Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine (Anglais) Broché – 16 octobre 2001
Découvrez notre boutique Rentrée scolaire et universitaire : livres, agendas, fournitures, ordinateurs, ameublement...
|Neuf à partir de||Occasion à partir de|
- Choisissez parmi 17 000 points de collecte en France
- Les membres du programme Amazon Prime bénéficient de livraison gratuites illimitées
- Trouvez votre point de collecte et ajoutez-le à votre carnet d’adresses
- Sélectionnez cette adresse lors de votre commande
Aucun appareil Kindle n'est requis. Téléchargez l'une des applis Kindle gratuites et commencez à lire les livres Kindle sur votre smartphone, tablette ou ordinateur.
Pour obtenir l'appli gratuite, saisissez votre numéro de téléphone mobile.
Détails sur le produit
Si vous vendez ce produit, souhaitez-vous suggérer des mises à jour par l'intermédiaire du support vendeur ?
Commentaires client les plus utiles sur Amazon.com
While the bulk of the book is devoted to CRM in aviation (the researchers have vastly more data and experience in that field), the book serves well as an introduction to cultural influences in the operating room (and in medicine in general, to a degree.) This book is not light reading, and is most suitable for professionals in aviation, medicine, or behavioral and social sciences familiar with inter- and intra-cultural dynamics and the statistical methodologies typical in such studies.
The book is excellent at breaking down cultural influences by national, organizational, and professional affiliation, and it adds a significant amount to the body of knowledge in this area. As a long time airline pilot (and part-time safety and training consultant), I found the book fascinating and generally in agreement with my experiences working with pilots from airlines around the world. There are a couple of minor areas where I disagree with the book, for instance on page 105, the authors state "we believe that every national culture values the safety of its members and that every airline is dedicated to improving the safety of its operations." I agree that this is the case in the vast majority of cases, but I have been given reason to doubt the complete accuracy of the second half of that statement based on my personal interactions with many pilots from airlines around the globe. I think that management at all airlines would prefer safe operations as a matter of profitability, but that some are content with doing the minimum mandated training with safety as a second thought to legality and profitability. This is a minor semantic point separating my opinions from those of the authors, and is based on my personal observations and interactions with several thousand crew members from scores of airlines from all over the world. I will unequivocally say that the cultural profiles that the authors have established for the pilots are nearly identical to my own perceptions.
A very interesting part of the book concerns itself with pilots distrusting management. The authors were stunned to discover what low regard pilots felt for management. (As a pilot I think, in general, justifiably so.) This ties in with my comments above about genuine managerial interest in safety. They all "talk the talk," but many don't "walk the walk." The matter is fully distilled for the non-industry insider on pages 127-128 which emphasizes the group mentality (with resultant long-term corporate health) of Southwest Airlines in a press release written by their founder Herb Kelleher, contrasted with a press release from one of the embattled legacy carriers, released by the CEO of that corporation. The latter gave no credit to the employees, while the Southwest release did. The esteem with which management regards employees couldn't be carved in greater relief: the problem for management is that this is a treacherous two way street, and the employees that are desperately needed by legacy carriers are now largely demoralized in some cases to the point of apathy. Fortunately, the Helmreich team was not able to tie safety records conclusively to morale, though that may be simply because accidents are so statistically rare. On page 179 the authors deal again with the trustworthiness of management. The assertion is that for a safety system to function employees must feel free to report safety problems, instead of hushing them up (this is a major issue on the medical side of the house with the ever-present malpractice litigation waiting to ensnare doctors.) The authors are right on the money: if a hint of vindictiveness or lack of anonymity exists in a safety program, it will fail. The authors cite the excellent program at Continental Airlines as a model for how to deal effectively with an accident (in this case a non-fatal gear up landing of a DC-9) to learn from it and make further safety gains with employees.
On page 204 the authors examine cultural issues in the context of language differences. They cite the problems of Chinese pilots speaking in English. They mention the issues of sending a (non-pilot) translator with the pilots to aid communication. I have worked with several Chinese airlines and they are all bright, polite, and perceptive in my experience, but the dynamics in the simulator with the translator are unnerving as instructions are translated and queried, checklists are run and maneuvers are flown. In general under abnormal conditions I found that when a translator is used, emergency procedures took much longer (perhaps twice as long) to accomplish due to the language problems involved. I fully support the Helmreich proposition that international pilots be given more training in English (the international language of air transport.)
In sum, this book is superior and fascinating. I have commented more on the aviation side of the book because that is where the majority of my expertise is, but the medical side is equally fascinating, and heralds the beginning of a true safety system approach to medicine. I highly recommend this book.
I have used this book in aviation safety training and it does provide a solid basis for creating a safety culture.