Striking Back et plus d'un million d'autres livres sont disponibles pour le Kindle d'Amazon. En savoir plus
EUR 11,96
  • Tous les prix incluent la TVA.
Habituellement expédié sous 1 à 2 mois.
Expédié et vendu par Amazon.
Emballage cadeau disponible.
Quantité :1
Striking Back: The 1972 M... a été ajouté à votre Panier
Vous l'avez déjà ?
Repliez vers l'arrière Repliez vers l'avant
Ecoutez Lecture en cours... Interrompu   Vous écoutez un extrait de l'édition audio Audible
En savoir plus
Voir cette image

Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response (Anglais) Broché – 9 janvier 2007

Voir les 6 formats et éditions Masquer les autres formats et éditions
Prix Amazon Neuf à partir de Occasion à partir de
Format Kindle
"Veuillez réessayer"
"Veuillez réessayer"
EUR 26,63 EUR 1,60
"Veuillez réessayer"
EUR 11,96
EUR 7,99 EUR 2,00
Cassette, Livre audio
"Veuillez réessayer"
EUR 67,63

Offres spéciales et liens associés

Descriptions du produit





MONDAY, JUNE 8, 1992, 1545H

The white Jeep Renegade hurtled down A-22 on its way to Paris. The driver was alone in the vehicle. He stopped twice, to buy food from a vending machine and gas from a pump. Five hours later, his surveillance tail almost lost him in the swirling rush-hour traffic of a Paris afternoon. On Rue du Commandant Mouchotte the trackers watched the new Renegade with the German plates, B-585X, make a sudden right turn. The driver of the surveillance car floored the accelerator and caught a glimpse of the Jeep as it dropped into the shadows of an underground parking garage. A quick look at the building explained the unexpected move: the garage belonged to the Le Méridien Montparnasse Hotel, an old, quality establishment in the heart of the upscale Montparnasse district, with over nine hundred rooms and suites, and a reputation for discretion. The visitor took the elevator to reception on the first floor. He registered under a pseudonym, paid cash, and went straight up to Room 2541 with a small suitcase in his hand.

The hotel guest was Atef Bseiso, a round-faced, elegantly dressed forty-four-year-old Palestinian who had been living in Tunis for the last ten years. He was the Palestine Liberation Organization-the PLO-liaison officer, working with, among others, the French internal security service, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST). He was considered a rising star in his organization. His good relations with European intelligence agencies were, in large part, a product of his personal charm and charisma.

Bseiso was drained from the drive-he had covered the six-hundred-mile journey in nine hours flat. Despite his fatigue and the alluring pull of the room's king-size bed, he went to the phone. Bseiso did not want to pass his only night in Paris with a remote control in his hand. He took out an address book and dialed the number of a PLO bodyguard. In Tunis, Bseiso felt safe; in Europe, he feared the Israelis. He had a list of names and numbers of men, frequently unarmed, who would accompany senior PLO officials in Europe to give them a sense of security. He told the man he'd be going out to dinner. The bodyguard offered to pick Bseiso up at the hotel. "I've driven enough for today," Bseiso said. "Let's say nine at the entrance to the hotel. A tout à l'heure." He showered and got dressed.

Shabtai Shavit, the head of Israel's Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, the Mossad, received a brief message in the operation's war room, located in a safe house in the 11th Arrondissement: "He's in the Méridien Montparnasse. We're getting ready." Shavit leaned back in his chair. The operation was in high gear. Shavit, in his early fifties, had run the Mossad for the past three years, and was well acquainted with undercover operations. He had served for six years as commander of the Mossad's Caesarea unit, which was charged with special operations and with running undercover Mossad combatants in enemy territory. He was in Paris on a borrowed identity: a different name was on the passport in the pocket of his blazer. None of his peers in the French secret service, or any other branch of the French intelligence services, knew he was in the country. His gut told him the mission would go well. He had complete confidence in the professionalism of Caesarea's combatants.

Ilan C, Caesarea's intelligence collection officer, placed the thirty-by-forty-centimeter pictures of the facade of the Méridien Montparnasse Hotel on a table in another room in the Mossad safe house. The new pictures had been shot from a variety of angles and included the streets surrounding the hotel. The surveillance team had taken them as soon as Bseiso checked in. The operational plans, drawn up in advance by Caesarea officers, took a number of hotels into consideration, primarily the Méridien Etoile, an elegant hotel situated a few steps from the Champs-Elysées-but not the Méridien Montparnasse. Bseiso's unexpected choice forced them to revise their plans accordingly. The work was done quickly and efficiently. In less than an hour a new plan was brought before Shavit. Time was tight, and Shavit, never garrulous under even the most relaxed circumstances, kept it brief. He asked Caesarea's commander and the head of the assassination squad a few questions about the operation. He honed a few key points, and then, satisfied, approved the mission.

The surveillance team had followed Bseiso for three days. They tracked him from the moment he arrived in Berlin; his meetings with German intelligence officers of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV); the purchase of the Jeep; his sprint to Paris. A half-dozen combatants, two cars, and two motorcycles comprised the surveillance team. Throughout, none of the operation's planners at Caesarea had any idea where Bseiso would stay. Would he choose the apartment of a friend, a flat set up by the DST, or a plush hotel room, courtesy of the kingly budget of Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO? Now they knew where they had to act. The operation needed to go into full swing immediately, as Bseiso, a notoriously reluctant traveler, might well spend only one night in Paris. Perhaps the following day, after meeting a colleague from the DST, he would return home, and the opportunity that had presented itself would be gone, possibly forever. Intelligence reports showed that Bseiso, whose job demanded frequent travel, tried to stay in Tunis as much as possible. When he did leave, he flew, a mode of travel not so susceptible to Israeli attack. Planes go directly from point A to point B. The traveler is never alone. People in cars meander, stop for gas, and spend the night at hotels. Bseiso, it turned out, was in fact planning to leave the following evening. He would drive to Marseilles, put the Jeep on a ferry to Tunis, and surprise his wife, Dima, and their three children with the new car.

The Israelis waited in ambush outside the hotel. They assumed Bseiso would go out for dinner. When he returned, tired and contented, they would act. The late hours of the night, when the streets are quiet and empty, were always best for covert operations. The final decision would be in the hands of the two assassins, "Tom" and "Frank." The point man, Tom, would pull the trigger. Up until the last instant, he would have the authority to call off the operation: he would raise his weapon only when certain that his team would emerge unscathed.

Atef Bseiso was a target because of the role he played in the slaughter of eleven Israeli Olympians in Munich, in 1972, almost twenty years prior. Shabtai Shavit wanted him to pay the price for participating in the killings. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir authorized the mission and gave it his blessing. The state of Israel was on the verge of closing its case against another one of the "bastards," as they were known in the Mossad, who took part in the Munich Massacre.

Bseiso did go out to dinner. The Caesarea surveillance team shadowed him, undetected, the whole time. They checked that he wasn't being guarded by his DST hosts. Bseiso, his bodyguard, and an unidentified Lebanese woman spent a pleasant night at a Hippopotamus Grill chain restaurant. It was after midnight when Bseiso picked up the tab and went back to the Jeep. He sat in the back, his bodyguard drove, and his friend sat in the front seat. They had a very loud, animated conversation in Arabic. A short drive brought them to the entrance of the Méridien Montparnasse. The Rue du Commandant Mouchotte was quiet; few cars passed by.

Bseiso got out and said goodbye to his friends. He took one step back, preparing to move in the direction of the hotel. A few seconds later, two young men approached him. Their walk was loose, casual. Tom, the point man, raised his hand and pulled the trigger. The Beretta 0.22 issued its shots in silence, the retorts muzzled by a silencer. The three bullets hit Bseiso in the head. He fell on the spot, next to his friend's car, his final inhalation a gurgle. The hot cartridges were caught, along with the clues they held, in a sturdy cloth bag attached to the pistol. Within seconds, the assassin and his backup were rapidly retreating down the street.

"Abie," the commander of the squad, waited for them near the corner, 150 yards away. He watched them cross to the other side of Avenue du Maine and, from the other side of the street, at a more casual pace, watched their backs. This standard procedure was meant to thwart a mishap during the escape phase of a mission-a highly unlikely scenario, since it takes bystanders many long seconds, if not minutes, to realize that an assassination has just taken place. Nonetheless, the possibility couldn't be ignored. Within twenty seconds the point man and his number two were at the corner of a one-way street. According to Mossad procedure, the getaway car always waits two 90-degree turns from the scene of an operation. The pair made a left onto Rue Vandamme, where the waiting car had kept its motor running.

Abie suddenly noticed two figures coming after his men. They were breathing heavily and speaking animatedly. This was a fast-approaching threat; they needed to be stopped. They could not be allowed to turn the corner and see the escape vehicle, or, even worse, commit the license plate to memory. Abie started toward them, his quick pace authoritative and threatening. When he was within fifteen feet of the pair he pulled out his Beretta. Holding it in front of their faces, he shouted: "Stop!" The weapon froze them in their tracks. They put their hands in the air, stumbled backward, turned around, and broke into a run in the direction of the hotel. Abie pocketed his gun and walked down Avenue du Maine. He watched his men turn left onto the narrow street and got into a second car waiting for him on his side of the avenue. He checked his watch: fifty-five seconds had elapsed since the first shot was fired. He smiled to himself. The account was squared; the mission, a success. He pushed a button, sending confirmation to the commander of Caesarea. In less than two hours, the point man, his number two, the squad leader, the commander of Caesarea, his staff officers, and Shabtai Shavit, had all left French soil.


Brigadier General Azriel Nevo, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's military aide, lay awake in bed waiting for the red, top secret telephone to ring. He picked it up quickly and heard a familiar voice say, "Azriel, it went according to plan." He recognized "Amir," Shabtai Shavit's chief of staff, on the other end of the line.

"Thanks, I'll pass it on."

Nevo sat up in bed and dialed Shamir's number. The prime minister picked up on the first ring. "Mr. Prime Minister, I just got word from Shavit's office, the Paris affair went smoothly."

"Thank you," Shamir said, and hung up.

Nevo put down the phone. Shamir, he thought, had nerves of steel. He and Shavit were two of a kind. Nevo went back to sleep thinking about how Le Figaro's headline might read the next morning.

News of the assassination traveled fast. Some Western media outlets automatically attributed the hit to the Mossad, even pointing to the possibility of revenge for the Munich murders of 1972. The Bseiso family, one of the largest and most respected clans in Gaza City, set up a traditional mourning tent, where they received hundreds of visitors. Bseiso was hailed as a "victim of the Intifada." Yasser Arafat, the founder of Fatah, was in Amman, Jordan, recovering from head injuries sustained when his plane was forced to crash-land in the Libyan desert during a sandstorm earlier that year.

Arafat told dozens of reporters that the Israeli Mossad was responsible for the assassination. "I warned them," he said, "dir balkum, be careful, the Mossad will hunt us down one by one, officer by officer. . . . Unfortunately, we have lost a national hero."

Israeli authorities never issued an official response. One of Prime Minister Shamir's spokespersons told The New York Times that the accusation was "totally and completely ridiculous." The head of Military Intelligence, Major General Uri Saguy, responded to Arafat's claims with an unperturbed: "Nu, so Arafat says we did it, hat ehr gezukt" (Yiddish for: He says so, so what?).

Officers at the Mossad's Brussels station were shocked. "Eyal," a high-ranking officer in Caesarea, hurried up the stairs to see "Haggai," his superior.

"Didn't we take this guy off the list?" Eyal asked.

"We took him off. I don't know what's going on." Haggai shrugged.

Both of them knew the deceased. Back in 1988, the two of them, in previous posts as officers at Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, had erased his name from the Mossad hit list. The removal had gone through all the proper channels. Nahum Admoni, the head of the Mossad at the time, had approved the move. Yet someone had put Bseiso back on the list and then led a covert operation to kill him on French soil. That someone was none other than Shabtai Shavit-a brilliant tactician and professional, who had excelled at every post he held along the chain of command, and who had the ear and the confidence of every prime minister he worked under.

Early in 1992, Shavit called a former protégé, the current head of Caesarea, to a short meeting. He asked him to check which of the terrorists involved in the Munich attack were still alive. Shavit was old-school, one of those who refused to close the book on Munich. As far as he was concerned, the state of Israel had painted a well-deserved target on the faces of everyone involved in the planning or the execution of the massacre. They would all pay with their lives; when and where was of no consequence. Mossad combatants were charged with carrying out the assassination orders, which had been passed down from Golda Meir to each successive prime minister.

Shavit believed in Israel's responsibility to its citizens, at home and abroad-he believed in the necessity of fulfilling this executive order not just because he saw it as moral and just, but because he knew that no one else would carry it out in his place. He would do all in his power to see the mission through.

A few months after the assassination, Shavit was officially invited to meet the newly appointed head of the DST. Forgoing pleasantries, the French intelligence officer fired his opening volley: "We know you killed Bseiso. We're still working on the proof. When it comes through, you'll get what's coming to you. In no way am I willing to allow you to turn Paris into your stage for acts of war and assassinations. We're not going back to the early seventies, when you did whatever the hell you wanted here. I will not allow it to happen," he said, pounding his fist on the table.

From the Hardcover edition.

Présentation de l'éditeur

“This is a thriller, a page-turner, a probing look into the inner workings of the assassination squads that Israel mobilized after the Munich massacre.”
–David K. Shipler, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Arab and Jew

“Gratitude is due to Mr. Klein for his painstaking . . . book, the best one could possibly hope for.”
–Walter Lacquer, The Wall Street Journal

Award-winning journalist Aaron J. Klein tells, for the first time, the complete story of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre and the Israeli counterterrorism operation it spawned. With unprecedented access to Mossad agents and an unparalleled knowledge of Israeli intelligence, Klein peels back the layers of myth and misinformation that have permeated previous books, films, and magazine articles about the “shadow war” against Black September and other related terrorist groups. In this riveting account, long-held secrets are finally revealed, including who was killed and who was not, how it was done, which targets were hit and which were missed. In the end, Klein shows that the Israeli response to Munich was not simply about revenge, as is popularly believed. By illuminating the tactical and strategic purposes of the Israeli operation, Striking Back allows us to draw profoundly relevant lessons from one of the most important counterterrorism campaigns in history.

“[Klein] makes it clear why [the Munich attacks were] a pivotal event in the evolution of global terrorism.”
–Janet Maslin, The New York Times

“A drama-filled look at the murders and Israeli reprisals.”
–Billy Heller, New York Post (“Required Reading”)

“A real thriller that will unnerve as much as it captivates.”
–Laurence Washington, Rocky Mountain News

Détails sur le produit

En savoir plus sur l'auteur

Découvrez des livres, informez-vous sur les écrivains, lisez des blogs d'auteurs et bien plus encore.

Dans ce livre (En savoir plus)
Parcourir les pages échantillon
Couverture | Copyright | Table des matières | Extrait
Rechercher dans ce livre:

Commentaires en ligne

Il n'y a pas encore de commentaires clients sur
5 étoiles
4 étoiles
3 étoiles
2 étoiles
1 étoiles

Commentaires client les plus utiles sur (beta) 43 commentaires
44 internautes sur 45 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
This isn't "Munich" 4 mars 2006
Par Stephen F. Davids - Publié sur
Format: Relié Achat vérifié
This excellent book is by an Israeli journalist who was able to get remarkable access to Mossad. One might think this would result in a one-sided presentation, but Klein has done an excellent job of being extremely objective and analyzing the twin motivations of revenge and deterrence that underlay the strike-back assassinations after Munich. The only point on which he isn't objective (and with good reason) is in his unreserved condemnation of the action, inaction, negligence, and callousness (not to mention stupidity) of the German officials during the 21 hours or so of the hostage crisis. The book is worth reading for his thorough account of that one day in September.

Klein's analysis of the Mossad reaction is unsparing, especially in the disaster and tragedy at Lilliehammer, when Mossad agents killed an innocent man whom they should have realized was not Ali Hassan Salameh ("The Red Prince"). Six Mossad operatives were actual imprisoned in Norway for this crime, and the fact that "Munich" never makes mention of this incident is sufficient refutation to those who ridiculously claim that Spielberg and Tony Kushner were insufficiently sympathetic to Israel. While he wrote the book in Hebrew, Klein makes it clear this is not an apologia for Mossad. He sternly questions the rightness of the process in which Palestinian terrorists were identified and "prosecuted" in "show trials" before Israeli Prime Ministers who issued death sentences. People identified as "architects" of Munich often had little if any direct connection to the tragedy. He also carefully analyses the deterrence claim. While Black September terror largely faded after the strike-back assassinations, this appears to have had much to do with the PLO's attempt for legitimacy (Arafat addressing the U.S. in 1974, etc.) and reluctance to incur the wrath of potentially friendly European governments by continuing to execute terror strikes in their countries. Klein also explodes the myth of Mossad invincibility, pointing out with great irony that two of the actual Munich terrorists are still alive, and neither of the actual planners of the mission (Abu Daoud and Abu Ehyad) died at Mossad's hands. Abu Daoud is, in fact, still alive, and Abu Ehyad was assassinated by an extremist Abu Nidal follower because Abu Ehyad had become "soft" on the destruction of Israel.

Don't confuse this book with the movie "Munich," however. "Munich" is based on a different book, George Jonas's "Vengeance," based on the recollections of a Mossad agent. There have been some criticisms and questions of "Avner"'s story in "Vengeance." Klein's account, however, shows that the initial 3 assassinations and the Spring of Youth assassinations in Beiruit were generally very accurately portrayed in "Munich." I see "Munich" as more of a philosophical question about the human cost of the eye-for-an-eye approach, and the ultimate futility of translating ideology into direct and violent action, especially when it means undertaking violent action that is dangerously similar to the type of action undertaken by your enemy. Klein's book is more of a thoughtful policy analysis of what Mossad did, and whether it was effective. While Klein claims that moral judgments are far beyond the scope of his book, they are an inevitable consequence of evaluating the remarkable research that he has compiled.
98 internautes sur 107 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
More interesting, credible, realistic than the movie "Munich" 31 décembre 2005
Par Kenneth Posner - Publié sur
Format: Relié
Aaron Klein's book "Striking Back" and Steven Spielberg's film "Munich" chonicle
the massacre of 11 Israeli athletes and coaches by the Black September Palestinian organization at the 1972 Munich Olympic games and tell the story of the Israeli's' government's response, which included a covert campaign to assasinate the terrorists responsible for planning the massacre.

"Munich" is a decent spy movie. "Striking Back" is exciting to read. But the book seems more balanced and credible to me, and it provides a real life case study that is probably worth understanding in the context of today's ongoing war on terror, while the movie appears to bend the facts to fit the story that Spielberg wants to tell.

Both the book and the movie do an excellent job recounting the events in Munich. They both capture many of the same details, like the scene where the Palestinian terrorists force their way into the Israeli dorm rooms using the barrel of an AK-47 as a lever to push open the door while an Israeli athlete tries to hold it shut. Evidently both the filmaker and author have studied the primary sources.

Where the two diverge is in the story of the Israeli government's response. While I have no insight into clandestine operations, I found the book's account much more believable and interesting and note that the author has respectable credentials (including a stint in the Israeli army) and claims to have interviewed numerous sources with firsthand experience of the events.

For example, in the movie, the entire responsbility for assasinating 11 Palestinian terrorists is placed on the shoulders of a single agent, who goes so deeply underground that he ostensibly no longer works for the Mossad. In contrast, the book explains how logistics, surveillance, and combatant teams from the Mossad worked in close coordination, while the cabinet and the prime minister made final go/no-go decisions. In reading the book, one learns something about the Mossad's tactics (for example, shooters always work in pairs) and comes to appreciate the organization's' efficacy and also its limitations -- for example, weak human intelligence and virtually no ability to operate in Arab or communist countries.

In the movie, the agent assasinates his terrorist targets. According to the book, the Israeli's were not quite so successful. Apparently they never got the chief architects of the Munich massacre. Moreover, several of the Palestinian terrorists that the Mossad did eliminate turned out, with hindsight, to have been low-level operatives (and thus "soft targets,") whose connections to the Munich massacre were tangential or non-existent. In one case of mistaken identity, over-eager Israeli agents tailed a suspected terrorist sympathizer to Norway and ended up killing an innocent man. Then several team members were arrested and convicted by the Norwegian courts. Certainly a low point in the history of the Mossad.

The movie wraps up with a focus on the pyschological trauma the Mossad agent suffers in pulling off his dangerous mission. Klein does not attempt to pass moral judgement on the Mossad's actions, but he ends the book with a brief but intelligent assessment of the efficacy of the assasination campagin and raises important questions about whether there was any real deterrent effect.
67 internautes sur 75 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
Spellbinding and real 24 décembre 2005
Par Robert Busko - Publié sur
Format: Relié
Klein's Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response reads like the latest bestseller from the pen of a major author.

Having lived through the events of 1972, I found Kleins account of the events succeeding the Olympic massacre to be terribly interesting and somehow very much on target in today's world. I only wish a certain major movie director had read this book before filming his version of the aftermath of the terrorist attack on defenseless athletes.

Klein's story is fast paced, well written, well researched, and jumps off the page at the reader. Striking Back is unapologetic which makes it unusual. The events and the principle characters are presented in a manner that makes sense. As I read Striking Back, I had the feeling that I was at last being let in on inside information. Truly a wonderful read.

Aaron Klein is perhaps one of only a handfull of individuals capable of writing of the events related to Munich. I'm so glad that he did.
18 internautes sur 19 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
Armed Force is sometimes the only moral and practical response to evil 29 août 2009
Par Kiwi - Publié sur
Format: Broché
When it comes to the story of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre and its aftermath there is fact and there is fiction. The fictional element was illustrated by filmmaker Steven Spielberg's Munich. He claimed the film was `inspired by real events' but it 's plot lines was implausible, not to mention the subjective political posturing and sanctimonious moralising. Funnily enough, left-wing Israeli journalist Aaron Klein has produced a thoughtful and balanced factual account of the Olympic slaughter and the Mossad counter-terrorist campaign that decimated the PLO's `Black September' unit that perpetrated the attack. Klein is an IDF reservist intelligence officer, and he has obviously put his spooky connections to good use.

Spielberg based his film on a widely discredited book relating the Walter Mitty fantasies of a Mossad-wannabe. By contrast, Klein interviewed most of the major Israeli players who planned and executed the operations against Black September. And just as in the craft of intelligence itself, excellent sources provide excellent information. While Munich-the-movie is a case of garbage-in-garbage-out, Klein provides us with an accurate portrayal of precisely what the Israelis did, how they did it, and for what purposes it was done. The angst and disillusionment that afflict Spielberg's fictional Israeli undercover agents are nowhere to be seen in Striking Back. During an interview with the 7:30 Report, Klein explained that the Mossadniks, in fact, were firmly imbued with a sense of the righteousness of their cause: I spoke with more than 50 veterans of Mossad and military intelligence. There was no remorse, no second thoughts. They were proud; most of them were proud of what they did and they are still proud of what they did. And in my personal opinion, rightly so!

The opening chapter of Striking Back relates how in August 1992, almost 20 years after the Munich Olympics, a Mossad team shot Atef Bseiso dead on a Paris street. By that time, Bseiso was the PLO's liaison to the French internal security service, but in 1972 he played a key role in the Black September unit that carried out the Munich massacre. And for that he eventually paid the price. Klein's narrative portrayal of Bseiso's death kicks off a fascinating and not uncritical blow-by-blow account of the undercover war that Mossad waged against Black September in the wake of the Olympic massacre. But the real virtue of Striking Back is found in its balanced discussion of the strategic and operational rationales for the campaign. Certainly a natural desire for vengeance contributed to Mossad's relentless pursuit of the Munich killers and their dispatchers. But Klein clearly outlines that conventional military considerations of deterrence and attrition played an even more important role in Israel's decisionmaking process.

By eliminating the Black September command and control network, Israel believed it could deplete the pool of terrorist expertise that was available for future attacks. And let's not forget the ancient principle of good, old fashioned deterrence through intimidation. On 06 April 1973, a Special Forces team from the IDF's elite Sayeret Matkal unit raided PLO facilities in downtown Beirut, killing three senior PLO leaders in their quarters. Combined with the Israeli retribution campaign in Europe this operation terrified the PLO's senior echelons. Every minute that Arafat and company spent worrying about their own safety was a minute that they could not devote to planning offensive operations against Israel. Klein writes: `The numbers show a steep slide in the frequency of terror attacks against Israelis and Israeli institutions abroad from 1974 to the present.' He continues: there is `near unanimous agreement' within the Israeli intelligence community that this decline was largely attributable to the mayhem inflicted upon Palestinian terrorist groups by the post-Munich undercover campaign. IDF Brigadier General Ido Nehushtan recently reiterated this doctrine during a discussion about Israel's counter-terrorism strategy during the current conflict with the Palestinians: A basic lesson we learned is the importance of preemption. We cannot wait until suicide bombers or terrorists make their way to the target, or rockets are launched at our cities. When pursued where commanders and planners are lurking at their hideouts in the cities, we dramatically reduced the number of terror attacks in our population centres.

Don't try telling that to Steven Spielberg. At the end of Munich-the-movie, the filmmaker clumsily attempts to unive rsalise his sanctimonious moralising about the supposed invariable futility of responding to violence with violence. In a kitschy final scene, the camera focuses on a Manhattan skyline in which the twin towers of the World Trade Centre loom large in the background before the camera fades. But when it comes to weighing the Hollywood theorising of Steven Spielberg against the fact-based logic conveyed by Aaron Klein there is no real contest. While the Tinseltown version of events is suitable for an afternoon of mindless entertainment in a vacuum of false moral equivalence, the message of Striking Back resonates with those who
understand that lethal armed force is sometimes the only moral and practical response to evil
7 internautes sur 7 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
This book covers all the angles 29 mars 2009
Par Dedalist - Publié sur
Format: Broché Achat vérifié
This book is not a written counterpart to the movie "Munich". This book goes into much deeper detail on all the parties involved in the Munich Massacre and the subsequent events that followed years and even decades later. It's well put together and easy to read with enough spy/assassin stuff to keep you moving to the next chapter.
Ces commentaires ont-ils été utiles ? Dites-le-nous


Souhaitez-vous compléter ou améliorer les informations sur ce produit ? Ou faire modifier les images?