Ce livre donne une vision à jour de l'investissement value. Il est à recommander à tout investisseur discipliné qui aime acheter une entreprise pour moins cher que ce qu'elle vaut. Vous trouverez des méthodes concrètes vous permettant d'estimer correctement la valeur d'un business pour acheter avec une marge de sécurité.
Je trouve que l'auteur est un peu sévère avec la méthode d'évaluation par d'un business par calcul du DCF (Discounted Cash Flow), qui est particulièrement adaptée pour les business à cash flow à peu près prévisibles (ceux qu'aime Buffett), et dont la méthode EPV donnée par l'auteur est en fait équivalente à condition de prendre une croissance 0 dans le DCF. Buffett et Klarman utilisent cette méthode et ça marche plutôt bien pour eux.
Je recommande fortement ce livre pour toute personne familière avec les notions de base de l'investissement et capable de prendre du recul par rapport au contenu.
Pour les néophytes, je recommanderais de lire "L'investisseur intelligent" de Benjamin Graham, Margin Of Safety de Seth Klarman et "Et si vous en saviez assez pour gagner en bourse ?" de Peter Lynch avant de vous lancer dans ce bouquin là.
J'ai bien aimé le livre puisqu'il propose une approche actualisée de la valorisation des entreprises. La méthode " reproduction cost" permet d'identifier des opportunités à l'inverse de la méthode "net-net". Seul bémol, dans un des exemple, page 102 je n'ai pas compris comment l'auteur a calculé le "excess cash and investment". Comme délà expliqué avant on doit rajouter le cash et enlever la dette. On faisant ça j'arrive à un chiffre positif
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58 internautes sur 59 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile
Must-read for serious investors of any stripe12 août 2006
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A must-read for investors of any stripe, growth or value. This book, written by a couple of the most popular professors at Columbia Business School, explains the innovations in the field of value investing as practiced by some of the most successful investors in the field. (fair disclosure: I took Prof. Greenwald's courses in 2007) This book successfully bridges the gap between the traditional Graham & Dodd style of value investing to what works today. Although it's a paperback, it's written with the density of a textbook. The writing style is not light, and the actual meat of the book takes some time to wade through. If you don't have some experience in accounting or corporate finance, then Joel Greenblatt's The Little Book That Beats the Market is good to read first.
The substance of this book is a process for modern value investing: value investing is not investing in lousy companies just because they appear cheap. The authors also teach a structured way to value a company. Finally, the authors address how to value growth.
First, before reading this book I had the mistaken impression that value investing was all about investing in the ugliest, least interesting company you could find just because it had a low P/E ratio. I was completely wrong! (Maybe I have attended too many stock pitch sessions and heard too many poultry stocks and encyclopedia companies get pitched.) Modern value investing, according the authors: "When B. Graham went scouring financial statements looking for his net-nets, it did not concern him that he may have known little about the industry in which he found his targets. All he was concerned with were asset values and a margin of safety by that measure. A contemporary value investor had better be able to identify and understand the sources of a company's franchise and the nature of its competitive advantages. Otherwise he or she is just another punter, taking a flier rather than making an investment." What a breath of fresh air to read this passage.
Second, this book lays out a structured way to value a company by first looking at reproduction costs of assets, then earnings power, and finally the value of profitable growth. I, like the authors, find traditional DCF valuations to be plagued by false precision. The authors' more practical method starts by adjusting the balance GAAP balance sheet to calculate the cost of the assets for a potential business entrant. Next, the company is valued based on the earnings generates consistently, assuming no growth. A key insight is the value of the franchise: the difference between asset value and Earnings Power Value is the value created by a company that has significant competitive advantage. Last, the value of profitable growth is considered.
As a self-admitted recovering growth stock addict, I learned from this book that value investors are skeptical about growth for two reasons. One reason is that it is so hard to predict, but more important, many times growth is not worth much. Unless the return on capital (ROC) of the company is higher than the cost of capital, growth does not create value. (I am a slow learner; Greenblatt's example in The Little Book That Beats the Market of opening an additional gum store is even clearer to me.) The growth matrix and formulas in the book were a revelation to me. The surprising thing is how little multiple expansion a stock deserves based on growth. Unless a company truly has a franchise, expanding into other areas and "diversifying" the business often destroys value. And growth for growth's sake will not make a stock go up.
This book brings value investing into the modern stock market. Modern value investors still use traditional valuation principles in a structured way, but they also consider the value of growth and the attractiveness of the business. What a relief, I not restricted to buying typewriter and pay phone stocks! The authors quote Warren Buffett: It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.
61 internautes sur 65 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile
Good content, but confusing19 août 2005
A Simple Guy
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Good content and good approach. I'm a fan of value investing. The book teaches the reproduction cost of assets and the earning power value. It also hints on how to incorporate growth.
The problem is that information is all scattered around and the wording is not very reliable. The authors mix capital with ROIC with ROE. They also don't make it clear when they mean cost of capital or WACC. Also, the definitions are not there and that creates confusion.
I found a few typos in tables. The values are carried from one table to another and sometimes are rounded sometimes are not. Some entries in the tables just don't mean anything because the values are never used nor referred to. That's a very bad practice for authors coming from academia. They should know better.
The book would improve to a 5-star rating had them fixed all typos, explained all terms, and put all calculations in tables in math formulas instead of just saying something along the lines of "we multiply the WACC by the ROIC and divide by the tax rate and we get a P/E of 10.5". (Example exagerated). Suggestion: List all the steps so we can follow. Add text to explain whats being done. Refer to rows and columns in the table so we know what values came from where. Also, clearly differentiate between tables with original facts (e.g., balance sheet from annual report) from tables that contain either speculation or derived numbers. Anything discounted or adjusted is speculation or derived.
12 internautes sur 12 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile
the most comprehensive review on value20 septembre 2006
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In short, this book is grounded on economics and common sense. It summarizes "the intelligent investor", "security analysis", and the modern books on Buffett pretty well (there are other paths to heaven besides Buffett's). Its verbiage is beautifully chosen and a joy to read, especially for avid value investors. Best of all it is a scholarly work - if you're sick and tired of the commercial investing books that flood bookstores, buy this book.
8 internautes sur 8 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile
Must-read for value investors!1 juillet 2007
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What I Liked About It * Details several valuation methods that I haven't seen in other non-academic, mainstream investing books. * Several real-world examples to apply valuation methods * Great treatment of brands vs. franchises
What Needed Work * Various investor profiles unnecessarily fill the 2nd half of the book. * Attempts at quantifying "franchise" felt a bit forced.
Greenwald's book ranks at the very top of my investing bookshelf. I read this after having read Graham, Greenblatt, Klarman, Lynch, P. Fisher, Cramer (yes, that Cramer!), Dorsey, Buffett, and Browne among others. Amazingly, this book broached a number of topics not covered by those prominent authors. As such, this book is required reading for the discerning investor.
The most important concepts this book gave me were valuation methods based on net asset value (NAV) and earnings power value (EPV). Before this, I had trouble valuing companies that didn't generate steady cash flow or have commodity assets. Now I have more angles from which to examine a prospect and find undervalued companies besides running a DCF analysis. We've heard about past opportunities where you could have bought a company like McDonalds for the price of its real estate and gotten the business for free. Greenwald shows you how to find these opportunities using his asset valuation methods. He also gives you the tools to fairly value "tech" companies (or any enterprise with heavy intangible capital). Less convincing is his discussion of earnings power value but nonetheless, it's still helpful to be able to examine a company's earnings ability.
Greenwald also spends time discussing problems with discount cash flow analysis (DCF) as well as franchises. While his thoughts on these subjects were thought-provoking, I don't completely agree with his conclusions.
On DCF, Greenwald says that trying to project future growth rates 5-10 years forward is folly and will distort your DCF analysis. While he is right that future growth projections are problematic, that doesn't mean DCF isn't helpful for individual investors. Greenwald concedes that his preferred methodologies require, in some instances, in-depth knowledge of the business and industry of the company being examined. The non-professional (me!) may not have this expertise and any estimates of asset worth or capital costs would be just as faulty as analyst growth estimates. In fact, an adjusted future growth rate derived from a number of industry-knowledgeable analysts may be more generally accurate (if imprecise).
The main knock against the book is the whole second half consisting of eight investor profiles. There's nothing wrong with them per se except that they are in the book at all. If I had wanted a book on famous value investors, I would have picked up something by Kirk Kazanjian. The chapter on Warren Buffett is almost exclusively quotations taken from freely available public reports and Seth Klarman has written his own book on investing.
I've written a more-indepth review at my enlightened-american website but in summary, my advice is to soak in the 1st half of the book and skip the 2nd half entirely. Dig into an annual report instead and start applying what Greenwald's shown you.
21 internautes sur 27 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile
Star Trek27 octobre 2007
Roger John Maudsley
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The authors announce their intention to bravely go "beyond" Graham and Buffet. I found their effort extraordinarily interesting. Not because it brings new ideas from the frontiers of Value Investing; but rather because it forced me to revalidate old ones.
Written mainly by academics, the book attempts - with undeniable clarity - to provide a simple framework for valuation of a firm using Value Investment principles. First, three sources of value are defined: Asset Value; Earnings Power Value; and Value of Growth. Second, some conceptual tricks are employed to link them in a theoretical structure capable of supporting hours of animated tutorial discussion.
The importance of Asset Value in the scheme derives from the idea that if a firm that has no defenses against competitors it is worth no more, or less, than the replacement value of the assets necessary to set up a similar business.
To illustrate, imagine a defenseless firm that is worth 2x on the stockmarket while its productive assets are worth only 1x. Attracted by the absence of barriers to entry and by the high market value achievable with a substantially lower investment, enterprising businessmen set up similar businesses.
As the new capacity comes on stream the market is inundated with products of the same type and prices and profits consequently fall. The process only ends when the market value of all the firms has fallen to the value of their assets, thus eliminating the differential that attracted new market entrants in the first place.
For this to happen we must have an idealized market of perfect competition: lots of buyers and sellers, undifferentiated products, no barriers to entry, perfect information, etc. In practice, however, a dozen firms with similar assets will generate a dozen different levels of profit. And in the end, as the book admits, it is profit expectations, not assets, that determine the value of an on-going business.
I wondered if Graham and his associates ever subscribed to this concept. In my 5th edition of "Security Analysis" I found the ambiguous comment: "ECONOMISTS believe that high returns on capital attract competition which ultimately forces down the rate of profit" (my capitalization). This same edition affirms that it is "The earning power of the assets in use (that) determines their investment value" (rather than the replacement value of these assets). I could find no evidence that the notion formed a key part of the valuation process described in the value-investing classic.
Moving on, We are told that the major difference between Earnings Power Value and Value of Growth, when used to estimate intrinsic value, is the confidence we can place on the result. It is notable, however, that both definitions of value exist in the same continuum. To calculate Earnings Power Value we can simply assume growth to be zero in the traditional Discounted Cashflow formula for estimating intrinsic value.
Beyond a certain point it is reasonable to suppose that the degree of confidence we can put on an intrinsic value calculation falls with the size of profit growth projected. How much faith would we have in a value based on a growth projection of 30% per annum, for example? But why should zero growth produce an intrinsic value closer to the truth than 5% per annum? Is one really inherently safer than the other? What about the risk of deceleration in the case of an assumption of zero growth? Conservatism does not mean ignoring reality.
Once again it all seems part of a jolly academic game. The questionable differentiation between Earnings Power Value and Value of Growth allows the authors to find a role for another element: the franchise - the defenses the firm possesses against competition. They thus arrive at a tidy little conceptual framework. If a firm has no franchise then its intrinsic value is represented by its Asset Value. If the franchise is weak then we base our estimate on its Earnings Power Value. And if it has a rock-solid franchise we might just be able to introduce the Value of Growth. Does all this have any useful meaning in the real world?
Aside from these conceptual questions I found the book exceptionally practical in describing the details of how to value the assets and evaluate the franchise of a firm. On the other hand I found the profiles of eight value investors rather tedious.