The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One [Anglais] [Broché]

David Kilcullen's book "The Accidental Guerrilla" is a dense read and requires you to have an intense interest in the subject. It is not for the faint of heart but is well worth the investment of reading in order to understand the subject - our safety. For those of us not involved in the military this book opens the curtain on a world we never see. I have far more respect (and disrespect in some cases) for the people who work so diligently to keep us safe and think about how to protect us from evolving threats and enemies.

David points out that while many US Military leaders where congratulating themselves on the supremacy of US strength and overwhelming dominance new hybrid threats emerged, ones we at first denied and now struggle to adapt to. While the US maintained that no major land war would ever occur again because of our massive armaments, the Chinese, for example, were developing the idea of unrestricted warfare. Colonel Qiao, said, "the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden."

Turns out that there are more wars and violence, not less, despite US dominance. The author offers four possible models for understanding why this situation exists and what responses can be taken. These localized wars could be 1) a backlash against Globalization 2) Insurgency has been globalized, i.e. funded and used by large interests that exceed national boundaries such as religious forces 3) a civil war within Islam, and 4) asymmetric warfare, that security should be understand from a functional and capability standpoint leaving the politics out of the evaluation and response.

Great book if you want to understand the dangerous world in which we live and why simplistic answers no longer work. Made me understand the challenges leaders face, and often having to select from 2 bad choices. Very dangerous world that is not getting any better. Read this book if you want to vote meaningfully and make informed decisions with opinions based on facts instead of rhetoric or simply from partisan politics.

One warning up front: if someone quotes this book, *check them*. This is a brilliant and comprehensive discussion of the current global environment, but has a lot of provocative comments that could be taken out of context.

Starting with two major case studies (Afghanistan and Iraq) and a few smaller ones (East Timor, Thailand, Pakistan, and the European Union), David Kilcullen builds several arguments. The most salient point to me were the need to identify both overarching patterns (like the movement of Al Qaida money and people) and to develop a refined understanding of each insurgency or movement in isolation. Also important are the concepts of the relative nature of "foreigner", "outsider", "invader" etc. and the absence of absolutes in counterinsurgency.

The case studies are well constructed and rapidly convey the complexity of the cultures and the implications of those complexities, as well as clearly identifying tactics and strategies for gaining the upperhand in the strategic sense. The central point, that many "insurgents" are locals who feel threatened operating with 'outsiders' (who threaten the locals) against other 'outsiders' (who also threaten the locals), is an old lesson of World War II Balkans, the British intervension in Malaysia, the French in Indochina and later the U.S. in Viet Nam. As far as I can tell, the reason it is forgotten is that Western militaries want to focus on big budget, big contract, high tech, maneuver warfare, and diplomats don't want to discuss conflict at all. Guerrilla warfare fits neither world view. Part of the strategic solution to these conflicts is address the issues that are exploited by "foreign fighters" (a.k.a. Al Qaida, but Communists in the past, and who knows what movements in the future). Each regional or country issue is both a part of the larger whole, and a microcosm, and has to be dealt with on both levels. When we try to 'simplify' the problem by lumping things together and ignoring the finer points of local conflicts, we complicate the solution of the local conflicts, and undermine the strategic efforts.

His final recommendations are far reaching, apparently simple, organizationally challenging, but, I believe, would significantly improve the U.S. efforts against the threats that face America.
->Develop (and implicitly, propagate and enforce the use of) a new lexicon to discuss insurgency, counter-insurgency, etc.
->Develop a good 'Grand Strategy'; don't focus on near term solutions, focus on national interest and the sensible allocation of resource towards those ends, and prioritize the geographical regions.
->Rebalance the instruments of national power; the Department of Defense is only one element, the diplomats hold the keys to infomational, diplomatic, and economic instruments, but they aren't manned proportionately.
->Develop a discrete 'Strategic Services' capability, mostly focused on infomation gathering and analysis, and providing humanitarian and other support in target areas.
->Develop a dedicated, central information warfare activity focused on getting our message out to people in 'at risk' regions.

This book is a 'must read' for anyone in diplomatic or military circles.

E. M. Van Court

First, the bad points.

Kilcullen writes in a very complex style, uses big words and long paragraphs. In short, it is not an easy-read, listen-to-the-radio, relax by the fire type of book. Reading it requires concentration-I couldn't really read more than 40 pages or so at a single sitting without taking some time to digest the info.

My only other criticism is it is not clear what the target audience is for this book. It is certainly not a mass-market paperback-I would guess the casual reader stops at page 20. But it seems a little light for the diplomatic/intelligence crowd. Rather it is more like an executive summary (albeit a large one) of a 10,000 page CIA analysis.

Now the good points.

First, subject to the above caveats, Kilcullen writes very well. His writing is logically constructed, concise, and has excellent grammar.

This is a man who knows what he is talking about. Kilcullen has advised General Petraeus in the "surge", has first hand knowledge of various insurgencies around the world, and is capable of well-reasoned analysis. I am by no means an expert in the subject, but after reading this book I feel that I know more about low-intensity warfare than most of the world's population, and half its politicians.

Kilcullen approaches the subject from the bottom up. Why are people fighting, who are they fighting, what do they believe in, what resources do they have, what are they willing to risk. Only when those questions are answered, does it make any sense to talk about strategy and tactics. The large powers of the world always seem to get this wrong, both today and in the historical cases cited in the book.

It was also refreshing to read a book on a complex subject where the author presents his own opinions on what might work, why it is a good idea, how it differs from what else has been tried, and what pitfalls might await. I don't have anywhere near the expertise to judge the merit of his opinions, but they are certainly presented in such a way that the seem logical.

A large portion of the book is dedicated to Iraq/Pakistan/Afghanistan and the struggle of the US with Islamic cultures. This book certainly gave me some new thoughts on our efforts to "bring democracy" to this part of the world. Kilcullen's analysis of Iraq is as comprehensive of any I have ever read, and puts some current events into a new perspective.

While the book brings out great detail on the "soft" side of low intensity warfare- namely culture and people issues, that is not to say that military weapons, strategies and tactics are outside Kilcullen's expertise. There are many details and discussions of these areas, but to be honest, they were not as interesting to me as the root causes and human side. Perhaps that is because this is a rare treatment of those issues.

In summary:

This is a great book if you are a serious student of modern events relating to warfare. Be warned, it is not an easy- or even fun- book to read. I found it more like reading a technical paper for something related to my profession- it requires careful reading and adequate processing time.

I also found myself reaching for a dictionary on occasion. Kilcullen uses words very precisely, and it is worth making sure you understand the exact nuances of the words he uses. Similarly, I found myself looking at maps to make sure I understood the geographical context of the work.

This book is a definite read for anyone seriously interested in this topic. It should be required reading for any "talking head" that shows up on the news channels spouting their opinions on modern warfare. I would also hope that it is on the West Point required reading list...as well as the Oval Office and Capitol Hill.