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John Stuart Mill

On Liberty and Other Essays (English Edition) Format Kindle

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This volume, containing Mill's "On Liberty", "Utilitarianism", "Considerations of Representative Government", and "The Subjection of Women", draws together the basic ideas of liberalism that, although radical in their time, have gained recognition as comprehensive and relevant fundamentals of government, economics, and logic. Since the publication of "On Liberty" in 1859, no other nineteenth century philosopher has delved so deeply into the implications of independence from the state and what it means to be truly free. The four works contained here are accessible texts that clearly delineate Mill's philosophies, the most remarkable of which are the basis for liberty as the sovereignty of man over his own body and mind, Mill's famous "Harm Principle," true and false democratic government, and equality of the sexes.

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978-1420934953
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Digireads.com
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2010
juin 24
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EN
Anglais
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Chapter One
Introduction

THE SUBJECT of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. A question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make itself recognized as the vital question of the future. It is so far from being new, that, in a certain sense, it has divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages; but in the stage of progress into which the more civilized portions of the species have now entered, it presents itself under new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment.

The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the Government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest, who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks, by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort, supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power. To the first of these modes of limitation, the ruling power, in most European countries, was compelled, more or less, to submit. It was not so with the second; and, to attain this, or when already in some degree possessed, to attain it more completely, became everywhere the principal object of the lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind were content to combat one enemy by another, and to be ruled by a master, on condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations beyond this point.

A time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way alone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage. By degrees this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party existed; and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself. That (it might seem) was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified with the people; that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of its tyrannizing over itself. Let the rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made. Their power was but the nation's own power, concentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise. This mode of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of European liberalism, in the Continental section of which it still apparently predominates. Those who admit any limit to what a government may do, except in the case of such governments as they think ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of sentiment might by this time have been prevalent in our own country, if the circumstances which for a time encouraged it, had continued unaltered.

But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation. The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French Revolution, the worst of which were the work of a usurping few, and which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made itself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of nations; and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as 'self-government', and 'the power of the people over themselves', do not express the true state of the case. The 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations 'the tyranny of the majority' is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.

Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant-society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it-its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit-how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control-is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should be, is the principal question in human affairs; but if we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed. The rules which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says, a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the first. The effect of custom, in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to himself. People are accustomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgement is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and his chief guide in the interpretation even of that. Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blameable, are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their reason-at other times their prejudices or superstitions: often their social affections, not seldom their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness: but most commonly, their desires or fears for themselves-their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest. Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots, between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and roturiers, between men and women, has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings: and the sentiments thus generated, react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of the ascendant class, in their relations among themselves. Where, on the other hand, a class, formerly ascendant, has lost its ascendancy, or where its ascendancy is unpopular, the prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the impress of an impatient dislike of superiority. Another grand determining principle of the rules of conduct, both in act and forbearance, which have been enforced by law or opinion, has been the servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their temporal masters, or of their gods. This servility, though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence; it made men burn magicians and heretics. Among so many baser influences, the general and obvious interests of society have of course had a share, and a large one, in the direction of the moral sentiments: less, however, as a matter of reason, and on their own account, than as a consequence of the sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them: and sympathies and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests of society, have made themselves felt in the establishment of moralities with quite as great force.
The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling, have left this condition of things unassailed in principle, however they may have come into conflict with it in some of its details. They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally. The only case in which the higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained with consistency, by any but an individual here and there, is that of religious belief: a case instructive in many ways, and not least so as forming a most striking instance of the fallibility of what is called the moral sense: for the odium theologicum, in a sincere bigot, is one of the most unequivocal cases of moral feeling. Those who first broke the yoke of what called itself the Universal Church, were in general as little willing to permit difference of religious opinion as that church itself. But when the heat of the conflict was over, without giving a complete victory to any party, and each church or sect was reduced to limit its hopes to retaining possession of the ground it already occupied; minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they could not convert, for permission to differ. It is accordingly on this battle-field, almost solely, that the rights of the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle, and the claim of society to exercise authority over dissentients, openly controverted. The great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his religious belief. Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves. One person will bear with dissent in matters of church government, but not of dogma; another can tolerate everybody, short of a Papist or a Unitarian; another, every one who believes in revealed religion; a few extend their charity a little further, but stop at the belief in a God and in a future state. Wherever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed. --Ce texte fait référence à l'édition kindle_edition.

Biographie de l'auteur

John Stuart Mill (20 May 1806 – 8 May 1873) was a British philosopher, political economist and civil servant. He was an influential contributor to social theory, political theory and political economy. He has been called "the most influential English-speaking philosopher of the nineteenth century". Mill's conception of liberty justified the freedom of the individual in opposition to unlimited state control. Mill expresses his view on freedom by illustrating how an individual's amelioration of personal quality and self-improvement is the sole source of true freedom. Only when an individual is able to attain such a beneficial standard of one's self, whilst in the absence of rendering external onerosity upon others, in their own journey to procure a higher calibre of self-worth, can true freedom prevail. Mill's attitude toward freedom and individual accomplishment through self-improvement has inspired many. By establishing an appreciable level of worthiness concerned with one's ability to fulfill personal standards of notability and merit, Mill was able to provide many with a principal example of how they should achieve such particular values. He was a proponent of utilitarianism, an ethical theory developed by Jeremy Bentham. He worked on the theory of the scientific method. Mill was also a Member of Parliament and an important figure in liberal political philosophy. --Ce texte fait référence à l'édition kindle_edition.

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ASIN ‏ : ‎ B003TU1OY4
Éditeur ‏ : ‎ Digireads.com (24 juin 2010)
Langue ‏ : ‎ Anglais
Taille du fichier ‏ : ‎ 1337 KB
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Nombre de pages de l'édition imprimée ‏ : ‎ 322 pages

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GEORGES-PICHOT Jean-Pierre

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Commenté en France le 1 novembre 2020

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Commenté en France le 5 janvier 2006

It is surprising to me how many people assume that 'On Liberty' was written before or during the American Revolution - Mill was certainly influenced by the spirit of American liberty, which was variously romanticised and adapted in Britain and Europe during the nineteenth century. Published in 1859, 'On Liberty' is one of the primary political texts of the nineteenth century; perhaps only the writings of Marx had a similar impact, and of the two, in today's world, Mill's philosophy seems (please note that I only said 'seems') the one that is triumphant.
One of the interesting ideas behind 'On Liberty' is that this may in fact be more the inspiration of Harriet Taylor (later Mrs. J.S. Mill) than of Mill himself; Taylor wrote an essay on Toleration, most likely in 1832, but it remained unpublished until after her death. F.A. Hayek (free-market economist and philosopher) noticed this connection. Whether this was the direct inspiration or not, the principles are similar, and the Mills were rather united in their views about liberty.
'On Liberty' is more of an extended essay than a book - it isn't very long. It relates as a political piece to his general Utilitarianism and political reform ideology. A laissez faire capitalist in political economy, his writing has been described as 'improved Adam Smith' and 'popularised Ricardo'. Perhaps it is in part the brevity of 'On Liberty' that gives it an enduring quality.
There are five primary sections to the text. The introduction sets the stage philosophically and historically. He equates the histories of classical civilisations (Greece and Rome) with his contemporary England, stating that the struggle between liberty and authority is ever present and a primary feature of society. He does not hold with unbridled or unfettered democracy, either (contrary to some popular readings of his text) - he warns that the tyranny of the majority can be just as dangerous and damaging toward a society as any individual or oligarchic despotism. Mill looks for a liberty that permits individualism; thus, while democracy is an important feature for Mill, there must be a system of checks and balances that ensures individual liberties over and against this kind of system. All of these elements receive further development in subsequent sections.
The second section of the text is 'Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion'. Freedom of speech and expression is an important aspect here. Mill presents a somewhat radical proposition that even should the government and the people be in complete agreement with regard to coercive action, it would still be an illegitimate power. This is an important consideration in today's world, as governments and people contemplate the curtailment of civil liberties in favour of increased security needs. The possibility of fallibility, according to Mill, makes the power illegitimate, and (again according to Mill) it doesn't matter if it affects many or only a few, people today or posterity. It is still wrong. Mill develops this argument largely by using the history of religious ideas and religious institutions, in addition to the political (since the two were so often inter-related).
The third section is perhaps the best known and most quoted, 'Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being'. It is perhaps a natural consequence of Enlightenment thinking that individuality over communal and corporate identity would dominate. Our world today goes back and forth between individual and communal identities (nationality, regionality, employment, church affiliation, school affiliation, sports teams, etc.). Mill's ideas of individual are very modern, quite at home with the ideas of modern political and civil individuality, with all of the responsibilities.
Mill states, 'No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions.' He recognises the increased limitations on individual liberty given that we do live in communal settings, but this does not hinder the idea of individuality and individual liberty, particularly as it pertains to thoughts and speech. Mill explores various ideas of personal identity and action (medieval, Calvinist, etc.) to come up with an idea of individuality that is rather modern; of course, this is political personhood that pre-dates the advent of psychology/psychoanalytic theory that will give rise to a lot more confusion for the role of identity and personhood in society.
The fourth primary section looks theoretically at the individual in community, 'Of the Limits to the Authority of Society Over the Individual'; the final section looks at specific applications. Mill discounts the idea of social contract while maintain that there is a mutual responsibility between individuals and community. Mill looks at the Temperance movements and laws as an example of bad laws (not only from the aspect of curtailment of liberty, but also for impractical aspects of enforcement); in similar examples, Mill looks at the role of society in regulating the life of the individual, calling on good government to always err on the side of the individual.
Mill puts it very directly -- Individuals are accountable only to themselves, unless their actions concern the interests of society at large. Few in the Western world would argue with this today; however, we still live in a world where 'thought police' are feared, and 'political correctness' is debated as appropriate or not with regard to individual liberties.
Mill wrote extensively beyond this text, in areas of philosophy (logic, religion, ethics). The particular text here includes other essays of interest: 'Utilitarianism', 'Considerations on Representative Government', and 'The Subjection of Women', and also has a useful bibliography and index. The essay on Utilitarianism is one of the more contentious works of Mill; the later two contain ideas well ahead of their time, and many parts can be seen at work in modern democracies.
This should probably be required reading in civics classes, if not in the pre-university years for students, then certainly in the early university years.

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Balthazar Burns

Photo frauduleuse

Commenté en France le 13 novembre 2020

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L'image fournie par Amazon laisse penser qu'il s'agit d'une édition Penguin, hors ce n'est absolument pas le cas. La couverture est floue, le texte imprimé en trop petits caractères, sur du papier blanc comme de l'ivoire. On est très loin des éditions Penguin.

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Dvorak

Déconseille fortement cet achat - do not buy !

Commenté en France le 26 juillet 2013

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Très déçu de cet achat.

Le livre n'est pas fait par un éditeur mais c'est amazon qui le fait imprimer (et ils ne le précisent pas sur internet) ! Et le résultat est très mauvais : police trop petite, pas de justification du texte.

Par exemple, les notes de bas de page ont été imprimées sans leur numéro à la fin des chapitres !

L'ensemble ressemble à un magazine de très faible qualité et est quasi illisible.

DO NOT BUY !

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Cody Allen

Personal liberty and societal prosperity is a balance

Commenté aux États-Unis le 23 novembre 2020

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Liberty is something we in the western world take for granted these days, and it’s important to remember that humankind was not always so generously geared towards personal autonomy. Published in 1859, Mill was at the forefront of political science and philosophy thinkers when he proffered his ideas on the subject. “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign,” he writes.

Once we move past this initial foray into the principles of liberty, Mill furthers his offered opinions. He warns us about the oppression of the ideals of the majority towards the minority. These ideas can be captivating, sometimes to the point of detriment. We can see it in society today, how so many of us find opposing ideas (especially political ones) truly intolerable. If we have progressed to a point in society where we accept other people’s religions and sexualities, why do we struggle so much to accept different ideological points of view? On this, Mill says that “There is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it.” I find this sentiment to be alarmingly true, and may we ring all the bells in the land with its message.

The truth is that there is a necessity for opposition to ideas. That is how shaky ideas become strong or how weak ideas are proven anemic. There is tremendous danger in relegating popular ideas to the forefront of public opinion and vilifying opposition. The best ideas are the ones that have continually stood the test of time, repelling opposition not with crushing force, but with uplifting power. For example, ancient tribes used to sacrifice human lives to the Gods for the hope of a better harvest. As civilizations grew, they eventually decided life shouldn’t be ended so simply. Death then became a punishment for wrongdoing, and over the course of centuries slowly transitioned from barbaric to (relatively) humane. Eventually, as a more modern society emerged, we came to condemn the taking of human life with more frequency, until now it is a rarity. History shows us that the acceptable reasons for ending a human life has been a debate for the entirety of humanity. The reason we live in a world today where you don’t lose your life for stealing a sheep is because enough people, over time, spoke up and said it was a bad idea, preferring alternative punishments. This is but an example of how different opinions on a single subject are required to continually clash and debate as to what is most correct. Here we see the good idea (valuing human life) winning over the bad (seeing human life as insignificant) due to the trials of time and ideological combat.

By today’s standards, much of what Mill writes would be considered Libertarian ideology. Basically, get the government and any oppressive bodies of influence out of the individual’s life. The only exception is when an individual would bring harm to another. This is where the government would have an obligation to step in, ultimately in the pursuit of a safer society for all.

One of the areas that becomes grey is the relationship between parents and their children. Parents have a moral obligation to raise their children to the best of their ability, but what happens if a man has no desire to be a part of his child’s life. Can society demand that he participate against his will? What about a contrary case study with a parent who is raising a child to be an abomination. Does a ruling body have authority to step in and violate the liberty of the parent on behalf of the wellbeing of the child? The answers are tricky and each scenario must be evaluated case by case. Even still, decisions made cannot be assured with one hundred percent certainty and approval from all parties. Hopefully, over time and continual debate, humanity will continue to get better at solving this age-old dilemma.

This balance between societal prosperity and personal liberty is constantly teetering back and forth. It is the crux at where we live. Something I think important to remember, phrased quite eloquently by Mill, goes like this: “In the human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception.” Essentially, if we want to keep our balance as a society, it is important to hear and understand people’s differing ideas. Only with this mutual respect for each other’s ideological liberties can we continue to move forward collectively.

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John Ferngrove

Should be taught in schools

Commenté au Royaume-Uni le 29 mars 2022

Achat vérifié

There has been much misplaced talk of the failure of Liberalism over the last decade or so, with the emergence of a rash of populist demagogues and more or less disguised dictators. But a return to the foundational primer of Liberalism provides a timely reminder as to why, of all political philosophies, Liberalism is the only one that deals in terms of what everybody needs; a certain amount of security and a certain amount of autonomy. All other political systems rely on the reification of dubious metaphysical entities such as Spirit, the Nation, the Will of God, the proletariat, and so forth. Only Liberalism pays close attention to the limitation of social power, All other systems exalt power in its negative and most inevitably corrupting form and provide the answers to all social issues in terms of yet more power.

This short book sets out the basic questions that any liberal political system must address. Not all liberals would necessarily agree with Mill's detailed recommendations, where provided. As a democratic socialist myself I'm not sure Mill would agree with all my own beliefs about social provision for distribution of wealth. And Mill does not attempt to set out detailed answers for all of the questions he raises. As over a hundred years of liberal practice has shown there are often no ironclad right answers to the nitty gritty questions that real life presents. But the questions and the analyses Mill provides are as fresh and as relevant today as they were in his own time.

Those of us who have been blessed with the great good fortune of having been born into liberal societies should wake up and acknowledge how precious our freedoms, are and resist wholeheartedly the relativism that tempts us to think that liberalism is just one system among several, and no better or worse than any other. Liberalism is the the politics of enlightened rationality that takes as its primary motivation the maximisation of the happiness of the many within the framework of the need for the maximisation of the happiness of all. All other systems aim at the maximisation of the happiness for some privileged group to the detriment of the remainder, or don't even regard happiness as a political value to be considered. ~On all rational grounds of measurement liberalism really is the best system.

Throughout, Mill as a person comes through as a Victorian hippy, passionately envisaging the flourishing of the individual, unshackled by conformity, within a flourishing society. I think I would have got on rather well with him.

This is one of those books that should be taught and actively debated in schools, perhaps in
a modernised form.

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T.A. Fisher

Powerful but also dense after chapter 1

Commenté aux États-Unis le 4 octobre 2022

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But on the flip side chapter 1 is the most powerful, I think. So you can get away with just reading that chapter. I very much enjoyed the first chapter of this book and think it should be required reading for anyone who believes in a democratic form of government. The other chapters got a little bit too much in the weeds for me. I'm sure for political theorists they are very engaging but they were too much for my little brain. The last chapter was a bit more engaging since it applied the concepts but even that went into the weeds.

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Kevin Currie-Knight

Bromwich and Kateb Edition is Very Helpful.

Commenté aux États-Unis le 19 janvier 2009

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I ihave read Mill's On Liberty three times now. The Bromwich and Kateb version is the most helpful, as we not only get to read Mill's essay, but 6 supplementary essays - two "introductions" and four sometimes critical "reinterpretations" by respected theorists.

Milll's basic point is simple: people should be left free to think and do as they please unless what they are doing causes actual harm to others. Mill's essay is spent both giving reasons for this principle, and exlporing what the principle means in practice.

He offers a plurality of reasons for his libertarian ideas, some utilitarian in nature and some based on (what some might call) natural law. Not only does freedom of action and thought encourage innnovation, keep public discussion vigorous, and lead to a more effective social network than government incursion, but people just-plain prefer directing their own lives to being directed from outside.

Mill gets into sticky territory, however, when he talks about the libertarian principle in concrete terms, as his distinction between what is private and what is public is often less clear than he might want. Should persons be free to tell others to do harm to themselves? Yes. Should parents be free not to educate their children? No. Should "vice-merchants" like bars, gambling parlors, and pornographers be free to conduct business without heavy government regulation? No. Should people be free to marry a plurality of spouses? If mormon, yes. If British, no.

My biggest criticism - and a criticism offered in Richard Posner and Jeane Bethke Elshtain's essays - is that Mill is all over the map when his principle is "put to the real world" because the distinction between public and private is just-plain fuzzy. Another interesting criticism, brought up in Elshtain's essay, is that Mill demonstrates a very unjustified bias in favor of experiment over tradition (where the former seems always presumed inferior to the latter).

In short, I like Mill's essay but see it as an edifice built on not-quite-solid sand. Mill relies on seperate categories, public and private, that are just not clear and distinct enough to be distinct. (While Dewey may have gone too far in the "all acts are social" direction, I think Dewey hit closer to the truth.) This is why the six supplementary essays in this edition are a nice touch.

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Eric W.

He brings in historical figures like Jesus Christ and Socrates

Commenté aux États-Unis le 28 décembre 2016

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John Stuart Mill writes about the Liberty’s that exist in society. He writes and discusses the Social and Civil Liberty. He asks and answers questions pertaining to the social and individual boundaries. In this persuasive piece, Mill defines what Liberties can be found in our societies.
On Liberty was written by John Stuart Mill. It was originally published in 1859, by J.W. Parker and Son. It is a short essay, about 100 pages, depending on what edition. During Mill’s time when people heard the word, liberty, they thought about John Locke. They thought about given liberties. However, Mill wanted to take a different approach to the term liberty. He wanted there to be a different interpretation.
Mill divides human liberties into three sections. The first section is Liberty of individual thought and opinion. He discuss that reality that not everyone thinks the same way. He brings in historical figures like Jesus Christ and Socrates, to reinforce his point that just because you think differently does not mean you’re wrong. The second section is Liberty if tastes and pursuits. This is planning your own life. This section discusses if people should be punished for acting on their own beliefs. While this seems like a cruel idea it is not. His point was if it causes a danger to others than the individual should be punished. He also develops his point of conformity in this section. While individuality is good, and sometimes conformity is good as well, too much of it can be a bad thing. The third section is Liberty to unite. He touched on this during the second section, however he goes into further detail here. If you conform to fit into a group, you are no longer being true to yourself. You will lose a sense of your individuality. You have to be able to find a balance between being an individual and conforming to a group.
In his essay, Mill was successful at getting his points understood. He used examples to further explain a topic. Also, he used allusions to influential individuals to bring credibility to his argument. Including these elements made it easier for people to understand his argument. For example, when Mill was talking about when people should be punished, he brought in the police. Having sampling adding in the word police, helps the reader understand what he is trying to say. If you think that the police will be summoned because of your action, then you should not do the action, or if you did do the action than you should be punished. He talked about Jesus Christ and Socrates actions. Most people know about them, but having them included in his argument brings credibility. People trust their religion, as soon as you mention their religion into the argument, people truly start to listen. The essay now pertains to them and they will read it thoroughly. Both of these techniques Mill used were very successful in getting his point across.
I would recommend this book to mature readers interested in philosophy. I liked how Mill did use examples and allusions to make it easier to understand for the reader. Also, I liked how he addressed John Locke’s view of liberty. It gave a comparison for the reader. Finally, I liked that he broke down his explanation into sections. This made the information, not as over welling to read. It allowed for the reader to read a section, absorb and understand the information before moving onto the next section.

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On Liberty and Other Essays (English Edition) Format Kindle