehow avoided it, and in either case it would have been a more effective warning against the failed policies of the past than this one, good as it is, could ever hope to be.
The "American dream" is a phrase attributed to American author James Truslow Adams in his 1931 book, _The Epic of America_. He wrote: "It is not a dream of motor cars and high wages merely, but a dream of social order in which each man and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable, and be recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances of birth or position."
In view of that, the modern interpretation has strayed far from the original meaning. In fact, the "American Dream" represents something more than the cars and big money that Adams warned about. Central planners and social engineers misappropriated the term, a long time ago, and put it into use as a slogan to convey a sense of entitlement and equality as they began to shape and subsidize the home ownership nation that started with the creation of Fannie Mae in 1938.
A new book by Regnery author Thomas E. Woods, Jr., _Meltdown_, suggests that the American dream became an American bubble brought on by the reckless, self-serving actions of government institutions that commenced a series of interventions that culminated in a collapse of the stock market and financial institutions, along with the rapid disintegration of the US economy. Ergo, the American nightmare.
Woods at once puts his finger on the unmistakable "elephant in the living room," the Federal Reserve System. As he points out, other than a few assorted rumblings, there has been almost no discussion in the mainstream media of the Federal Reserve's role in launching this crisis. The Federal Reserve, which centrally plans monetary policy and interest rates, sparked the crisis by drastically reducing interest rates beyond levels that would otherwise have been set by a free market. "Making cheap credit available for the asking does encourage excessive leverage, speculation, and indebtedness," Mr. Woods writes. He adds, "Manipulating interest rates and thereby misleading investors about real economic conditions does in fact misdirect capital into unsustainable lines of production and discombobulate the market." This begins the authors' explanation of the boom-bust phenomenon and how an artificial boom, and the financial holocaust it leaves behind, can be perfectly clarified and understood in terms of the Austrian theory of the business cycle.
--Turn on the Bubble Machine--
Thanks to the Fed's easy-credit policies, the housing bubble became ground zero for the catastrophe. Mr. Woods points out several factors that contributed to this mess, all of which were significant government interventions that emerged in order to fulfill a specific agenda. First there were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that had the benefit of an implied government backing, thus giving investors the appearance that their investments in these entities were essentially risk-free. Both entities were created for the sole purpose of intervening in the housing market and subsidizing home ownership, especially for the politically favored classes. Besides easing credit requirements so that banks could loan to dubious buyers, both Fannie and Freddie helped to spread the bubble's aftermath by buying mortgages on the secondary market and pooling and selling the mortgages in the form of mortgage-backed securities. Soon everyone was getting their mitts on these securities and holding them as investments, creating conditions that were ripe for disaster.
Another factor in the housing bubble that Woods points to is the Community Reinvestment Act, a law born in 1977 that was given a new lease on life from Bill Clinton. The CRA was a crusade to jettison traditional lending standards in favor of an equality-based agenda aimed at putting minorities and the poor into homes they couldn't afford. Woods points to a study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston that concluded, "even allowing for differences in creditworthiness, minority applicants were still getting mortgage loans at lower rates than whites." Consequently, it was determined that the mortgage banking industry was engaging in discriminatory lending policies and a massive government intervention was needed to stamp out the disparity. The result was the birth of the CRA, and the beginnings of a massive lending spree to unqualified, or subprime, borrowers.
In spite of the obvious problem of granting long-term loans to high-risk individuals, perhaps one of the more illuminating points made by Mr. Woods is that the subprime loan mishap may have been overemphasized while the flurry of impractical lending innovations, such as 100 percent loans, ARMs, and interest-only loans, were given less attention.
The push for relaxed lending standards for low and middle-income borrowers was so pervasive and systemic, persisting for a full decade, that it is no surprise that it should have spilled over into the standards for higher-income borrowers as well.
"...Not only were these easier mortgage terms available to speculators, but the surge in demand for housing caused by the much easier access to financing also led to increases in home prices that had the unintended effect of enticing speculators into the market in the first place."
Alan Greenspan, as chairman of the Federal Reserve, publicly put his stamp of approval on ARMs , thereby leading people to believe that they were reasonably safe options. Woods points out that the foreclosure crisis has not been confined to the subprime sphere, and in fact prime loan foreclosures increased in unison with subprime foreclosures.
--Weekend at Ben and Hank's--
In the spring of 2008, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulsen claimed "we are closer to the end of the market turmoil than the beginning." Rather, it was just the beginning, as Bear Stearns had collapsed and the Fed set up a bailout arrangement with JP Morgan so it could acquire the investment bank. What followed was a meltdown of the entire financial system that had been incorrectly assessed time and time again, by both Paulsen and fed Chairman Ben Bernanke.
The government seized control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac just a couple of months after it placed IndyMac Bank into receivership. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch was rescued by the Bank of America, Washington Mutual was seized by the FDIC, the government poured billions into the failing giant AIG, and Wachovia was scooped up by Wells Fargo. The White House responded by announcing its Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 that would give unprecedented powers to the US Treasury. This bailout bill was sold to the American people via repetitive, tactical scaremongering. Woods notes that the public was told:
"...all kinds of horror stories of what would happen to them if they failed to do as their betters told them: the decimation of their retirement plans, the collapse of housing prices, the inability of small businesses to make payroll (as if a healthy small business borrows to make payroll), and on and on. The bailout had to be passed right away."
This epic bill that was too big to read and passed too quickly for debate to take place, was put forth as necessary to breathe life back into an expiring economy that only the Fed-Gods could save with their collective financial genius and business acumen. Of course, once the Feds decide something is a "crisis," that opens the door to inescapable solutions, and only government can ever provide those solutions. Crisis, then, becomes the doorman for a massive series of government interventions. The "do something" mentality of the bureaucrats acted on impulse, and they made things up as they went along, changing their minds whenever it was convenient. This produced, in Mr. Woods's words, "a Weekend at Bernie's economy, with sunglasses and Hawaiian shirts on zombie companies supposed to give the impression of life and health."
The housing mania wasn't the only hiccup, however. The Federal Reserve had successfully ushered in a "No Adult Left behind" policy for the credit-intoxicated, consumption-crazed masses with its years of low interest rates. Government had created a credit dependent society in which people did not want to give up their newfound "prosperity" quite so easily. With the average American saving little or no earnings and living dangerously on the edge of insolvency, it became apparent that life in a bubble did not reflect real prosperity. Thus we witnessed the birth of a nation of Two-Thousandaires - those with a Hummer and a decked-out Chrysler 300, a huge house, all the latest toys, vacations that Bernie Madoff would envy, and $2,000 in the bank.
Soon thereafter came the nationalization of the banking system so that the credit markets could be propped up so the extravagant lifestyle people had come to depend on could be sustained indefinitely. Loan! Spend! Don't Save! Or so said the Keynesians who saw spending as being the key ingredient of a prosperous economy. Paulsen even lamented the illiquidity that was said to be "raising the cost and reducing the availability of car loans, student loans and credit cards." The lesson is this: give rise to more of what caused the financial mess in the first place.
--Government is to Blame--
After Mr. Woods lays out the house of cards that became the meltdown, he launches into an ample explanation of the government's boom-bust business cycle, along with an entire chapter of challenges to the conventional wisdom concerning the Great Depression and the countless fallacies that surround both its causes and cure. By invoking F.A. Hayek's theory of the business cycle, he aptly explains to the reader the basics of how things work in a free market and what happens when the visible hand of the Federal Reserve manipulates interest rates, distorts the supply of credit, and misrepresents investment opportunities for entrepreneurs, thereby leading them to commit clusters of errors that lead to the misallocation of resources. The Austrian theory of the business cycle, Woods says,
"Exonerates the free market of blame for the boom-bust cycle, since the factors that bring the cycle about - the artificially low interest rates that provoke the boom, and the foolish government interventions that prolong the bust, - are all examples of interference with the free market."
The other piece of evidence that the Fed's fingerprints are on this calamity is the money problem. Woods calls into question a monetary system that devalues the dollar, expropriates through the hidden tax of inflation, and manipulates the money supply in order to achieve specific political agendas. He refers to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 as "special-interest legislation masquerading as a public-spirited measure." As a follow-up, Woods puts forth the notion that a monetary system based on precious metals, or a commodity standard, is the only system available that will return America to a sound monetary policy free from entrenched political privileges and central planning machinations.
--Throw the Bums Out--
Readers oftentimes don't like reading a whole lot of abysmal revelations unless there are some promising solutions that follow. Tom Woods doesn't disappoint those who want to hear how the current system can be rescued from the grip of despots and placed onto a free-market foundation for building genuine prosperity. He speaks clearly to the free-market reforms that are necessary to convert America from a bankrupt nation to a free and flourishing republic. The solutions, however, are radical, and in fact, so radical that Ron Paul, who also sought the same reforms, was disavowed by his Republican Party members for the crime of endorsing the intellectual roots of this country's Founding Fathers.
Toss the too-big-to-fail baloney, says Woods, and let insolvent, inefficient, bloated giants fail, because the free market will take the best of what's left and make good use of it without having to poach the taxpayers' pockets for Friday night beer money. As to Fannie and Freddie, say goodbye, and as to all government bailouts of private institutions, good riddance. "Problems caused by excessive spending and indebtedness," says Woods, "cannot be cured by more spending and more indebtedness, any more than the cure for excessive lending is more excessive lending."
Finally, since "money is the most socialized sector in the American economy," it must be liberated from the hands of tyrants. Thus the subject of the Federal Reserve, then, must be put up for debate. The Fed generates economic instability through its monopoly on money, advances moral hazard, and conducts much of its affairs in secret, notes Woods, so it is time to put some new ideas on the table and allow the market to function as the bedrock for a free society.
Connoisseurs of Austrian economists, along with newbies to the freedom movement and everyone else in between, will find _Meltdown_ to be a compelling account that sheds light on the darkest economic times our generation has ever encountered.
This book is a godsend by clarifying what people have observed for years but couldn't piece together. It also helps to have someone of Mr. Woods' credentials as an historian and stalwart Catholic traditionalist hammer these point home. If it had been Murray Rothbard, Ron Paul, or Ludwig von Mises, or any of the Randians, the Paul Krugman's of the world would yell "Crank!" "Extremist!" or some other irrelevant charge, in order to distract us from the issue. Now after reading this book, which won't take you too long, you will know that this is not some curse from the gods but the deliberate result of government's incompetent operations.
He does provide solutions that are immediate and effective. Restoration of commodity money, repeal of the legal tender laws, and above all else ABOLITION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE. It does not take government sanctions to make money or to keep it's value. In fact the government has no business at all with money, outside of taxes. Thomas Woods demonstrates this on page after page, leaving no room for error or denial.
This book should be read in conjunction with Hazlitt's "Economics in One Lesson" Economics in One Lesson: The Shortest and Surest Way to Understand Basic Economics for a one-two punch against the welfare-warfare state. We have now reached the point where we LITERALLY cannot afford the lunacy of liberals and conservatives alike.
(I want you to go out and commit two treasonous acts: educate yourself, friends and family on economics, and enforce the Constitution on money, that Article 1, Sec. 8--no state shall accept anything other than gold or silver in payment of debt. )
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