The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report Of The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States : Official Government Edition [Anglais] [Broché]

Within a month, there were calls for an independent bipartisan group to look into the matters. Led by Republican Thomas Kean and Democrat Lee Hamilton (former Congressman from Indiana, the state where I live), the Commission as a whole presents this report as a unified document, without dissent and without addition. That makes it rare in the annals of political writing.

The Report itself contains many things: A preface, thirteen chapters of historical narrative, situational analysis, and recommendations for further action, notes, staff list -- 585 pages in all (there is an executive summary available also, but not incorporated in the body of the text). The historical narrative looks at previous Al-Qaeda terrorist activity, at home and abroad, as well as actions by the United States designed to counter this (embassy security, bombing in the Sudan, etc.). While many were aware of embassy bombings and the previous World Trade Centre attack in 1993, probably few people are aware of other foiled attempts -- Ramzi Yousef's plot (out of Manila) to blow up airliners flying over the Pacific.

The panel interviewed both the current President and the former President. They actually do address the Lewinsky affair in the text, but only briefly. They conclude that there was no 'wag-the-dog' syndrome going on with regard to the timing of Clinton's actions, but that the distraction of this affair did nothing to promote good government.

The Commission addresses the issues of communication and cross-agency cooperation (still at a poor stage), politics and security failures at every level, and recommendations for future action. The question becomes -- does the White House, Congress, the military and the civilian agencies involved in security have what it takes to implement changes? The Commission's report is presented as a unanimous document; Democrats might not want to hear that the relatively-liberal Lee Hamilton is in favour of the general tenets of the Patriot Act, whereas Republicans might not like the governmental control aspects that relatively-conservative Thomas Kean supports.

Terrorism was a minor issue pre-9/11; neither the Clinton nor Bush administrations held it as a high priority. It is destined to remain one for the foreseeable future. No one imagined the capabilities of bin Ladin and al Qaeda as being what they were; this has changed now, too, but the Commission asks, are we reacting (how many terrorists are actually going to use box-cutters to hijack planes again?) or are we anticipating properly? The Commission pointed to failed diplomatic efforts, bureaucratic mismanagement, problems within the intelligence establishment, lack of military options available, problems with immigration and border control, and inadequate homeland defense structures as all contributory to the problem. The Commission are to be praised that this was more of an analysis than a blame-game exercise; the general tone overall is pro-active rather than reactive, problem-solving rather than attempting to fix past accountability that, more likely than not, can be evenly shared.

Already, the Bush White House, the Kerry campaign and leaders of Congress have responded to the report, and more is likely in the coming days and weeks. This is an important document for all citizens of the United States -- it should be read, studied, and inwardly digested so that peopel will be aware of what is happening, or, as the situation warrants, what is not happening. The broad phrase, 'Unity of Effort' is used in many headings and contexts to describe what the Commission envisons. At one point, they write, 'Unity of purpose and unity of effort are the way we will defeat this enemy.'

May it be so.

Within a month, there were calls for an independent bipartisan group to look into the matters. Led by Republican Thomas Kean and Democrat Lee Hamilton (former Congressman from Indiana, the state where I live), the Commission as a whole presents this report as a unified document, without dissent and without addition. That makes it rare in the annals of political writing.

The Report itself contains many things: A preface, thirteen chapters of historical narrative, situational analysis, and recommendations for further action, notes, staff list -- 585 pages in all (there is an executive summary available also, but not incorporated in the body of the text). The historical narrative looks at previous Al-Qaeda terrorist activity, at home and abroad, as well as actions by the United States designed to counter this (embassy security, bombing in the Sudan, etc.). While many were aware of embassy bombings and the previous World Trade Centre attack in 1993, probably few people are aware of other foiled attempts -- Ramzi Yousef's plot (out of Manila) to blow up airliners flying over the Pacific.

The panel interviewed both the current President and the former President. They actually do address the Lewinsky affair in the text, but only briefly. They conclude that there was no 'wag-the-dog' syndrome going on with regard to the timing of Clinton's actions, but that the distraction of this affair did nothing to promote good government.

The Commission addresses the issues of communication and cross-agency cooperation (still at a poor stage), politics and security failures at every level, and recommendations for future action. The question becomes -- does the White House, Congress, the military and the civilian agencies involved in security have what it takes to implement changes? The Commission's report is presented as a unanimous document; Democrats might not want to hear that the relatively-liberal Lee Hamilton is in favour of the general tenets of the Patriot Act, whereas Republicans might not like the governmental control aspects that relatively-conservative Thomas Kean supports.

Terrorism was a minor issue pre-9/11; neither the Clinton nor Bush administrations held it as a high priority. It is destined to remain one for the foreseeable future. No one imagined the capabilities of bin Ladin and al Qaeda as being what they were; this has changed now, too, but the Commission asks, are we reacting (how many terrorists are actually going to use box-cutters to hijack planes again?) or are we anticipating properly? The Commission pointed to failed diplomatic efforts, bureaucratic mismanagement, problems within the intelligence establishment, lack of military options available, problems with immigration and border control, and inadequate homeland defense structures as all contributory to the problem. The Commission are to be praised that this was more of an analysis than a blame-game exercise; the general tone overall is pro-active rather than reactive, problem-solving rather than attempting to fix past accountability that, more likely than not, can be evenly shared.

Already, the Bush White House, the Kerry campaign and leaders of Congress have responded to the report, and more is likely in the coming days and weeks. This is an important document for all citizens of the United States -- it should be read, studied, and inwardly digested so that peopel will be aware of what is happening, or, as the situation warrants, what is not happening. The broad phrase, 'Unity of Effort' is used in many headings and contexts to describe what the Commission envisons. At one point, they write, 'Unity of purpose and unity of effort are the way we will defeat this enemy.'

May it be so.