From Publishers Weekly
Is there any cause or war worth risking one's life for? How can we determine which actions are vices and which virtues? MacIntyre, professor of philosophy at Vanderbilt University, unravels these and other such questions by linking the concept of justice to what he calls practical rationality. He rejects the grab-what-you-can, utilitarian yardstick adopted by moral relativists. Instead, he argues that four wholly different, incompatible ideas of justiceput forth by Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and Humehave helped shape our modern individualistic world. In his unorthodox view, each person seeks the good through an ongoing dialogue with one of these traditions or within Jewish, non-Western or other historical traditions. This weighty sequel to After Virtue (1981) is certain to stir debate.
Copyright 1988 Reed Business Information, Inc. --Ce texte fait référence à une édition épuisée ou non disponible de ce titre.
Copyright 1988 Reed Business Information, Inc. --Ce texte fait référence à une édition épuisée ou non disponible de ce titre.
From Library Journal
In this sequel to After Virtue ( LJ 9/15/81), MacIntyre contends that any rational justification of moral judgments must presuppose some particular tradition's conception of rationality. He illustrates his contention by examining four philosophersAristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Humeto show how their different views about justice and practical rationality derive from different sources. MacIntyre asserts that although a tradition may fail by its own standards, the answer to any question about justice depends upon the historical, social, and cultural situation of the respondent and upon how he sees himself. The book's historical analyses are clear and stimulating, but the arguments for its own thesis are cloudy and ineffectual.Robert Hoffman, York Coll., CUNY
Copyright 1988 Reed Business Information, Inc. --Ce texte fait référence à une édition épuisée ou non disponible de ce titre.
Copyright 1988 Reed Business Information, Inc. --Ce texte fait référence à une édition épuisée ou non disponible de ce titre.
