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End This Depression Now! (English Edition) Format Kindle
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Paul Krugman
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A New York Times best-selling call to arms from Nobel Prize–winning economist Paul Krugman.
The Great Recession is more than four years old—and counting. Yet, as Paul Krugman points out in this powerful volley, "Nations rich in resources, talent, and knowledge—all the ingredients for prosperity and a decent standard of living for all—remain in a state of intense pain."
How bad have things gotten? How did we get stuck in what now can only be called a depression? And above all, how do we free ourselves? Krugman pursues these questions with his characteristic lucidity and insight. He has a powerful message for anyone who has suffered over these past four years—a quick, strong recovery is just one step away, if our leaders can find the "intellectual clarity and political will" to end this depression now.
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Description du produit
Revue de presse
Quatrième de couverture
The Great Recession is more than four years old-and counting. Yet, as Paul Krugman points out in this powerful volley, "Nations rich in resources, talent, and knowledge-all the ingredients for prosperity and a decent standard of living for all-remain in a state of intense pain."
How bad have things gotten? How did we get stuck in what now can only be called a depression? And above all, how do we free ourselves? Krugman pursues these questions with his characteristic lucidity and insight. He has a powerful message for anyone who has suffered over these past four years-a quick, strong recovery is just one step away, if our leaders can find the "intellectual clarity and political will" to end this depression now. --Ce texte fait référence à l'édition paperback.
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Détails sur le produit
- ASIN : B007AJFSJW
- Éditeur : W. W. Norton & Company; Reprint édition (30 avril 2012)
- Langue : Anglais
- Taille du fichier : 1796 KB
- Synthèse vocale : Activée
- Confort de lecture : Activé
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- Nombre de pages de l'édition imprimée : 273 pages
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I conclude that the book is a good enjoyable read, well written with a great sense of humor and deserves top marks.
As usual Krugman explains his views and economic concepts in layman's terms, allowing non-economists to take part in the debate. Of course Krugman leans to the left to put it mildly, but his argument is not ideological which allows the reader to at least honestly reflect on the economic situation we are in right now and what our leaders are doing to deal with it.
Book well worth reading.
So the solution to our economic problem, Krugman insists, is not austerity (which might work for households) but the opposite. We need the government to spend money to create jobs so that people can buy other people's goods and services. We especially need some infrastructure building here at home instead of in the Middle East.
"Collectively," Krugman asserts, "the world's residents are trying to buy less stuff than they are capable of producing, to spend less than they earn. That's possible for an individual, but not for the world as a whole. And the result is the devastation all around us." (p. 30)
The other thing to understand about governments, especially huge governments like the US with a $15-trillion a year economy is that government intervention can smooth out a crisis. This is because the US will not run out of people to buy its debt since its tax base is so huge that the risk of default is miniscule. When the economy gets back on its feet tax revenues will increase and the debts will be paid. Well, not paid in full. That is unlikely to ever happen, since it makes little sense. To borrow to buy something you don't need like luxuries is not wise. (Wars are usually luxuries for governments.) But to borrow to help grow the economy is a fine investment. Sound companies borrow because borrowing allows them to take advantage of their knowhow in producing goods and services that people will buy allowing the company to make money. Borrowing to party big time to impress the neighbors or your girlfriend grows no wealth. (Wars are sometimes shock and awe parties for heads of state looking to stay in power.)
Aside from offering the solution to our economic woes in simple, straightforward terms, Krugman also does an outstanding job of explaining how we got into this mess in the first place. I've read several books and a number of articles explaining the mortgage crisis, the "too big to fail" bank welfare fraud and the derivatives hustles, but nowhere is this spelled out in as clear as fashion as Krugman does here. He is simply the best economist writing for an informed non-professional public at work today. This is not to mention that he is also a Nobel Prize winning economist.
As for wages being too high, Krugman writes:
"...today it's often argued that more labor market `flexibility'--a euphemism for wage cuts--is what we really need" (to cure high unemployment). "But while an individual worker can improve his chances of getting a job by accepting a lower wage, because that makes him more attractive compared to other workers, an across-the-board cut in wages leaves everyone in the same place, except for one thing: it reduces everyone's income, but the level of debt remains the same. So more flexibility in wages (and prices) would just make matters worse." (pp. 52-53)
I think the average person, even the fairly well educated average person, doesn't really understand how banks work and how they make money. I didn't until I was well into my fifties. Certainly the core of the Tea Party doesn't, although some of the supporters of financial institution deregulation do and that is precisely why they want deregulation. Here's how Krugman explains this in part:
First he notes that the Glass-Steagall act of 1933 primarily did two things. It "established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which guaranteed (and still guarantees) depositors against loss if their bank should happened to fail" (p. 59) Additionally, "Glass-Steagall limited the amount of risk banks could take. This was especially necessary given the establishment of deposit insurance, which could have created enormous `moral hazard.' That is, it could have created a situation in which bankers could raise lots of money, no questions asked--hey, it's all government-insured--then put that money into high-risk, high stakes investments, figuring that it was heads they win, tails the taxpayers lose."
Krugman then reminds us that this is exactly what happened during the savings and loan scandal of the Reagan administration. Likewise, the big investments banks knew during the later years of the George W. Bush administration that they were in fact too big to fail and the government in order to prevent a massive financial meltdown would have to bail them out if their Pandora's Box of risky derivatives (and other "financial instruments") went toxic. This knowledge gave them free rein to gamble like drunken sailors--well, that knowledge and the (how sweet it is!) deregulation of investment banking that took place primarily in the Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Toxic those gambles went and both the Bush and the Obama administrations found themselves with no choice but to bail the banks out lest the whole economy come tumbling down.
One of the results of deregulation has been the enormous increase in the wealth of the top one percent (yes, those people) and what has happened to the real income of most of the rest of us. Krugman has two charts on page 74 showing the growth in household income from 1947 to the present. While the rich have indeed gotten richer the average family has seen its income growth "slowed to a crawl."
But it's even worse than Krugman makes it appear. That's because the only reason middle income Americans have been able to tread water is because many of those families became two income families. In other words the head of household's real income has actually fallen.
Another factor in the actual decline in the average worker's buying power and the amazing increase in CEO compensation comes about, Krugman suggests, because worker's unions have lost a lot of their power. "It's surely relevant here to note the sharp decline in unionization during the 1980s, which removed one major player that might have protested huge paychecks for executives." (p. 82)
One more point. Krugman argues that the harsh austerity measures currently being acted out in Greece and other places in Europe are not only mistaken but based on a kind of "morality play" mentality. We all understand how it feels when our neighbors get away with something like buying houses they can't afford. We don't want the government to bail them out. They were fiscally irresponsible and should have to pay the piper. However even if that is true it doesn't help us by administering punishment in the form taking place in Greece, Ireland, Spain, and elsewhere. Our standard of living will suffer if we place our desire to punish others ahead of our doing what is necessary to grow the economy. It would help a lot if somehow some of the mortgage indebtedness were to be forgiven, is what Krugman suggests.
In short, there's a tremendous amount of economic wisdom in this book, so much so I would recommend it as a supplement to a college macroeconomics text. You'll find that a number of the sometimes difficult ideas in those texts are illuminated almost incidentally by Krugman as he explains how we got into this mess and how we can get out. I wish this were required reading for high school students and the members of the Congress of the United States.
--Dennis Littrell, author of "The World Is Not as We Think It Is"
The central idea of this book is that fiscal austerity is not the adequate response to an economy subjected to a liquidity trap, even if the latter has a huge budget deficit. As a self-confessed Keynesian, he recommends bigger, immediate and globally coordinated fiscal stimuli.
As to Europe, his opinion is clear-cut: he was skeptical, he still is and he thinks he will remain so. Its discussion of the euro zone troubles is not original in itself, but the quality of his argument combined to the harsh reality of the facts harbinger of a turbulent future for the nations using the single currency.
In brief, I might not be an economist but I enjoyed the book, I found the topics engaging and the discussions to the point.
Meilleurs commentaires provenant d’autres pays
He begins by outlining the tremendous costs of a prolonged depression, especially in human terms. His humanity comes through strongly, not something one normally associates with economists. For example, he notes research which shows that a graduate qualifying during a downturn has his or her whole career affected adversely, not just for the duration of the recession. Long recessions cause permanent, irretrievable losses that leave nations with weak industries and poor skill bases, unable to take full advantage of any recovery. They can lead to political extremism - look at Hungary and Greece today.
The lessons of the Great Depression are outlined. Krugman sees himself as a "sorta-kinda New Keynesian" and argues that depressions are essentially due to lack of demand. This can be counteracted effectively by government spending of particular types - infrastructure spending, mortgage debt relief, temporary higher target rates for inflation, and effective devaluation of the currency and "printing of money". He criticises the stimulus package of President Obama as being far too timid and small to be really effective. Krugman does not think debts should not be paid off, but this should be done when the economy is stronger.
His remedies mainly apply to America but there is also discussion of the UK and Europe. He is scathing about the economic policies of the coalition government. As the UK has its own currency and central bank, Krugman states that we could easily apply a stimulus package without causing a troublesome run on the currency (he talks about the "confidence fairy" in debunking the excessive weight given to "confidence" in the design of policy). He shows that such countries (the USA, Japan, the UK, Sweden) are much less prone to being at the mercy of the market compared to those in the Eurozone. He contrasts Sweden and Denmark with Finland: very similar economies but as Finland is in the Eurozone, has suffered much greater speculative pressure. However, he is much more pessimistic about the Eurozone as a whole. The individual countries do not have their own currency, nor their own central bank and this, Krugman maintains, makes all the difference. The only solution he can see is Germany enacting, for a time, strong inflationary policies - totally against the grain in that country - combined with general wage reduction in southern Europe, again not likely to happen voluntarily.
So far, so Keynesian, but the really fascinating parts of the book lie elsewhere. For example, the "paradoxes": the "Paradox of thrift", where everyone saves (and so spends less) leading to generally declining income and shrinking of the economy. The "Paradox of deleveraging" - the more debtors pay, the more they owe. And the "Paradox of flexibility" - lack of demand leads to a cut in prices e.g. for labour - in short, wage cuts. Across the board wage cuts, incomes all reduced, but debt remains the same. It is such things which really counter the usual objection - you cannot cure debt by more debt. Krugman says we need to change the metaphors used to describe the economy in slumps. He shows that in a slump, normal concepts do not apply. He likens it to being on the other side of the looking glass, and I then saw it as akin to quantum mechanics compared to Newtonian physics, or the peculiar properties of materials at extremely low temperatures, e.g. superconductivity. Certain states need ways of thinking that are superficially not logical and counter-intuitive.
Another strong theme of the book is the increasing inequality in Western societies since the early 1980s (the time of President Reagan and "Reaganomics"). Krugman sees this time as the one where the dominant economics changes from Keynesian ideas to those of the laissez-faire economists who believe that human beings are logical and markets always do the right thing. This has the ring of doctrine, not science, and Krugman mentions the messianic tendencies of some of this ilk. Keynesian ideas were seen by conservatives as the thin end of the wedge - socialism would surely follow. Keynes was certainly not a socialist.
It was the time of deregulation of the banking sector and failure to regulate the "shadow banks" and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act (to legalise, retroactively, an illegal merger in the banking sector!) All this went hand in hand with the increasing polarisation of politics in American (and the UK). The rich, consisting of corporate executives and "financial wheeler-dealers" in the main, somehow monopolised any increase in the GDP, leaving the incomes of the vast majority flat-lining. The rich managed to do this by fixing thing to their advantage: "soft corruption" at a political level: they had and have more access to power, they are articulate and influence disproportionately. They even influenced which economists had the strongest voice: To quote Krugman:
"The preferences of university donors, the availability of fellowships and lucrative consulting contracts...must have encourages [economists] not just to turn away from Keynesian ideas but to forget much that had been learned in the 1930s and 1940s".
Not only this, but Keynesians were actively discriminated against at some universities. This could sound like a conspiracy theory but it is not a club of rich people colluding to do something. It is a myriad of such people acting in their own interest in a myriad of separate, disconnected actions. These actions carry more weight than that of "little people". There is a net vector to such actions.
He outlines the story of the housing bubble, the subprime mortgage scandal and the ludicrous idea that risk can virtually be eliminated from the financial sector by complex "instruments".
The scope of the book is far wider than one might think from the title. He outlines much of what has gone wrong in the Western democracies over the past thirty years or so. The "culture wars" in the USA, sadly spreading to our blessed isle. The disregard of experts in favour of pure ideology. The disappearance of calm but passionate political discussion in favour of ad hominem attacks. In his postscript, he says: "Tribal allegiance should have no more to do with your views about macroeconomics than with your views on, say, the theory of evolution or climate change...hmm, maybe I'd better stop right there". Who says Americans don't do irony?
Speaking as a reader who has been more inclined to the doctrine of austerity, rather than spending, Krugman makes a convincing critique of Austerity policies, and provides great examples and information to support his points.
In all, a very decent book, perhaps one of the more accessible works on the post 2008 economy, and worthy of both reading, and at least considering the policies Krugman advocates.
Krugman then sets out a well argued case for government spending to create jobs, from which all good things will flow. For those who feel that austerity policies are self defeating and cruel (Krugman's word) it is encouraging to hear the solid arguments against them from a Nobel prizewinning economist.
Although Krugman's style is sometimes a tad patronising, in general this book is well written and readable, and engages much more deeply with the subject than several others I've read. Recommended.
This book pitches itself at just the right level. Explains Keynesian economics in a simple yet truthful way, does not patronise and does not baffle with science. Unlike most books on economics where the authors seem to be saying "Look at how clever I am", this book just gets down and tells a story...
... a story about how this damned recession should be over now. How we have the resources to end it and find our way back into growth but how the recovery is being stifled by those charged with its execution. How austerity measures, far from ending the depression, are making matters worse.
This morning (1 Jan 2013), it was announced that the UK is probably about to enter a TRIPLE DIP as the austerity measures are making matters worse. I urge everyone to read this book - although focusing on the USA, it still makes the case for a Keynesian solution clearly.



