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Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Anglais) CD – Livre audio, CD

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--Ce texte fait référence à l'édition Broché.
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Présentation de l'éditeur

Cyberspace, where information--and hence serious value--is stored and manipulated, is a tempting target. An attacker could be a person, group, or state and may disrupt or corrupt the systems from which cyberspace is built. When states are involved, it is tempting to compare fights to warfare, but there are important differences. The author addresses these differences and ways the United States protect itself in the face of attack. --Ce texte fait référence à l'édition Broché .

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Amazon.com: 3.4 étoiles sur 5 9 commentaires
1 internautes sur 1 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
3.0 étoiles sur 5 Too old for this topic 28 mars 2013
Par Paul Huber - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Broché Achat vérifié
The book is good from a historical perspective, but this area has moved ahead dramatically and this is only history. Current situation is very different and very high risk
0 internautes sur 1 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
5.0 étoiles sur 5 Interesting 20 janvier 2013
Par Frenchsimmer - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Broché Achat vérifié
Doing the association between cyberwar and deterrence is interesting.

You should read it in order to understand cyberwar through another lens.
0 internautes sur 1 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
1.0 étoiles sur 5 One Star 17 novembre 2014
Par Brad Coleman - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: MP3 CD Achat vérifié
The audio book is difficult to start and stop because the tracks don't correlate to the chapters.
53 internautes sur 57 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
3.0 étoiles sur 5 Lack of operational security experience undermines argument 25 novembre 2009
Par Richard Bejtlich - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Broché
As background, I am a former Air Force captain who led the intrusion detection operation in the AFCERT before applying those same skills to private industry, the government, and other sectors. I am currently responsible for detection and response at a Fortune 5 company and I train others with hands-on labs as a Black Hat instructor. I also earned a master's degree in public policy from Harvard after graduating from the Air Force Academy.

Martin Libicki's Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (CAC) is a weighty discussion of the policy considerations of digital defense and attack. He is clearly conversant in non-cyber national security history and policy, and that knowledge is likely to benefit readers unfamiliar with Cold War era concepts. Unfortunately, Libicki's lack of operational security experience undermines his argument and conclusions. The danger for Air Force leaders and those interested in policy is that they will not recognize that, in many cases, Libicki does not understand what he is discussing. I will apply lessons from direct experience with digital security to argue that Libicki's framing of the "cyberdeterrence" problem is misguided at best and dangerous at worst.

Libicki's argument suffers five key flaws. First, in the Summary Libicki states "cyberattacks are possible only because systems have flaws" (p xiii). He continues with "there is, in the end, no forced entry in cyberspace... It is only a modest exaggeration to say that organizations are vulnerable to cyberattack only to the extent they want to be. In no other domain of warfare can such a statement be made" (p. xiv). I suppose, then, that there is "no forced entry" when a soldier destroys a door with a rocket, because the owners of the building are vulnerable "to the extent they want to be"? Are aircraft carriers similarly vulnerable to hypersonic cruise missiles because "they want to be"? How about the human body vs bullets?

Second, Libicki's fatal understanding of digital vulnerability is compounded by his ignorance of the role of vendors and service providers in the security equation. Asset owners can do everything in their power to defend their resources, but if an application or implementation has a flaw it's likely only the vendor or service provider who can fix it. Libicki frequently refers to sys admins as if they have mystical powers to completely understand and protect their environments. In reality, sys admins are generally concerned about availability alone, since they are often outsourced to the lowest bidder and contract-focused, or understaffed to do anything more than keep the lights on.

Third, this "blame the victim" mentality is compounded by the completely misguided notions that defense is easy and recovery from intrusion is simple. On p 144 he says "much of what militaries can do to minimize damage from a cyberattack can be done in days or weeks and with few resources." On p 134 he says that, following cyberattack, "systems can be set straight painlessly." Libicki has clearly never worked in a security or IT shop at any level. He also doesn't appreciate how much the military relies on civilian infrastructure from everything to logistics to basic needs like electricity. For example, on p 160 he says "Militaries generally do not have customers; thus, their systems have little need to be connected to the public to accomplish core functions (even if external connections are important in ways not always appreciated)." That is plainly wrong when one realizes that "the public" includes contractors who design, build, and run key military capabilities.

Fourth, he makes a false distinction between "core" and "peripheral" systems, with the former controlled by users and the later by sys admins. He says "it is hard to compromise the core in the same precise way twice, but the periphery is always at risk" (p 20). Libicki is apparently unaware that one core Internet resource, BGP, is basically at constant risk of complete disruption. Other core resources, DNS and SSL, have been incredibly abused during the last few years. All of these are known problems that are repeatedly exploited, despite knowledge of their weaknesses. Furthermore, Libicki doesn't realize that so-called critical systems are often more fragile that user systems. In the real world, critical systems often lack change management windows, or are heavily regulated, or are simply old and not well maintained. What's easier to reconfigure, patch, or replace, a "core" system that absolutely cannot be disrupted "for business needs," or a "peripheral" system that belongs to a desk worker?

Fifth, in addition to not understanding defense, Libicki doesn't understand offense. He has no idea how intruders think or the skills they bring to the arena. On pp 35-6 he says "If sufficient expenditures are made and pains are taken to secure critical networks (e.g., making it impossible to alter operating parameters of electric distribution networks from the outside), not even the most clever hacker could break into such a system. Such a development is not impossible." Yes, it is impossible. Thirty years of computer security history have shown it to be impossible. One reason why he doesn't understand intruders appears on p 47 where he says "private hackers are more likely to use techniques that have been circulating throughout the hacker community. While it is not impossible that they have managed to generate a novel exploit to take advantage of a hitherto unknown vulnerability, they are unlikely to have more than one." This baffling statement shows Libicki doesn't appreciate the skill set of the underground.

Libicki concludes on pp xiv and xix-xx "Operational cyberwar has an important niche role, but only that... The United States and, by extension, the U.S. Air Force, should not make strategic cyberwar a priority investment area... cyberdefense remains the Air Force's most important activity within cyberspace." He also claims it is not possible to "disarm" cyberwarriors, e.g., on p 119 "one objective that cyberwar cannot have is to disarm, much less destroy, the enemy. In the absence of physical combat, cyberwar cannot lead to the occupation of territory." This focus on defense and avoiding offense is dangerous. It may not be possible to disable a country's potential for cyberwar, but an adversary can certainly target, disrupt, and even destroy cyberwarriors. Elite cyberwarriors could be likened to nuclear scientists in this respect; take out the scientists and the whole program suffers.

Furthermore, by avoiding offense, Libicki makes a critical mistake: if cyberwar has only a "niche role," how is a state supposed to protect itself from cyberwar? In Libicki's world, defense is cheap and easy. In the real world, the best defense is 1) informed by offense, and 2) coordinated with offensive actions to target and disrupt adversary offensive activity. Libicki also focuses far too much on cyberwar in isolation, while real-world cyberwar has historically accompanied kinetic actions.

Of course, like any good consultant, Libicki leaves himself an out on p 177 by stating "cyberweapons come relatively cheap. Because a devastating cyberattack may facilitate or amplify physical operations and because an operational cyberwar capability is relatively inexpensive (especially if the Air Force can leverage investments in CNE), an offensive cyberwar capability is worth developing." The danger of this misguided tract is that policy makers will be swayed by Libicki's misinformed assumptions, arguments, and conclusions, and believe that defense alone is a sufficient focus for 21st century digital security. In reality, a kinetically weaker opponent can leverage a cyber attack to weaken a kinetically superior yet net-centric adversary. History shows, in all theatres, that defense does not win wars, and that the best defense is a good offense.
2 internautes sur 3 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
4.0 étoiles sur 5 Worth Reading 31 août 2010
Par A. Student - Publié sur Amazon.com
Format: Broché
Well, this book has certainly stirred up some emotion. If you're on the fence about reading this book, you can get the PDF at the RAND web site and make up your mind about whether it belongs in your library (it is in mine).

This is a good book on a timely topic and adds quite a bit to the debate about the utility of the principle of deterrence through cyberweapons. Keep this focus in mind as this is not a general book about information/network security or even cyber warfare and its conclusions should not be taken out of context (which I humbly suggest Bejtlich did).

So, if you're interested in whether it makes real sense for the US to develop cyberweapons in the hope that our ability to do unto others will deter them from doing unto us, then do read this book as its conclusions may surprise you.
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