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Mind and Cognition: An Anthology (Anglais) Broché – 10 janvier 2008
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Description du produit
Revue de presse
Shaun Nichols, University of Arizona
An enormously useful collection, including representative articles not only on the multitude of positions before and after the cognitive revolution , but also on topics such as the emotions, animal minds and distinctively perceptual content that have only recently begun to receive the attention they deserve. An ideal text for both introductory and graduate study of the many topics.
Georges Rey, University of Maryland
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Commentaires client les plus utiles sur Amazon.com
In the excerpt from Watson's Behaviorism, he states, "The behaviorist advances the view that what the psychologists have hitherto called thought is in short nothing but talking to ourselves. The evidence for this view is largely theoretical but it is the one theory so far advanced which explains thought in terms of natural science." (Pg. 14)
U.T. Place argues in his essay, "The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. The conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of the same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain the subject's introspctive observations by reference to the brain processes with which they are correlated. It is argued that the problem of providing a physiological explanation of introspective observations is made to seem more difficult than it really is by the 'phenomenological fallacy,' the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment." (Pg. 29)
Elliott Sober notes, "Functionalism began as a reaction against the identity theory. Functionalism's negative insight was that psychological properties are not type-identical with physical properties. Psychological state types are multiply realizable... But this claim about what psychological states are not had to be supplemented with some positive account of what the nature of psychological states is."
Paul M. Churchland [author of books such as The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain] summarizes, "Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conceptions of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience. Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience..." (Pg. 206)
Frank Jackson admits, "I am what is sometimes known as a 'qualia freak.' I think that there are certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes... There are many qualia freaks, and some of them say that their rejection of Physicalism is an unargued intuition. I think that they are being unfair to themselves. They have the following argument. Nothing you could tell of a physical sort captures the smell of a rose, for instance. Therefore, Physicalism is false." (Pg. 469)
This is an EXTREMELY useful collection, that will be "must reading" for anyone interested in the philosophy of mind, or perhaps for those primarily interested in related issues (e.g., cognitive neuroscience, artificial intelligence, etc.).