Organization at the Limit et plus d'un million d'autres livres sont disponibles pour le Kindle d'Amazon. En savoir plus

Acheter neuf

ou
Identifiez-vous pour activer la commande 1-Click.
Acheter d'occasion
D'occasion - Bon Voir les détails
Prix : EUR 24,87

ou
 
   
Plus de choix
Vous l'avez déjà ? Vendez votre exemplaire ici
Désolé, cet article n'est pas disponible en
Image non disponible pour la
couleur :
Image non disponible

 
Commencez à lire Organization at the Limit sur votre Kindle en moins d'une minute.

Vous n'avez pas encore de Kindle ? Achetez-le ici ou téléchargez une application de lecture gratuite.

Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia Disaster [Anglais] [Relié]

William Starbuck , Moshe Farjoun

Prix : EUR 40,91 Livraison à EUR 0,01 En savoir plus.
  Tous les prix incluent la TVA
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Il ne reste plus que 1 exemplaire(s) en stock (d'autres exemplaires sont en cours d'acheminement).
Expédié et vendu par Amazon. Emballage cadeau disponible.
Voulez-vous le faire livrer le jeudi 25 septembre ? Choisissez la livraison en 1 jour ouvré sur votre bon de commande. En savoir plus.

Formats

Prix Amazon Neuf à partir de Occasion à partir de
Format Kindle EUR 29,57  
Relié EUR 40,91  
Broché --  

Description de l'ouvrage

18 juillet 2005
The book offers important insight relevant to Corporate, Government and Global organizations management in general. The internationally recognised authors tackle vital issues in decision making, how organizational risk is managed, how can technological and organizational complexities interact, what are the impediments for effective learning and how large, medium, and small organizations can, and in fact must, increase their resilience. Managers, organizational consultants, expert professionals, and training specialists; particularly those in high risk organizations, may find the issues covered in the book relevant to their daily work and a potential catalyst for thought and action. A timely analysis of the Columbia disaster and the organizational lessons that can be learned from it. Includes contributions from those involved in the Investigation Board report into the incident. Tackles vital issues such as the role of time pressures and goal conflict in decision making, and the impediments for effective learning. Examines how organizational risk is managed and how technological and organizational complexities interact. Assesses how large, medium, and small organizations can, and in fact must, increase their resilience. Questions our eagerness to embrace new technologies, yet reluctance to accept the risks of innovation. Offers a step by step understanding of the complex factors that led to disaster.

Offres spéciales et liens associés


Descriptions du produit

Revue de presse

“The authors lift up the heavy curtain of secrecy at NASA to look at the many backstage decisions that led to the Columbia space shuttle disaster. Organizational leaders too often fail to learn from their past mistakes, but readers of this volume will be better equipped to understand and hopefully prevent future catastrophic failures.” Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University “As the influential philosopher Karl Popper observed, to avoid perishing along with our false theories, we systematically try to eliminate our false theories, letting them die in our stead. The Columbia disaster is a stark and tragic lesson in the consequences of false theories. Using the Columbia disaster and NASA as its focal points, Organization at the Limit offers a rich, multifaceted examination that reveals how and why complex organizations using risky technologies often produce and sustain false theories. The analysis yields insights indispensable for those who wish to help such organizations unlearn their false theories, learn more truthful ones, and avoid the disasters that lurk beyond their limits.” Joel A. C. Baum, University of Toronto “The Columbia disaster has much to teach any student and manager of organizations. In this marvellous collection, Professors Farjoun and Starbuck have assembled some of the most profound and relevant thinking about the hitherto hidden vulnerabilities of today’s organizations, their sources, and just how to address them. Readers will be most amply rewarded.” Danny Miller, HEC Montreal “The CAIB report was the most sophisticated official examination of an accident ever. Now we have an exhaustive social science exploration which amplifies, extends, enriches, and even at times contradicts the Board’s analysis. A variety of theoretical perspectives are applied, generating many fresh insights.” Charles Perrow, Yale University Howard Aldrich, Review on Amazon: After two horrible disasters, do you think that NASA has learned from its mistakes, and that it will never happen again? If so, you need to read this book! In 18 well–written chapters, the editors have assembled a set of experts on organizations and disasters to analyze lessons from the Columbia disaster. Because the Challenger disaster foreshadowed many of the problems that subsequently turned up in official investigations of the Columbia disaster, it also figures heavily in this edited book. The authors demonstrate the analytic power of an historically informed organizational analysis of a large governmental agency under strong political pressure to produce results with limited resources. Two points in particular caught my eye. First, after the Challenger disaster, NASA was supposedly reorganized to place greater emphasis on safety. However, because the organization began to define the space exploration program as a problem of meeting production goals and deadlines, "safety" never achieved the priority in the organization than it deserved. Instead of seeing the space shuttle program as a developmental one, exploring the risky frontier of technological knowledge, NASA officials treated it like any other flight program. Second, as anomalies continued to crop up after flights, engineers and officials began to think about deviations from acceptable practices and outcomes as "normal." As deviation was normalized, unusual events were taken for granted and didn′t provoke the kind of response than one would expect from life threatening occurrences. Scholars interested in organization studies, organizational learning, systems theory, and other academic disciplines will learn much from this book. However, one can also hope that public officials will take its lessons to heart and look more closely at the design of other risky systems that are operating close to the limits of our scientific knowledge. Amazon

Quatrième de couverture

Tragedies like the Columbia disaster are distressing reminders that things can go wrong in large, highly regarded organizations. Although we embrace new technologies eagerly, we are reluctant to accept the risks of innovation. Moreover, some technologies and organizations may be too complex to control effectively. What makes some organizations more prone to accidents? Do the very measures taken to increase safety contribute to accidents? Can societies, organizations, and individuals learn from failures and reduce risks? Against this backdrop, Professors William H. Starbuck of New York University and Moshe Farjoun of York University have invited diverse experts to contribute insights about the Columbia accident and the organizational lessons it suggests. This book thus presents many viewpoints on the complex behavioral factors that led to disaster.

Détails sur le produit


Dans ce livre (En savoir plus)
Première phrase
On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated in a disaster that killed its crew. Lire la première page
En découvrir plus
Concordance
Parcourir les pages échantillon
Couverture | Copyright | Table des matières | Extrait | Index
Rechercher dans ce livre:

Commentaires en ligne 

Il n'y a pas encore de commentaires clients sur Amazon.fr
5 étoiles
4 étoiles
3 étoiles
2 étoiles
1 étoiles
Commentaires client les plus utiles sur Amazon.com (beta)
Amazon.com: 5.0 étoiles sur 5  2 commentaires
4 internautes sur 4 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
5.0 étoiles sur 5 Limits to human control over risky technology 28 octobre 2006
Par Howard Aldrich - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Relié
After two horrible disasters, do you think that NASA has learned from its mistakes, and that it will never happen again? If so, you need to read this book! In 18 well-written chapters, the editors have assembled a set of experts on organizations and disasters to analyze lessons from the Columbia disaster. Because the Challenger disaster foreshadowed many of the problems that subsequently turned up in official investigations of the Columbia disaster, it also figures heavily in this edited book. The authors demonstrate the analytic power of an historically informed organizational analysis of a large governmental agency under strong political pressure to produce results with limited resources.

Two points in particular caught my eye. First, after the Challenger disaster, NASA was supposedly reorganized to place greater emphasis on safety. However, because the organization began to define the space exploration program as a problem of meeting production goals and deadlines, "safety" never achieved the priority in the organization than it deserved. Instead of seeing the space shuttle program as a developmental one, exploring the risky frontier of technological knowledge, NASA officials treated it like any other flight program. Second, as anomalies continued to crop up after flights, engineers and officials began to think about deviations from acceptable practices and outcomes as "normal." As deviation was normalized, unusual events were taken for granted and didn't provoke the kind of response than one would expect from life threatening occurrences.

Scholars interested in organization studies, organizational learning, systems theory, and other academic disciplines will learn much from this book. However, one can also hope that public officials will take its lessons to heart and look more closely at the design of other risky systems that are operating close to the limits of our scientific knowledge.
5.0 étoiles sur 5 Good overview 31 mai 2008
Par Mr. Andrew Evans - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format:Relié
A series of powerful essays from an excellent and diverse range of writers including the initial ideas on resilience engineering. Covers issues of communications over the imagery requests well.
Ces commentaires ont-ils été utiles ?   Dites-le-nous

Discussions entre clients

Le forum concernant ce produit
Discussion Réponses Message le plus récent
Pas de discussions pour l'instant

Posez des questions, partagez votre opinion, gagnez en compréhension
Démarrer une nouvelle discussion
Thème:
Première publication:
Aller s'identifier
 

Rechercher parmi les discussions des clients
Rechercher dans toutes les discussions Amazon
   


Rechercher des articles similaires par rubrique


Commentaires

Souhaitez-vous compléter ou améliorer les informations sur ce produit ? Ou faire modifier les images?