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The Death of Corporate Reputation: How Integrity Has Been Destroyed on Wall Street par [Macey, Jonathan]
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Longueur : 293 pages Word Wise: Activé Composition améliorée: Activé
Page Flip: Activé Langue : Anglais

Description du produit

Présentation de l'éditeur

Why did the financial scandals really happen? Why are they continuing to happen? In The Death of Corporate Reputation, Yale's Jonathan Macey reveals the real, non-intuitive reason, and offers a new path forward. For over a century law firms, investment banks, accounting firms, credit rating agencies and companies seeking regular access to U.S. capital markets made large investments in their reputations.  They treated customers well and  sometimes endured losses in transactions or business deals in order to  sustain and nurture their reputations as faithful brokers and “gate-keepers.”  This has changed completely . The existing business model among leading participants in today’s capital markets no longer treats customers as valued clients whose trust must be earned and nurtured, but as  one-off “counter-parties” to whom no duties are owed and no loyalty is required .  The rough and tumble norms of the market-place have replaced the long-standing reputational model in U.S. finance. 

This book describes the transformation in American finance from the old reputational model to the existing laissez faire model and argues that the change came as a result of  three factors: (1) the growth of reliance on regulation rather than reputation as the primary mechanism for protecting customers and (2) the increasing complexity of regulation, which made technical expertise rather than reputation the primary criterion on which customers choose who to do business with in today’s markets ; and (3) the rise of the “cult of personality” on Wall Street, which has led to a secular demise in the relevance of companies’ reputations and the concomitant rise of individual “rain-makers” reputation as the basis for premium pricing of financial services. This compelling book will drive the debate about the financial crisis and financial regulation for years to come -- both inside and outside the industry.

Quatrième de couverture

“...a brilliant, provocative, and persuasive exploration of a root cause of the failure of modern financial market regulation, engendered by lawmakers, regulators and prosecutors, and their legal and accounting acolytes.... A must-read for anyone concerned about the health and well-being of our capital and financial markets.”
--Harvey Pitt, CEO of global business consultancy Kalorama Partners, formerly 26th Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2001-2003)

  • The real reasons why we can no longer trust Wall Street and what to do about it
  • How the SEC got captured--and why it’s perfectly happy about that
  • Essential reading for every policymaker, financial executive, investor, and citizen concerned with well-functioning capital markets

Trust and reputation are central to the operation of capital markets. But in our generation, reputational mechanisms are failing, and when these fail, markets and societies will fail as well.

The conventional response is more aggressive regulation. But this only worsens the problem. In The Death of Corporate Reputation, one of the world’s leading experts in financial market regulation explains why. Yale Law School’s Jonathan R. Macey demonstrates how and why poorly considered regulation has undermined traditional trust mechanisms throughout financial institutions, accounting and law firms, credit ratings agencies, and stock exchanges alike.

Macey retells Wall Street’s recent history in a new and more productive light, revealing what has really happened--and offering a different and better path back to trust and integrity.

For more than a century, law firms, investment banks, accounting firms, credit rating agencies, and companies seeking regular access to U.S. capital markets made large investments in their reputations. They generally treated their customers well and occasionally even endured losses to maintain their reputations as faithful brokers, dealers’ issuers, and “gatekeepers.” This has changed. Today’s leading capital market participants no longer treat customers as valued counterparties whose trust must be earned and nurtured but as distant “counter-parties” to whom no duties are required. The rough and tumble norms of the marketplace have replaced the long-standing fiduciary model in U.S. finance. The result has been unrelenting financial scandal.

In The Death of Corporate Reputation, pioneering corporate law and governance expert and Yale professor Jonathan Macey describes the disastrous transformation from the old reputational model to the existing buyer beware model in finance. Macey convincingly argues that the change can be attributed to several factors, including (1) the growth of reliance on regulation rather than reputation to protect customers and (2) growing regulatory complexity, which has made technical expertise more important to customers than reputation. After identifying the heart of the problem, he offers a better path forward--and a true “silver lining” in the age of Madoff.

Why traditional methods of fraud deterrence have failed in finance
The unintended consequences of aggressive overregulation--and how to fix them

It’s not just the banks: touring post-reputation Wall Street
Failure of reputation in accounting and law firms, rating agencies, and exchanges

Milken and beyond: why “nobody goes down with the ship” anymore
Why the employees of scandal-tarnished firms keep right on thriving

The perverse incentives that make the SEC so ineffective
Responding to the wrong metrics, driven by the wrong politics

Détails sur le produit

  • Format : Format Kindle
  • Taille du fichier : 1312 KB
  • Nombre de pages de l'édition imprimée : 293 pages
  • Utilisation simultanée de l'appareil : Jusqu'à 5 appareils simultanés, selon les limites de l'éditeur
  • Editeur : FT Press; Édition : 1 (20 mars 2013)
  • Vendu par : Amazon Media EU S.à r.l.
  • Langue : Anglais
  • Synthèse vocale : Activée
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  • Word Wise: Activé
  • Lecteur d’écran : Pris en charge
  • Composition améliorée: Activé
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Commentaires client les plus utiles sur (beta) (Peut contenir des commentaires issus du programme Early Reviewer Rewards) 4.2 étoiles sur 5 13 commentaires
4.0 étoiles sur 5 reputation is irrelevant 22 novembre 2013
Par Sam Motes - Publié sur
Format: Format Kindle Achat vérifié
Discusses the death of the general partnership through the exposure limiting vehicles of the limited liability partnership and corporation that has lead to reduced skin in the game to loss if the firm stumbles and falls. These new company forms operate in a post SOX and other regulation world that drives funding via legal mandate rather than reputation protecting incentives leading to little long term upside for the accounting or legal firm to spend its limited resources to build its corporate reputation. This crazy system is all monitored by rating agencies compromised by greed with allegiance to the companies they are rating rather than the investing populace relying on their integrity to help make wise decisions. That populace are largely lemmings who will follow the ratings even though some know they are bad ratings just in a effort to follow the animal instincts of the crowd and take advantage of the irrational market moves. A true house of cards that will fall over again and again.
Par DRBRODY - Publié sur
Format: Relié Achat vérifié
I knew a lot of what Macey advocated, however the pulling together into a comprehensive organized work, made this book valuable to me. I have recommended it to an affiliate organization of financial services with 2,000 members. It is important to understand how the financial world and what you hear and are told has to be comprehended in view of the many conflicting messages and overt propaganda that exists. You are told so many things, that actions and unethical business activity can be easily overlooked.

Macey clearly lays out the current state of reputation and business culture, which actually appears all over American culture and the reputation of all institutions.
0 internautes sur 1 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile 
1.0 étoiles sur 5 A poorly argued polemic 9 décembre 2013
Par Timothy Tessin - Publié sur
Format: Relié Achat vérifié
Macey, a professor in both the Yale Law School and Yale School of Management, has written a number of scholarly articles on the same theme as this book. Not having yet read any of the articles, my observations here are focused on the book’s presentation of the argument rather than on the argument’s validity.

Macey writes at the beginning of the book, “Economists developed an elegant and highly useful grand theory of reputation to explain why having a good reputation is critical to success, particularly for companies in the financial sector, like insurance companies and banks. The point of this book is to explain why that theory has lost its explanatory power when it comes to understanding the way Wall Street works today.” His thesis, in short, is that financial firms (and gatekeepers such as accounting firms, law firms, and credit rating agencies) no longer behave the way the “economic theory of behavior” (ETR) says they should.

The book’s intended audience is clearly broader than that for Macey’s scholarly papers. This being the case, it is odd that Macey provides us with no background on ETR. I didn’t have to search hard to find out that ETR is an application of game (or rational choice) theory. The book makes no mention of this.

Furthermore, ETR uses “reputation” in a sense that is synonymous with “trust.” But there is another sense, call it “stakeholder reputation,” that is related to but distinct from “reputation as trust.” “Stakeholder reputation” is what we might learn from a public opinion survey. Despite the distinction, Macey slips back and forth between the two throughout the book.

Without an exposition of ETR, we also have to take it on faith that ETR did in fact have explanatory power at one time, even if it no longer does. However, Macey’s own examples undercut that assumption. He writes in Chapter 5, for example, that the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert “is important because it marks the death knell of the traditional economic theory of reputation.” That is because, although the firm failed, many of its employees went on to successful careers at other financial firms. By contrast, Salomon Brothers’ failure exemplified ETR because the firm’s leaders also failed. Except that Salomon Brothers’ failure post-dated Drexel’s.

In Chapter 6, Macey writes that, in ETR companies “willingly and voluntarily contract for an pay for audit services.” But public companies have not “willingly and voluntarily” contracted for external audits since passage of the 1933 Securities Act. So ETR could still (theoretically) have explanatory power with regard to pre-1933 Wall Street behavior, ETR certainly can’t explain the post-WWII economic boom in the U.S., as Macey would like it to.
5.0 étoiles sur 5 good as expected 28 avril 2014
Par Tutan - Publié sur
Format: Format Kindle Achat vérifié
such a good stuff, but i do not know i have to reply so many words to submit my review. i love amazon it is a best place to shopping and consume,
5.0 étoiles sur 5 good 29 avril 2014
Par eric - Publié sur
Format: Format Kindle Achat vérifié
It is very useful book. I learnd a lot of knowledge from this book. It is very nice. I love it.
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