As a 1-volume history of the naval war in all theatres in WWII, this book can by no means be complete or in-depth. However, if you read this book as an introduction to naval warfare, or as a look at the "big picture", this volume does the job very well. It is easy to read, informative, touches on virtually all the important events, and keeps up a good pace. Of course, certain events are relegated to mere footnotes, including the Dieppe raid and the loss of USS Indianapolis (where most of the deaths were from sharks and exposure, not enemy activity) in the interest of timing and length. However, Miller usually points the way to further readings in such cases, if the reader wants to know more. There is an extensive notes section at the end of the book divided by chapter, listing many primary sources, which gives the book a good deal of credibility.
His analysis is generally brief as well, which is ideal for a book of this type, where pace important. This doesn't mean it's any less insightful, however. He convincingly argues that the use of the atomic bomb was a strategic, war-ending measure, not just an attempt to scare the Soviet Union; that the refusal of the Japanese to withdraw skilled pilots to train the next generation was a fatal error; and that the industrial might of the combined allies was too much for the Axis - they had to win in the first couple of years or be ultimately worn out. Another important point in praise of this book is the way Miller is careful to point out the involvement of the so-called minor allies. For example, by 1945, Canada had the 3rd largest navy in the world, but because the RCN primarily participated in the Battle of the Atlantic, they get ignored by historians who get caught up in Big Events storytelling. Miller is always very careful to point out these countries' contributions.
Unfortunately, there are a few quibbling points that drop the book to 4 stars. First, the maps are conveniently located together at the back of the book, but are never referred to in the text, and are often of too large an area to be useful. For example, a lot of space is devoted to amphibious operations on Guadalcanal, Okinawa, etc., but these islands are merely dots on a "Pacific theatre" map. Even a 1/4 page sketch per island would have been very helpful. Secondly, Miller seems to have a vendetta against Winston Churchill - he is always quick to ridicule Churchill's wild ideas, but never to give credit to his good ones, instead saying, "The British wanted ...." Finally, there's an occasional confusion, such as mixing up the British cruisers Dorsetshire (that sunk the Bismark) and Devonshire.
These quibbles do not really detract from the overall enjoyment of the book, however, and it's recommended for any armchair historian interested in the naval aspects of World War II.
