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The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, With a New Preface and Appendix (Harvard Economic Studies Book 124) (English Edition) Revised Édition, Format Kindle
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mancur Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls “public goods”—goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law, and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need. This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the “lesser” members of the small group to exploit the “greater” members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.
All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory’s relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.
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Détails sur le produit
- ASIN : B00DMKS0WU
- Éditeur : Harvard University Press; Revised édition (1 janvier 1971)
- Langue : Anglais
- Taille du fichier : 800 KB
- Synthèse vocale : Activée
- Lecteur d’écran : Pris en charge
- Confort de lecture : Activé
- X-Ray : Non activée
- Word Wise : Activé
- Pense-bêtes : Sur Kindle Scribe
- Nombre de pages de l'édition imprimée : 192 pages
- Pagination - ISBN de l'édition imprimée de référence : 0805201785
- Classement des meilleures ventes d'Amazon : 294,645 en Boutique Kindle (Voir les 100 premiers en Boutique Kindle)
- 266 en Popular Economics
- 470 en Sociology
- 5,892 en Entreprise et bourse en langues étrangères
- Commentaires client :
À propos de l'auteur
Meilleure évaluation de France
Un problème s'est produit lors du filtrage des commentaires. Veuillez réessayer ultérieurement.
La question est fondamentale parce que cette hypothèse '- homme rationnel qui ne suit que son intérêt '- est au centre de la théorie économique classique et au cœur d'un puissant courant politique qui ne voit le salut que dans la « concurrence parfaite ».
Et le résultat est inattendu : dans un tel système le faible, notamment le petit groupe, tend à exploiter le fort, le nombreux.
Y aurait-il là une explication de la répartition des richesses dans notre société, sans recours à une quelconque « lutte des classes » ?
Un classique relativement facile à lire.
Meilleurs commentaires provenant d’autres pays
1) Critique of Marx (Ch. 4, primarily) Marxism *does not* come about through a class of people overthrowing bourgeois values. In practice, Marxism only happens when a tiny faction commits violence under (and against) a weak government. Marx is emotional, not rational; that emotion is ENVY (108). Marx is utopian and his “Theory of Everything” is just as riddled with holes as any other “Theory of Everything,” except more so, because Marx misunderstands both human nature and prices. Lethal for an economist.
2) Externalities (Appendix A and pp 48-49, 161) When common goods benefit only a minority within a jurisdiction, the goods will be provded (if at all) only to a less than optimal degree (171). The discussion of “political entrepreneurs” who bluster instead of bargaining is prescient (176).
This is my third time through this book (1992 and 1997 were the others) and it is interesting to see Olson’s theories hold up through different political/social cycles. The book was written in 1965, the Appendix in 1971. I could spend a week reading and thinking about just the footnotes in this book. Excellent analysis and cogent writing. Recommend!
William J. Baumol “Welfare Economics” p. 98
Joseph Schumpeter “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” p. 109
Olson's theory is applied to labor unions, corporations, and other pressure groups. Olson also has a critique of Marxian class theory which drives one more nail into the coffin of communism. The Logic of Collective Action is important because it explains so much about how real groups have functioned throughout history. Pressure groups date back to the ancient world, and Olson's theory fits very well with this experience.
Olson's ideas need further dissemination because most people get the special interest issue wrong. Most people recognize that pressure groups are often pernicious. But all too many people think that undue special interest influence is just a current phase that can be dealt with in a simple manner. This book indicates that we really should reconsider the role of government in society, especially at the Federal level. Olson is certainly not an anarchist, he insists that there are some things that government can and should do. However, the inevitability of special interest influence does make it impossible for government to function as many would like it too. Read this book along with Gordon Tullock's The Politics of Bureaucracy. Olson and Tullock enable us to make greater sense of world history.