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How Big Banks Fail, And What to Do About It Relié – 19 novembre 2010
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A leading finance expert explains how and why big banks fail--and what can be done to prevent it
Dealer banks--that is, large banks that deal in securities and derivatives, such as J. P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs--are of a size and complexity that sharply distinguish them from typical commercial banks. When they fail, as we saw in the global financial crisis, they pose significant risks to our financial system and the world economy. How Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It examines how these banks collapse and how we can prevent the need to bail them out.
In sharp, clinical detail, Darrell Duffie walks readers step-by-step through the mechanics of large-bank failures. He identifies where the cracks first appear when a dealer bank is weakened by severe trading losses, and demonstrates how the bank's relationships with its customers and business partners abruptly change when its solvency is threatened. As others seek to reduce their exposure to the dealer bank, the bank is forced to signal its strength by using up its slim stock of remaining liquid capital. Duffie shows how the key mechanisms in a dealer bank's collapse--such as Lehman Brothers' failure in 2008--derive from special institutional frameworks and regulations that influence the flight of short-term secured creditors, hedge-fund clients, derivatives counterparties, and most devastatingly, the loss of clearing and settlement services.
How Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It reveals why today's regulatory and institutional frameworks for mitigating large-bank failures don't address the special risks to our financial system that are posed by dealer banks, and outlines the improvements in regulations and market institutions that are needed to address these systemic risks.
- Nombre de pages de l'édition imprimée160 pages
- LangueAnglais
- ÉditeurPrinceton University Press
- Date de publication19 novembre 2010
- Dimensions14.61 x 1.27 x 22.23 cm
- ISBN-100691148856
- ISBN-13978-0691148854
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- Éditeur : Princeton University Press (19 novembre 2010)
- Langue : Anglais
- Relié : 160 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0691148856
- ISBN-13 : 978-0691148854
- Poids de l'article : 255 g
- Dimensions : 14.61 x 1.27 x 22.23 cm
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In the academic literature on bank and bank failures, a bank simply fails or it does not fail. When it fails, it is either liquidated at a cost or it is bailed out by regulators. In some cases, there is the issuance of equity possible at time of liquidation but by and large it is ruled out based on arguments that equity issuance is very costly. The liquidation point is also assumed to be reached suddenly and abruptly. As a result, this literature is somewhat distant from the actual realities and complexities of how banks fail, what is the set of chain reactions that arises, why certain types of banks (such as broker-dealers) fail so swiftly, and why it is so hard to restructure them. For instance, it is often assumed that renegotiation of debt in models is infeasible or fully feasible (as it is with a monolithic creditor). But when one talks about banks, there are all kinds of counterparties involved with different bankruptcy exemptions. The stage is thus set right for someone to lay at the outset what the issues are in some detail, and what the possible solutions might be.
The book fills this important gap and in a manner that should interest not just academics but practitioners and policy-makers alike.
I liked in particular the following aspects of the book:
1. The beginning of the book with a simple case and narrative of how a large dealer bank may fail. The book breaks free from traditional banking views and clarifies at the outset that it is concerned with practical issues affecting failures of large, complex financial institutions.
2. The focus on unconventional regulatory mechanisms that deal precisely with the recapitalization of distressed institutions close to - but sufficiently before - distress is realized. Mandatory debt-for-equity conversions and forced deep-discount rights issues are examples of these mechanisms, justified in a cogent way and explained with a lucid exposition style.
3. The recognition that these mechanisms may not in all cases get triggered sufficiently in advance, or in the end be inadequate, and that therefore, prudential mechanisms are needed in good times to reduce the likelihood of distress and losses in some other ways. Centralized clearing of derivatives and greater liquidity requirements from dealers are examples of mechanisms proposed by the book to deal with these issues.
4. Throughout the book, there are nice examples, graphs illustrating size of certain markets that have grown significantly, and simple schematics that help understand technical market-specific concepts. They help streamline the discussion significantly.
Overall, I recommend the book highly. It is pithy, highly effective and on the central issue facing financial sector reforms today.